United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES [DOC. #39]
HON.
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Mayra Enid Yulfo-Reyes (“plaintiff”) has filed an
application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act [Doc. #39], along with an
“[a]ffirmation in [s]upport” of that application
[Doc. #40]. Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security (“defendant”) has filed a
memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's application [Doc.
#41], to which plaintiff has filed a reply [Doc. #42]. For
the reasons stated below, plaintiff's Application for
Attorney's Fees [Doc. #39] is
granted, in part, in the amount of
$12, 313.80.
I.
Background
On
December 18, 2009, plaintiff concurrently applied for
supplemental security income (“SSI”) and
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) claiming
that she had been disabled since September 18, 2007. See
Certified Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #16,
compiled on January 11, 2018, (hereinafter “Tr.”)
at 203; Tr. 215; Tr. 541-52.[1] Following a lengthy procedural
history which has spanned nine years and involved four
administrative hearings, an administrative remand, and a
prior remand by the district court, plaintiff, then
self-represented, filed the Complaint in this case on
December 6, 2017. [Doc. #1]. On February 8, 2018, defendant
filed her Answer and the official transcript. [Doc. #16].
On
April 19, 2018, the Court appointed Attorney John J. Morgan
as pro bono counsel for plaintiff. [Docs. #22, #23]. On July
19, 2018, and in accordance with the Court's April 19,
2018, Order [Doc. #22], plaintiff filed her Motion for Order
of Reversal, or in the Alternative Remand for Further
Proceedings (“Motion to Reverse”), along with a
supporting memorandum and medical chronology [Doc. #32]. On
September 17, 2018, defendant filed a Motion to Affirm the
Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #34], to which plaintiff
filed a Reply Memorandum on October 1, 2018 [Doc. #35]. On
November 8, 2018, the undersigned issued a Ruling granting
plaintiff's Motion to Reverse, and ordered a remand of
this matter for a calculation and award of benefits. [Doc.
#36]. Judgment entered on November 9, 2018. [Doc. #37]. An
Amended Judgment was thereafter entered on November 14, 2018.
[Doc. #38].
On
January 7, 2019, plaintiff filed an application for
attorney's fees together with an affidavit, assignment of
fees, and time sheet. [Docs. #39, #40]. On January 17, 2019,
defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's
application. [Doc. #41]. Plaintiff filed a reply to
defendant's opposition on January 24, 2019. [Doc. #42].
II.
Discussion
A.
Entitlement to Fee
A party
who prevails in a civil action against the United States may
seek an award of fees and costs under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA” or the “Act”), 28
U.S.C. §2412, the purpose of which is “to
eliminate for the average person the financial disincentive
to challenging unreasonable government actions.”
Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163
(1990) (citing Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883
(1989)). In order for an award of attorney's fees to
enter, this Court must find (1) that the plaintiff is a
prevailing party, (2) that the Commissioner's position
was without substantial justification, (3) that no special
circumstances exist that would make an award unjust, and (4)
that the fee petition was filed within thirty days of final
judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B).[2]
The
Court finds that plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of
28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B), and an award of fees may
enter. Defendant does not contest that point. See Doc. #41 at
1. Specifically, the Court finds that: (1) plaintiff is a
prevailing party because the Court granted plaintiff's
Motion to Reverse and ordered a remand of this matter for a
calculation and award of benefits; (2) the Commissioner's
position was without substantial justification; (3) on the
current record, no special circumstances exist that would
make an award unjust; and (4) the fee petition was timely
filed.[3] 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B). The Court
next turns to the reasonableness of the fees sought.
B.
Reasonableness of Fees Sought
Plaintiff
seeks fees in the amount of $16, 551.80, representing 80.65
hours of attorney time at the rate of $205.23 per hour. See
Doc. #39 at 1. Plaintiff's counsel generally asserts that
the fees sought are reasonable because the “case is a
highly complex appeal” and the record contains
thousands of pages. Doc. #39 at 1. Plaintiff's counsel
also contends that his work involved “detailed
analysis” and “extensive legal research[,
]” and that “the time billed substantially
underrepresents the work necessary (and actually done) to
represent the claimant properly.” Id. at 2, 3.
In that regard, plaintiff's counsel represents that such
time was not submitted to account for his
“‘learning curve' required to understand the
underlying legal predicate for plaintiffs claim.”
Id. at 3 (sic).
Defendant
does not contest the hourly rate sought, [4] but instead
asserts that “80.65 hours is excessive and unreasonable
for this social security matter.” Doc. #41 at 2.
Defendant also specifically objects to an award of fees for
time billed for clerical tasks; the time billed in connection
with the EAJA application; and the time billed in responding
to the Court's Order to Show Cause. See Id. at
8-9.
It is
plaintiff's burden to establish entitlement to a fee
award, and the Court has the discretion to determine what fee
is “reasonable.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,461 U.S. 424, 433, 437 (1983) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§1988, which allows a “prevailing party” to
recover “a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs”).[5] This Court has a duty to review
plaintiff's itemized time log to determine the
reasonableness of the hours requested and to exclude hours
“that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary[.]” Id. at 434. “Determining
a ‘reasonable attorney's fee' is a matter that
is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge.”
J.O. v. Astrue, No. 3:11CV1768(DFM), 2014 WL
1031666, at *1 (D. Conn. ...