WILLIAM PATTY ET AL.
v.
PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF WILTON ET AL.
Argued
November 14, 2018
Procedural
History
Appeal
from the decision of the named defendant granting the
application of the defendant Wilton Youth Football, Inc., for
an amendment to an existing special permit and for site plan
approval to allow the installation of an artificial turf
field at a school, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court,
Jacobs, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the
plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Paul
A. Sobel, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Matthew C. Mason, for the appellee (defendant Wilton Youth
Football, Inc.).
Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellees (named defendant
et al.).
Alvord, Bright and Bear, Js.
OPINION
ALVORD, J.
The
plaintiffs, William Patty and Eliot Patty, appeal from the
judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal from the
decision of the defendant Planning and Zoning Commission of
the Town of Wilton (commission), granting the application of
the defendant Wilton Youth Football, Inc., [1] for an amendment
to an existing special permit and for site plan approval to
allow the installation of an artificial turf field at the
Middlebrook School in Wilton.[2] On appeal, the plaintiffs claim
that the court improperly concluded that the commission's
approval did not include prohibited trailers on the property.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the only evidence in
the record before the commission was that the defendant's
application included trailers that were prohibited by §
29-4.C.9 of the Wilton Zoning Regulations (regulations). Our
review of the record reveals that the plaintiffs failed to
raise this claim before the commission, and, accordingly, we
decline to review it.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. Middlebrook School is located at 131 School Road and
is situated in an R-2A district. Schools are allowed in this
district by special permit. The school property includes an
athletic field, which is used for sports and other
activities. On May 6, 2015, the defendant filed an
application with the commission[3]to amend the existing special
permit for Middlebrook School ‘‘to allow the
renovation of the existing natural grass field to an
artificial turf field . . . .'' The defendant's
application also provided for the relocation of existing
field lighting and for the installation of new field
lighting.
The
commission held a public hearing on the defendant's
application that commenced on June 22, 2015, and was further
continued to July 13, July 27, and September 15, 2015. The
plaintiffs, owners of abutting property, were represented by
counsel at the hearing and vigorously opposed the
application. Several other individuals attended the hearing,
some speaking in favor of the proposal and others speaking
against it. Numerous exhibits were submitted to the
commission.
After
the public hearing was closed, the commission discussed the
application on September 15, September 28, and October 13,
2015, as evidenced by the transcripts filed with this court.
On October 13, 2015, the commission approved
‘‘the installation of an artificial turf field at
Middlebrook School, '' subject to certain enumerated
conditions, but denied ‘‘the relocation,
placement or replacement of new or existing permanent and/or
temporary lighting on the field site.''
The
plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, challenging the
defendant's standing to file the application with the
commission[4] and claiming that the commission's
approval allowed for the relocation and continued use of
outdoor storage trailers that are prohibited by the
regulations. The plaintiffs filed their prehearing brief in
support of their appeal on September 16, 2016, in which they
argued, inter alia, that the commission's approval
encompassed the defendant's use of prohibited storage
trailers. The defendant's response in its prehearing
brief filed on November 10, 2016, which was adopted by the
commission and the town, was as follows: ‘‘Based
on our review of the record, the legality of the
existing storage containers on the [p]roperty was not raised
before the [commission], only that they were unsightly, would
have to be relocated as part of the project, and the
[commission] [s]taff [r]eport suggested consideration of a
more ‘permanent solution.' '' (Emphasis in
original.) Additionally, the defendant stated that various
submissions to the commission indicate that the alleged
‘‘trailers'' were identified as
‘‘storage containers.'' Further, the
defendant argued that the containers did not fall within the
definition of ‘‘trailer'' set forth in
§ 29-2.B.166 of the regulations.
In
their reply brief filed on November 18, 2016, the plaintiffs
argued that the commission's staff report referred to the
containers as ‘‘storage trailers'' and
that the defendant's response to the staff report
likewise described the containers as
‘‘trailers.'' The plaintiffs did not
respond to the defendant's statement that ...