United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE
BOND ARTERTON, U.S.D.J.
the Court's granting of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, (Ruling Granting Senior Philanthropy's Mot. to
Dismiss [Doc. # 104] ("the Ruling")), Plaintiff
moved for alteration of judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e),
effectively asking the Court to reconsider its Ruling,
(PL's Mot. to Amend [Doc. # 112]). For the reasons that
follow, Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment is
Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history of Plaintiffs claims,
set out in greater detail in the Ruling. Senior Philanthropy
moved to dismiss Counts Four, Five, and Six, i.e. all counts
named against Senior Philanthropy, (see Am. Compl.
[Doc. # 34]), of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff opposed
that motion, (PL's Mem. Opp. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss
[Doc. # 62]), which this Court granted in the Ruling on
December 8, 2017. Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion to
Amend on January 5, 2018.
One, Two, and Three of the Amended Complaint, against
Defendant 1 Burr Road Operating Company II, LLC
("BROC"), were later dismissed by stipulation.
(Stip. of Dismissal withPrej. [Doc. #116].)
Civ. P. 59(e) permits motions to alter or amend a judgment,
which must be filed "no later than 28 days after the
entry of judgment." "Rule 59(e) covers a broad
range of motions, including motions for reconsideration . . .
." Assoc, for Retarded Citizens of Conn. v.
Thome, 68 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1995). "The
standard for granting such a motion [for reconsideration] is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). The major grounds justifying
reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law,
the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Virgin
Atlantic Airways, Ltd v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956
F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992).
"a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the
moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already
decided." Thome, 68 F.3d at 553. "It is
well-settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating
old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing
a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second
bite at the apple'." Sequa Corp. v. GBJ
Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). "Rather,
'the standard for granting [a Rule 59 motion for
reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked.'" Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga
Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257). Novel legal arguments are
therefore not a proper basis for reconsideration under Rule
other arguments, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs Motion
"should be denied for the  reason that it raises
arguments that were not previously presented in connection
with the Motion to Dismiss." (Def.'s Opp. at 5.)
Specifically, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs arguments that
its complaint was "viable in light of §
52-592(a)" and that Defendant Senior Philanthropy
"could be liable for the conduct of co-defendant 1 Burr
Road Operating Company, II, LLC" are new theories which
were not raised by Plaintiff in response to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and are therefore improper grounds for a
motion to reconsider. (Id.)
review of Plaintiffs opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, it is clear that Plaintiff then raised neither of
the arguments he raises now. Plaintiffs Memorandum does not
include any arguments under § 52-592, nor does it argue
Senior Philanthropy's liability as a result of its status
as a successor company to BROC. (See generally
PL's Mem. Opp. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.)
appears not to dispute that his motion under Rule 59(e)
raises new arguments, arguing instead that Rule 59(e) motions
may also be granted "to prevent manifest injustice"
and urging the Court to consider those new arguments at this
stage nonetheless. (PL's Reply [Doc. # 121] at 3.)
Plaintiff argues for adoption of the approach of the District
Court for the District of Columbia, which held that judgments
may be altered under Rule 59(e) to prevent manifest injustice
where there is "at least (1) a clear and certain
prejudice to the moving party that (2) is fundamentally
unfair in light of governing law." Mohammadi v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F.Supp.2d 48, 78 (D.D.C.
2013). However, that same court acknowledged that "under
Rule 59(e), 'manifest injustice does not exist where ...
a party could have easily avoided the outcome, but instead
elected not to act until after a final order had been
entered.'" Id. (quoting Ciralsky v.
CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
in support of his argument that the Court's Ruling
produces manifest injustice, Plaintiff merely reiterates the
merits of his claims under § 52-592 and the harms
allegedly suffered as a result of Defendant's conduct.
(PL's Reply at 4 ("The Plaintiff remains unemployed,
unable to find new employment, and has been prejudiced and
deprived of the opportunity to pursue his claims against the
Defendant Senior Philanthropy, due to a technicality, which
he had pursued for years - this is the definition of manifest
injustice. Plaintiff has meritorious claims against the
the "standard for granting" motions for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) "is strict,"
Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257; because "Rule 59 is
not a vehicle for ... presenting the case under new theories
... or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the
apple'," Sequa, 156 F.3d at 144; and in the
absence of any "controlling decisions or data"
which were presented and which "the court
overlooked," Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257, the Court
declines to revisit its Ruling Granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.