Argued
December 11, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Hon. Stanley Novack,
judge trial referee; judgment dissolving the marriage and
granting certain other relief; there- after, the court,
Colin, J., granted in part and denied in part the
defendant's motion for contempt; subsequently, the court
granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion
to enforce the dissolution judgment; thereafter, the court
denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt, and the
plaintiff appealed to this court; subsequently, the court
denied the plaintiff's motion to reargue, and the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Krzysztof Wolyniec, self-represented, with whom, on the
brief, were Tara C. Dugo and Norman A. Roberts, II, for the
appellant (plaintiff).
Lavine, Alvord and Moll, Js.
OPINION
ALVORD, J.
In
these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Krzysztof
Wolyniec, appeals from the judgments of the trial court
rendered on several postjudgment motions filed by him and the
defendant, Marlena Wolyniec.[1] On appeal, the plaintiff claims
that the court erred by (1) ordering that the defendant may
continue to reside at the plaintiff's Darien residence
until he satisfies his acknowledged arrearage in unallocated
alimony and child support, [2] and (2) failing to find that the
defendant's motion for contempt as to the arrearage in
unallocated alimony and child support was barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches. We are not persuaded by either
claim and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The parties were married on July
3, 1993, and they have two children. On January 30, 2007, the
court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage.
The judgment incorporated by reference the parties'
stipulation of the same date (stipulation).
As to
family support, the stipulation provided that the plaintiff,
commencing February 1, 2007, was to pay to the defendant
unallocated alimony and child support in the sum of $10, 000
per month, until her death, remarriage, or until May 30,
2016, which date fell shortly after the parties' younger
child reached the age of eighteen. The plaintiff also agreed
to purchase a house in Darien (Darien residence) for the use
of the defendant and the parties' two
children.[3] The defendant agreed to vacate the Darien
residence on March 1, 2016, or six months following the date
the residence no longer served as the primary residence of
the defendant and a minor child, whichever shall occur
first.[4] The parties agreed that the
plaintiff's ‘‘obligation to pay for said
house is in the nature of alimony and as such is
modifiable.'' The parties further agreed that
‘‘[i]n accepting the amount of unallocated
alimony and support as provided for herein, the [defendant]
is relying upon the [plaintiff's] securing of this house
for her use and the use of the children. Should the
[defendant] not have the use of said home for herself and the
children, such fact shall be deemed a substantial change in
circumstances warranting modification of the unallocated
alimony and support herein.''
As to
the division of marital property, the stipulation provided
that each party would retain the property appearing on their
respective financial affidavits, the plaintiff would pay to
the defendant the sum of$400, 000, and the plaintiff would
purchase a new Volvo automobile for the defendant.
On May
6, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, claiming
that the plaintiff owed an unallocated alimony and child
support arrearage of $202, 146.25, and the plaintiff filed an
objection. On June 13, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for
contempt, arguing that the defendant wilfully remained in the
Darien residence beyond March 1, 2016, in violation of the
express terms of the stipulation incorporated into the
dissolution judgment.[5] On the same day, he also filed a motion to
enforce the judgment of dissolution; that motion asserted
many of the same facts as his motion for contempt and
requested that the court order the defendant to vacate the
Darien residence.
The
court held an evidentiary hearing on the parties' motions
on March 7, 2017. At the beginning of the hearing, the
parties introduced into evidence an ‘‘agreement
as to facts at hearing'' (agreement). The parties
recognized that the dissolution judgment required the
plaintiff to pay the defendant $10, 000 monthly in
unallocated family support commencing in February, 2007, and
ending in May, 2016. The parties further agreed that the
‘‘dissolution of marriage judgment was never
modified by the court.'' According to the agreement,
the plaintiff acknowledged that he owed $122, 145.25 in
family support arrearage. Attached to the agreement was a
yearly summary of family support owed and paid. The parties
further agreed that the ‘‘defendant was to vacate
[the] plaintiff's residence in Darien on March 1, 2016,
which she has not done. [The] [d]efendant currently resides
in the Darien home.'' Lastly, the parties agreed that
the defendant had paid for three years of tuition, room, and
board at Emory University for the parties' older
child.[6]
During
the hearing, [7] the self-represented plaintiff sought to
inquire of the defendant as to whether she was aware that the
plaintiff's income had dropped substantially in 2010. In
response to the objection of the defendant's counsel on
grounds of relevance, the plaintiff represented to the court
that the parties had reached, postjudgment, the following
oral agreement: ‘‘[W]e agreed that I will lower
the alimony payment for a period [un]til the older [child]
goes to college and then I'll cover all the . . . college
costs after the expiration of the agreement. And that was
precipitated by the fact that my income dramatically dropped,
and I was- otherwise I intended to file for
modification.'' The plaintiff further inquired of the
defendant whether it was true that the parties had entered
into such an oral agreement in 2010, although he described
the terms of the agreement differently, asking whether they
had agreed that he would reduce the unallocated support until
the older child entered college, at which time he would
‘‘return to paying-paying the full amount, and
then after the conclusion of the divorce decree I will pay .
. . for the last years of the older one's and the full .
. . college cost of the younger one.''
The
defendant gave various answers to questions asking whether
such an oral agreement existed, testifying:
‘‘[Y]ou have so many versions of all your
agreements through our relationship that . . . I lost track
with all your agreements''; ‘‘[i]t's
difficult to sift through what you say to me. You were
promising me lots of things through our . . . marriage and
after divorce. I cannot say what is true, what is
false''; ‘‘[i]t's difficult to say
that this is agreement because all our relationship is like I
do what you say''; and ‘‘[w]e agreed
about lots of things that didn't come up as a true, so at
the certain moment in my life I stopped paying attention what
you say. I just do . . . what is necessary to survive for my
kids and me until the moment that I can start working and be
independent person, and for my kids to go to college and be
independent. Until then-I cannot say that I agreed; you
forced me to agree about lots of things.''
The
defendant testified at the hearing that she did not have much
money left and did not have funds to pay for an apartment.
She testified that she would be able to move out of the
Darien residence if the plaintiff satisfied the support
arrearage.
Following
the hearing, on March 13, 2017, the court issued three
orders. With respect to the defendant's motion for
contempt, the court granted it in part and denied it in part.
As to the plaintiff's claim of an oral agreement
regarding his family support obligation, the court found that
‘‘[t]he credible evidence introduced at the
hearing is insufficient for the court to find that such an
agreement ever existed or, if it did exist, its specific
terms.'' The fact that the defendant waited to file
the motion for contempt, despite a period of the
plaintiff's failing to pay the family support order in
full, led the court to infer that the parties had some
discussion that impacted the plaintiff's decision not to
pay the full amount of support. Thus, the court found that
the plaintiff's noncompliance was not wilful and that the
defendant ‘‘failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff wilfully and
intentionally violated the alimony order.'' The court
ordered the plaintiff to pay the undisputed family support
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