United States District Court, D. Connecticut
JOHN P. BLANCHARD, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO REVERSE THE
COMMISSIONER'S DECISION (ECF NO. 18) AND MOTION TO AFFIRM
THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION (ECF NO. 19)
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Preliminary
Statement
The
Plaintiff, John P. Blanchard, brings this appeal under
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (hereinafter
“the Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
He challenges the denial of his application for Title II
Disability Insurance Benefits under the Act and requests a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision on multiple
bases. The Commissioner opposes the motion and avers that the
Commissioner's findings were appropriately arrived at and
are supported by substantial evidence in the record. She asks
this Court to affirm the decision. For the reasons set forth
below, the Plaintiff's motion to reverse the
Commissioner's decision is DENIED. The Defendant's
motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
The
Plaintiff sought a determination that he was disabled as of
March 22, 2010, the amended purported date of onset, through
the date of the hearing. A person is “disabled”
under the Act if that person is unable to “engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death of which has lasted or can
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). A physical or
mental impairment is one that “results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). In
addition, a claimant must establish that his “physical
or mental impairments are of such severity that [he] is not
only unable to do [his] previous work but cannot, considering
[his] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy …” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A). The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner
establish a five-step analysis for evaluating disability
claims. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142
(1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. First,
the Commissioner considers if the claimant is, at present,
working in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(I). If not, the Commissioner next considers if
the claimant has a medically severe impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the severity requirement is met,
the third inquiry is whether the impairment is listed in
Appendix 1 of the regulations or is equal to a listed
impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); Pt. 404,
Subpt. P. App. 1. If so, the disability is granted. If not,
the fourth inquiry is to determine whether, despite the
severe impairment, the claimant's residual functional
capacity allows him or her to perform any past work. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If a claimant demonstrates
that no past work can be performed, it then becomes incumbent
upon the Commissioner to come forward with evidence that
substantial gainful alternative employment exists which the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v); McIntyre v. Colvin,
758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). If the Commissioner fails
to come forward with such evidence, the claimant is entitled
to disability benefits. See Alston v. Sullivan, 904
F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990).
It is
well-settled that the District Court will reverse an
ALJ's decision only when it is based upon legal error or
when it is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d
1432, 1433 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive …”).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations omitted). The Court does not inquire as
to whether the record might also support the Plaintiff's
claims, but only whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner's decision. See Bonet ex
rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hether there is substantial evidence supporting
[the Plaintiff's] view is not the question here; we must
decide whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ's decision”) (emphasis in original). Thus,
“[e]ven where the administrative record may also
adequately support contrary findings on particular issues,
the ALJ's factual findings ‘must be given
conclusive effect' so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.” Genier v. Astrue, 606
F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Schauer v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982)). Once an ALJ
finds facts, the Court can reject those facts “only if
a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude
otherwise.” Brault v. Social Sec. Admin., 683
F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012).
The
ALJ's Decision
At step
one, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the claimed onset date,
March 22, 2010 through December 31, 2013, the date last
insured. At step two, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had
severe impairments, specifically, mild degenerative disc
disease, bilateral knee degenerative joint disease,
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and a
mood disorder. At step three, the ALJ found that the
Plaintiff did not establish an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
the listed impairments in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart 4, Appendix 1. At step four, the ALJ determined
that the Plaintiff had an RFC to perform a range of light
work. The ALJ placed limitations on this determination,
however, finding that the Plaintiff was limited to simple
routine tasks; should not work with the general public; and,
while he was able to work with others, the Plaintiff should
not do work that required frequent or extensive
collaboration. In light of these finds, the ALJ determined
that the Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant
work. At step five, the ALJ, crediting the testimony of the
vocational expert, determined that were a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that the Plaintiff could
perform. The ALJ therefore concluded that the Plaintiff was
not under a disability during the relevant period, from March
22, 2010, through December 31, 2013, the date last insured.
Discussion
At
issue in this appeal are the Commissioner's
determinations at step four and step five of the sequential
analysis. The Plaintiff raises five arguments. First, he
asserts that the ALJ violated the treating physician rule by
giving insufficient weight to opinions of the Plaintiff's
treatment providers and gave too much weight to the State
Agency medical consultants. Second, the Plaintiff asserts
that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record. His
third argument is that the ALJ did not give adequate weight
to the VA disability rating. Fourth, the Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ's evaluation of the Plaintiff's pain was
insufficient. Finally, the Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's
reliance, at step five, on the testimony of vocational expert
Jeffrey Joy. The Commissioner, in response, disagrees with
each of these assertions and avers that the ALJ's
findings are well supported by substantial evidence.
The
Court has reviewed the parties' submissions, the decision
of the ALJ, the transcript of the proceedings, and the
administrative record. The parties have filed a stipulation
of facts, submitted as part of the Plaintiff's brief,
which the Court incorporates herein. Additional references to
the record will be made as necessary.
The
Medical Opinions and Treatment Records
Pursuant
to the so-called “treating physician rule, ” the
Commissioner is to give controlling weight to a treating
physician's opinion when it is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R.
§404.1527(c)(2); see also Poupore v. Astrue,
566 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009). Where the opinion is
contradicted by other substantial evidence in the record, the
ALJ is entitled to use discretion in weighing the medical
evidence as a whole. See Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d
578, 587 (2d Cir. 2002). In resolving the amount of weight to
give a medical opinion, the ALJ should consider the examining
relationship; the treatment relationship, the length of the
treatment relationship, the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship; the evidence supporting the medical
opinion; consistency with the record; and specialization of
the medical source. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527 and 416.927. The ALJ must provide a reason for any
rejection of a treating source opinion. See Schisler v.
Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993).
Dr.
Schartel
Prior
to the hearing, the Plaintiff regularly saw Dr. Schartel from
August 2012 to May 2015. On April 22, 2013, Dr. Schartel
opined that the Plaintiff had “significant
interpersonal problems that would interfere [with] his
ability to get along [with] peers [and] supervisors.”
She opined that he would have an obvious or serious problem
performing work activity on a sustained basis”; an
“obvious problem performing basic work activities at a
reasonable pace/finishing on time”; and “a
serious problem using appropriate coping skills to meet
ordinary demands of a work environment.” She noted that
the Plaintiff's “symptoms wax and wane; when in a
mood episode, he has significant problems with selfcare and
utilizing healthy coping skills.” The ALJ gave little
weight to Dr. Schartel's opinions regarding the
Plaintiff's limitations. The Plaintiff argues that, in
doing so, the ALJ arbitrarily substituted his own judgment
for that of the Plaintiff's treating physician. He argues
...