Argued
December 6, 2018
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried
to the court, Oliver, J.; judgment denying the petition, from
which the petitioner, on the granting of certification,
appealed to this court.
Deren
Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Nancy
L. Chupak, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and
David Carlucci, senior assistant state's attorney, for
the appellee (respondent).
DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Pellegrino, Js.
OPINION
SHELDON, J.
The
petitioner, William Betts, appeals from the judgment of the
habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, in which he claimed that trial counsel in his
underlying criminal prosecution rendered ineffective
assistance by giving him constitutionally inadequate advice
concerning the state's pretrial plea offer to recommend a
lesser sentence in exchange for his guilty plea to certain
charges, which he rejected before the start of trial. On
appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in
ruling that (1) trial counsel did not give him inadequate
advice concerning the state's pretrial plea offer, and
(2) he was not prejudiced by such allegedly inadequate advice
in connection with that offer. We disagree with both of the
petitioner's claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment
of the habeas court.
On May
19, 2005, the petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial,
of one count each of risk of injury to a child in violation
of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), sexual assault in
the third degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-72a (a) (1) (a), assault in the third degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-61, and interfering with an
emergency call in violation of General Statutes §
53a-183b, and of two counts of risk of injury to a child in
violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On July
12, 2005, the petitioner was sentenced on his conviction of
those charges, together with two resulting violations of
probation to which he had pleaded guilty, to a total
effective sentence of forty-three years incarceration,
execution suspended after twenty-three years, followed by
thirty-five years of probation. The petitioner appealed his
conviction, which was affirmed by our Supreme Court on March
18, 2008. See State v. Betts, 286 Conn. 88, 942 A.2d
364 (2008).
The
following facts, as described by our Supreme Court in its
decision on the petitioner's direct appeal, are relevant
to our disposition of this appeal. ‘‘On February
29, 2004, A.L., [1] the thirteen year old victim, visited the
home of T.H., her mother, as she did typically once every
other week. During that visit, A.L. and the [petitioner], who
was T.H.'s fiance´, watched television together in
the living room while T.H. slept in a downstairs bedroom that
she shared with the [petitioner]. A.L., who initially was
sitting on the floor, then moved to [lie] down on the couch,
at which time the [petitioner] put his hand in her shirt and
touched her breasts before moving his hand down to rub her
‘privates' with his right hand. A.L. told the
[petitioner] to stop touching her or else she would kick him,
and then started to bang on the floor to wake T.H. The
[petitioner] stopped briefly, but then lay on top of A.L. and
continued to touch her and grab her breasts with even more
force.
‘‘At
that time, T.H. entered the room, witnessed the [petitioner]
lying on top of A.L., and began to yell at both of them; T.H.
then ran downstairs intending to call the police. Thereafter,
an argument ensued between T.H. and the [petitioner], at
which point he called A.L. into the room and asked her to say
that nothing had happened between them. A.L. complied with
the [petitioner's] request and then left the room, at
which point T.H. and the [petitioner] started arguing again
about who was lying. At that point, A.L., who had overheard
the conversation, became angry, returned to the room and told
the [petitioner] to tell T.H. the truth. A.L. then told T.H.
that the [petitioner] had ‘rap[ed]' and
‘sexually harass[ed]' her.
‘‘T.H.
then went back down to the bedroom to call the police. The
[petitioner] followed her downstairs and began to choke, beat
and spit on her. A.L. also tried to call the police, but was
unable to do so because the telephone in the room was
disconnected. The [petitioner] then stopped choking T.H., and
she left the bedroom. At this time, A.L. gave T.H. a letter
that the [petitioner] had written expressing his sexual
desire for A.L. The [petitioner] then took the letter and hid
it in the bedroom that T.H. and the [petitioner] shared
before T.H. could read it.
‘‘Thereafter,
the police arrived at the house, and T.H. then gave the
letter to Robin Gibson, a Manchester police officer who had
responded to her call for help. Subsequently, the
[petitioner] was arrested and charged with numerous counts of
risk of injury to a child, sexual assault in the third
degree, assault in the third degree, unlawful restraint in
the first degree and interfering with an emergency
call.'' (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Betts,
supra, 286 Conn. 90-92.
The
petitioner commenced this habeas corpus action on December
11, 2014, challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel in
his underlying criminal prosecution. After a two day trial,
the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision in which it
made the following relevant factual findings. The petitioner
was represented at trial by Attorney Bruce Lorenzen. Prior to
trial, the state extended an offer to the petitioner that it
would recommend a sentence of twenty years incarceration,
execution suspended after eight years, followed by twenty
years of probation, reserving to the petitioner the right to
argue for a fully suspended sentence, if he would plead
guilty to the principal charges then pending against him. The
petitioner testified that during his discussions with
Lorenzen concerning the state's offer, Lorenzen had
explained to him each of the charges he was facing, the
elements of those charges, and the evidence that would likely
be adduced at trial to establish those elements.
The
petitioner also testified that Lorenzen had discussed with
him the terms of the state's offer and his own decision
whether to go to trial. He claimed that he had rejected the
offer because Lorenzen had told him that if he went to trial,
the worst case scenario he would face in the event of a
conviction would be a sentence of fifteen years
incarceration. Importantly, the petitioner testified that he
could not recall if Lorenzen had ever explained to him the
minimum and maximum sentences he could receive for each
offense with which he was charged. He expressed certainty,
however, that Lorenzen had never informed him of the maximum
exposure he would face if he were convicted of all charges
and given the ...