information charging the defendant with violation of
probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to the court,
Markle, J.; judgment revoking the
defendant's probation, from which the defendant appealed
to this court.
M.G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender, for the
M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom
were Kevin D. Lawlor, state's attorney, and, on the
brief, Cornelius P. Kelly, assistant state's attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Prescott, Bright and Harper, Js.
defendant, DeShawn Tyson, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court revoking his probation and sentencing him to nine
years of incarceration. See General Statutes § 53a-32.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1)
improperly admitted into evidence details of his prior
criminal history, and (2) abused its discretion in concluding
that he was no longer amenable to probation and imposing the
entire period of incarceration remaining on his underlying
sentence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.
January 24, 2006, the defendant pleaded guilty to sexual
assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-70 (a) (1). The court subsequently sentenced him
to eighteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after
nine years, and ten years of probation. On March 1, 2013, the
defendant was released from incarceration and began serving
March 16, 2016, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a
warrant charging him with violating his probation.
Specifically, the state alleged that the defendant violated
his probation by, among other things, committing a forcible
sexual assault on May 6, 2014, on the victim at the Marriott
Hotel in New Haven. Following a violation of probation
hearing, the trial court found by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant had committed a sexual assault in
the first degree as alleged by the state and, thus, had
violated one or more conditions of his probation. The court
also concluded that the defendant posed a risk to the public
and would not benefit from an additional period of probation.
Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to the
remaining nine years of incarceration imposed as part of his
original sentence. This appeal followed.
defendant's claims on appeal do not merit extensive
discussion. With respect to his claim that the court
improperly admitted evidence regarding the details of prior
crimes he had committed, the defendant recognizes that
‘‘the Connecticut Code of Evidence does not apply
to proceedings involving probation. Section 1-1 (d) (4) of
the Connecticut Code of Evidence specifically provides: The
Code, other than with respect to privileges, does not apply
in proceedings such as, but not limited to the following . .
. [p]roceedings involving probation. . . . Furthermore, [i]t
is well settled that probation proceedings are informal and
that strict rules of evidence do not apply to them.''
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Tucker, 179 Conn.App. 270, 276-77,
178 A.3d 1103, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 917, 180 A.3d 963
(2018). ‘‘The evidentiary standard for probation
violation proceedings is broad.
. . .
[T]he court may . . . consider the types of information
properly considered at an original sentencing hearing because
a revocation hearing is merely a recon-vention of the
original sentencing hearing.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Megos, 176
Conn.App. 133, 147, 170 A.3d 120 (2017). All that is
necessary is that the information presented to the court is
relevant and ‘‘has some minimal indicia of
reliability.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Shakir, 130 Conn.App. 458, 464, 22
A.3d 1285, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 931, 28 A.3d 345 (2011).
We review a trial court's rulings regarding the
admissibility of evidence at a violation of probation hearing
for an abuse of discretion. Id.
the factual details regarding other offenses committed by the
defendant were plainly relevant to the court's
discretionary determination regarding whether it should
revoke the defendant's probation, impose a new sentence,
or continue the defendant on probation. Moreover, the
evidence of the details of his other crimes was probative and
had a minimal indicia of reliability because the defendant
himself testified to the details during cross-examination by
the state. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.
defendant's second claim is equally devoid of merit.
After concluding that a defendant has violated his probation,
the trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine
whether the defendant should be continued on probation, or
whether probation should be revoked and all or some of the
original sentence be imposed. State v.Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 185, 842 A.2d 567 (2004);
State v.Corringham, 155 Conn.App. 830,
837-38, 110 A.3d 535 (2015). ‘‘In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court's ruling; reversal is required
only where ...