MARY DOE ET AL.
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTALHEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES ET AL.
Argued
December 10, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
to recover damages for the defendants' alleged violations
of the patients' bill of rights in connection with the
named plaintiff's treatment and confinement at a forensic
psychiatric hospital, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Litchfield and tried to the court,
Schuman, J.; judgment in favor of the defendants,
from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Lisa
M. Vincent, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Ralph
E. Urban, assistant attorney general, for the appellees
(defendants).
Elgo,
Bright and Moll, Js.
OPINION
BRIGHT, J.
The
plaintiffs, Mary Doe and her conservator Jane Doe,
[1]
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a
trial to the court, in favor of the defendants, the
Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services,
Connecticut Valley Hospital, and Whiting Forensic Division of
Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting). On appeal, the
plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that
the commitment of Mary Doe, as the only woman in an otherwise
all male maximum security unit at a forensic psychiatric
hospital, was not a per se violation of the statutory bill of
rights for psychiatric patients (patients' bill of
rights); see General Statutes §§ 17a-540 through
17a-550; and (2) applied the standard outlined by Mahoney
v. Len-sink, 213 Conn. 548, 565-68, 569 A.2d
518 (1990), to determine that the defendants' treatment
of Mary Doe while she was committed to the maximum security
unit had not violated her right to ‘‘humane and
dignified treatment'' under § 17a-542. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The
following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural
history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Mary
Doe was born in 1970, and she was raised by her great aunt
because her parents essentially were absent from her early
life. Mary Doe's childhood and adolescence were
‘‘chaotic, unpredictable, and dangerous, often
requiring intensive mental health treatment and
containment.'' She was raped when she was eleven or
twelve years old, and she may have been subject to another
incident of sexual abuse thereafter. Between the ages of
twelve and nineteen, Mary Doe committed physical acts of
violence against a male student, two teenage girls, and her
family members. She subsequently was diagnosed with
‘‘schizophrenia, paranoid type, '' and,
at age nineteen, she was admitted to Connecticut Valley
Hospital for the first time. Over the next twenty years, Mary
Doe committed seventy-nine reported assaults, some of which
were ‘‘very serious, '' involving
‘‘dangerous instruments, '' such as
‘‘knives, plastic utensils, a broken CD, and
broken radio antennae.'' In connection with these
incidents, Mary Doe was arrested numerous times
‘‘and then examined and treated for lack of
competency to stand trial.'' In 2007, Jane Doe became
Mary Doe's conservator.
Between
1992 and 2008, Mary Doe intermittently was committed to
Whiting, which is the only forensic psychiatric hospital in
Connecticut. Whiting has a capacity of
‘‘somewhere between [ninety-one] and 110
beds.'' While committed between 1992 and 2008, Mary
Doe ‘‘exhibited difficult behaviors such as
paranoid delusions, resistance to taking medications, poor
hygiene and lack of showering, making crude comments and
accusations about sex, urinating in common areas, throwing
liquids and other items, hoarding of items, and, at least at
one point, expressing a suicidal intent.''
In
2008, Mary Doe involuntarily was committed pursuant to an
order of the Probate Court and, consequently, she was placed
in unit 6 at Whiting on December 24, 2008. Unit 6 is a
maximum security unit with an approximate capacity of twelve
persons. Unit 6 is a ‘‘highly specialized section
for patients, '' like Mary Doe, ‘‘who had
a history of trauma, psychotic episodes, and serious
impairment. No other unit at Whiting could provide such
treatment.'' Her admission diagnosis included, among
other things, ‘‘schizophrenia, paranoid type,
post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline intellectual
functioning, type two diabetes, [and] seizure disorder . . .
.'' Mary Doe resided in unit 6 until January 30,
2011, when she was discharged from Whiting and began living
in Jane Doe's residence with supervision from the staff
of Community Systems, Inc. (Community Systems). After she
assaulted Jane Doe's husband and two Community Systems
staff members, Mary Doe involuntarily was committed pursuant
to an order of the Probate Court. Mary Doe then resided in
unit 6 from April 6, 2011 through May 18, 2012. Thereafter,
Mary Doe again was discharged from Whiting and, after
approximately four years, she returned to Whiting, where she
currently resides.[2] Mary Doe was the only female who resided
in unit 6 during the operative periods between 2010 and 2012.
On
April 23, 2013, the plaintiffs, pursuant to § 17a-550,
[3]
filed the present civil action against the defendants seeking
monetary damages. In the operative amended complaint, dated
June 15, 2014, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
were responsible for the ‘‘diagnosis,
observation, or treatment of persons with psychiatric
disabilities . . . .'' They also alleged, in relevant
part, that from April 25, 2010 through January 29, 2011,
[4] and
from April 6, 2011 through May 18, 2012, the defendants'
placement of Mary Doe in the otherwise all male unit 6, as
well as the defendants' treatment of Mary Doe while in
unit 6, caused the ‘‘dehumanization and
degradation'' of Mary Doe in violation of §
17a-542.
On
February 17, 2017, after a three day trial, the court issued
a memorandum of decision in which it rendered judgment in
favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs' complaint. The
court concluded that the placement of Mary Doe in the
otherwise all male unit 6 was not a per se violation of her
right to humane and dignified treatment pursuant to the
patients' bill of rights. The court also concluded,
pursuant to the standard set forth in Mahoney v.
Lensink, supra, 213 Conn. 565-68, that the treatment
of Mary Doe while she was confined in unit 6 was not inhumane
and undignified in violation of § 17a-542.[5] This appeal
followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
Before
turning to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, we
briefly set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘The
scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper
characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To
the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact,
our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were
clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws
conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide
whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and
find support in the facts that appear in the
record.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sun
Val, LLC v.Commissioner of Transportation, 330
Conn. 316, 325-26, 193 A.3d 1192 (2018); Hartford v.CBV Parking Hartford, LLC, 330 Conn. 200, 214, 192
A.3d 406 (2018) (‘‘[w]hether the trial court
applied the proper legal standard is subject to plenary
review on appeal''). On appeal, the plaintiffs do not
contest any ...