JOHN STRANO ET AL.
DARWYN AZZINARO ET AL.
October 17, 2018
to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Middlesex, where the court, Domnarski,
J., granted the defendants' motion to strike the
plaintiffs' revised complaint; thereafter, the court
granted the defendants' motion for judgment and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this
R. Williams, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Stephen P. Brown, with whom, on the brief, was Nicole R.
Cuglietto, for the appellees (defendants).
Sheldon, Elgo and Beach, Js.
plaintiffs, John Strano and Rider Strano, appeal from the
judgment of the trial court rendered after its decision
striking their claims sounding in intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which claims were brought against the
defendants, Darwyn Azzinaro, in his official capacity as
Essex Boy Scouts Troop 12 Committee Chairman, and the Boy
Scouts of America Corporation. The plaintiffs claim that
their revised complaint alleged facts sufficient to support
the conclusion that the defendants engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct toward them. We affirm the judgment of the
following facts and procedural history are pertinent to our
decision. The original complaint was brought by John Strano
on his own behalf and as the father and next friend of his
minor son. The plaintiffs alleged, in relevant part, that the
minor plaintiff, a scout in the Essex Boy Scouts Troop 12,
had been bullied by a fellow scout. After John Strano
requested that Azzinaro and other adult troop leaders
intervene to stop the bullying and John Strano attended troop
meetings to monitor his son's treatment, Azzinaro sent
John Strano a letter notifying him that the minor plaintiff
was no longer permitted to attend troop meetings or events,
because John Strano's presence at troop meetings
disrupted the group's functioning.
defendants filed a motion to strike the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient
to establish that the defendants had engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct. The court granted the motion to strike,
concluding that no reasonable fact finder could find that the
defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous.
plaintiffs filed a revised complaint, in which they pleaded
additional facts in support of their claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The revised complaint added
that the minor plaintiff had been diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder, which diagnosis qualified him for an
Individual Education Plan pursuant to Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and
that the defendants were aware that the minor plaintiff
required educational accommodations. The revised complaint
also described several instances in which a fellow scout had
bullied the minor plaintiff, as well as remedial actions that
the alleged bully's parents and the defendants had taken
in response to the bullying.
defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs'
revised complaint on the ground that it, like the original
complaint, failed to plead facts sufficient to allege that
the defendants had engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
toward them. The court granted the defendants' motion.
The plaintiffs did not file a new pleading within the time
allotted in Practice Book § 10-44. The defendants filed
a motion for judgment, which the court granted. This appeal
plaintiffs claim that the court erroneously determined that
no reasonable fact finder could find that the defendants'
alleged conduct had been extreme and outrageous and,
therefore, erred in striking their revised complaint. We
standard of review for granting a motion to strike is well
settled. In an appeal from a judgment following the granting
of a motion to strike, we must take as true the facts alleged
in the plaintiff's complaint and must construe the
complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its
legal sufficiency. . . . A motion to strike admits all facts
well pleaded. . . . A determination regarding the legal
sufficiency of a claim is, therefore, a conclusion of law,
not a finding of fact. Accordingly, our review is plenary. .
. . If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause
of action, the motion to strike must be denied. . . .
Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied ...