United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
JANET
BOND ARTERTON, U.S.D.J.
Defendants
Robert Capelli and Scott Bodnar ("the Defendants")
are each charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and
laundering of monetary instruments. Though neither was
present at the time of the challenged DEA search, Mr. Capelli
and Mr. Bodnar move jointly to suppress evidence seized
during the search of a private airplane. Oral argument was
held on January 17, 2019 regarding the Defendants'
standing to challenge the search of the airplane. For the
reasons that follow, the Defendants' Motion to Suppress
[Doc. # 153] is denied.
I.
Background
On June
29, 2017, a small private airplane flown by non-movant
co-defendant Donald Burns arrived at Sikorsky Airport in
Stratford, Connecticut. (Defs,' Mem. Supp. Mot. to
Suppress [Doc. # 154] at 4; Govt. Opp. to Mot. to Suppress
[Doc. # 156] at 3.) Upon landing, Mr. Burns was approached by
agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency conducting a
"ramp-check" of the plane pursuant to Federal
Aviation Administration authority. (Govt. Opp. at 3.) The
government contends that during this ramp check, Mr. Burns
admitted that there was "some marijuana" on the
plane and subsequently consented to a search of the plane by
the agents. (Id. at 4.) DEA agents searching the
plane found "16 large duffle bags, containing a total of
approximately 393 pounds" of marijuana. (Id.)
The
government alleges that Mr. Burns told agents that
"Robert Capelli was expecting the delivery of the
marijuana;" that the "marijuana was bought and
secured by Capelli from" a source in California and that
he had "made between 12 to 15 aircraft related trips
that have been organized and coordinated by Capelli,"
who tasked Mr. Burns with "fly[ing] the bulk quantity of
U.S. Currency .. . which is used to secure the purchase of
the bulk quantities of marijuana." (Id. at 5.)
Working with the agents, Mr. Burns then made contact with Mr.
Capelli and made plans to deliver the marijuana.
(Id.) At the time of delivery, both Mr. Capelli and
Mr. Bodnar were arrested. (Id. at 6.)
The
Defendants contend that," [w]hile the airplane was
solely registered to Mr. Burns," the plane was
"jointly own[ed]" by Burns, Capelli, and Bodnar.
(Defs.' Mem. at 3.) They claim that, along with "a
third individual," Capelli and Bodnar "purchased
the airplane with their personal funds and Mr. Burns was
making installment payments to Mr. Bodnar, Mr. Capelli, and
[that] third individual for the airplane." (Id.;
see Exhibit A (Affidavits of Bodnar and Capelli) to
Defs.' Mem. [Doc. #154-1].) Mr. Bodnar and Mr. Capelli
each claim separately that the "black duffle bags inside
of the aircraft on June 29, 2018 belonged to myself and two
other individuals" and that they "intended the
contents of the black duffle bags to remain private while
they were in the custody of Donald Burns." (Affidavits
at 1-2.)
Mr.
Capelli, Mr. Bodnar, Mr. Burns, and a fourth individual, Mr.
Terrell Givens, were subsequently indicted on a variety of
related charges.
II.
Discussion
Defendants
Bodnar and Capelli move jointly to suppress evidence obtained
during the search of the airplane as the fruit of a
"flagrant[] violat[ion] of the defendants' Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights." (Defs.' Mem. at
2.) The government argues that the Defendants lack standing
to challenge the search of the airplane.[1] (Govt. Opp. at
6.)
The
Fourth Amendment protects only those persons with a
"legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978). It is well established that "Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously
asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174 (1969). Therefore, only those who were entitled to
Fourth Amendment protections in the searched area - i.e.,
those who had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
- may seek exclusion of evidence seized there. The Defendants
bear the burden of demonstrating that they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area searched. See Rawlings
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (Defendant,
"of course, bears the burden of proving not only that
the search . . . was illegal, but also that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in" the searched
area.).
A.
Subjective Expectation of Privacy
First,
in order to challenge the search of the airplane, Defendants
must have '"exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy'" in the searched area.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (quoting
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
Defendants
argue that they did exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy in the airplane, and especially in the duffle bags,
given the "style of bag" and their decision to
transport the bags "us[ing] a trusted private
pilot." (Defs.' Mem. at 8.) Because the
"contents [of the duffle bags] could not be identified
without opening the bags," Defendants argue that
"it is evident that [they] intended to keep the contents
of the bag private." (Id.) The government does
not appear to dispute that Defendants manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy. (See generally Govt. Opp. at
7-13). Thus the Court finds that the Defendants' efforts
to conceal the inner contents of the bags did manifest their
subjective expectation of privacy.
B.
Reasonable ...