Argued
September 20, 2018
Procedural
History
Information
charging the defendant with the crimes of murder, criminal
possession of a pistol or revolver, stealing a firearm, and
carrying a pistol without a permit, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to a
three judge court, Kavanewsky, Pavia and E. Richards,
Js.; thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as
to the charge of stealing a firearm; judgment of guilty, from
which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Dina
S. Fisher, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, assistant state's attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's
attorney, and Emily D. Trudeau, assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Keller, Prescott and Harper, Js.
OPINION
HARPER, J.
The
defendant, Gregory L. Weathers, appeals[1] from the judgment
of conviction, rendered after a trial by a three judge court,
[2] of
murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a),
criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-217c (a) (1), and carrying a
pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes
§ 29-35 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1)
the trial court's rejection of his affirmative defense of
mental disease or defect was not reasonably supported by the
evidence and (2) the court erred as a matter of law in
deciding an issue without the aid of expert testimony. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
The
court reasonably could have found the following facts from
the evidence presented at trial.[3] On the morning of March 26,
2015, the victim, Jose Araujo, and several other individuals
employed by Burns Construction were installing an underground
gas main on Pond Street in Bridgeport. Fernando Oquendo, a
patrolman with the Bridgeport Police Department, was working
overtime duty at the construction site and had blocked off
Pond Street near Chopsey Hill Road.[4] Around the time in question,
Officer Oquendo had gone to retrieve coffee for the
construction crew, who were in the process of backfilling a
trench that had been dug along the side of the road. Matthew
Girdzis, one of the crew members, was seated in a dump truck
positioned near the trench. The victim was standing on the
driver's side of the truck speaking with Girdzis about
where they should dump the fill material.
While
the victim and Girdzis were talking, the defendant walked
into the work zone and approached the victim. Girdzis had
never seen the defendant there before; he was not an employee
of Burns Construction. The defendant greeted the victim with
a seemingly amicable ‘‘fist bump'' and
asked the victim whether the construction company was hiring.
The victim, in turn, relayed the question to Girdzis.
Speaking to the defendant directly, Girdzis suggested that he
go to the construction company's office downtown to fill
out an application and ‘‘see what
happens.'' By all accounts, there was nothing unusual
or remarkable about the defendant's demeanor during his
initial interaction with the victim and
Girdzis.[5] There was nothing to suggest that any sort
of argument or altercation ensued or that the defendant
harbored any animosity toward the victim or Girdzis. The
defendant did not appear to be acting strangely; he appeared
to be rational and to understand what was being said.
Following
this encounter, the defendant walked away, seemingly leaving
the work zone, but, in fact, he merely walked around to the
other side of the truck and stood near the passenger side
door. Meanwhile, Girdzis and the victim had begun walking
toward the trench. After a few seconds, the defendant looked
up and down the street and, seeing the street empty,
proceeded to walk back around the truck and reapproach the
victim. In a matter of seconds, the defendant, without saying
a word, removed a revolver from his pocket and shot the
victim several times. The victim ultimately died from gunshot
wounds.
Immediately
after the shooting, the defendant began running up the
street, zigzagging across it several times. Several of the
victim's coworkers chased the defendant on foot. The
defendant, seeing that he was being pursued, stopped
momentarily at a parked pickup truck and opened its door but
then quickly shut it again and resumed running up the street.
The coworkers continued chasing the defendant until he ran in
between two houses.
Members
of the Bridgeport Police Department soon arrived on the scene
and began canvassing the area. The defendant eventually was
located by Officer Darryl Wilson, who found the defendant
hiding in some tall bushes in a backyard. Wilson ordered the
defendant to show his hands, at which point the defendant
began to run. Wilson ordered the defendant to stop and again
demanded that he show his hands. The defendant complied. Upon
observing the revolver in the defendant's hand, Wilson
ordered the defendant several times to drop the weapon and
warned the defendant that he was prepared to shoot if the
defendant did not comply. After repeating this order, the
defendant dropped his weapon. Additional police units arrived
a few seconds later, and the defendant was arrested. As he
was being arrested, the defendant mumbled something to the
effect of, ‘‘it's all messed up'' or
‘‘I messed up.''
Following
his arrest, the defendant was led out from behind the house
and into the street, at which point Lieutenant Christopher
LaMaine heard the defendant state spontaneously that he had
been involved in a ‘‘labor dispute.''
When approached by LaMaine, the defendant again claimed that
there had been a ‘‘labor dispute.'' After
advising the defendant of his constitutional rights, which
the defendant waived, LaMaine questioned him. The defendant
seemed to have difficulty focusing, putting his thoughts
together, and answering LaMaine's questions fully, and,
at times, he rambled on incoherently, causing LaMaine to
suspect that the defendant either had a mental illness or was
under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP). Upon further
questioning, the defendant stated that the victim was a
foreman and was not ‘‘letting anyone out here
work'' and that he had shot the victim to settle this
dispute.
The
defendant subsequently was transported to the police station,
where he was interviewed by Detective Paul Ortiz and another
detective.[6] As Ortiz observed, there were numerous
instances throughout the interview where the defendant either
entirely failed to respond to questions or gave less than
responsive answers, and some of his statements seemed
disorganized. Given his interactions with the defendant,
Ortiz thought it was appropriate to have him evaluated at a
hospital for possible mental health or drug problems.
Nevertheless, the defendant appeared to understand the
detectives' questions. He admitted to shooting the victim
and expressed remorse for it. He stated that he had been
looking for a job and felt that the victim had
‘‘brushed [him] off.'' Following the
interview, the defendant was transported to Bridgeport
Hospital for evaluation and, the next day, was remanded to
the custody of the Commissioner of Correction. Additional
facts will be set forth as necessary.
The
defendant subsequently was charged with, inter alia,
[7]
murder, criminal possession of a firearm, and carrying a
pistol without a permit. The defendant elected to be tried by
a three judge court and raised the affirmative defense of
mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes §
53a-13 (a), otherwise known as the insanity defense.
‘‘This defense has both a cognitive and a
volitional prong. . . . Under the cognitive prong [of the
insanity defense], a person is considered legally insane if,
as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity . . . to appreciate the . . . [wrongfulness] of his
conduct. . . . Under the volitional prong, a person also
would be considered legally insane if he lacks substantial
capacity . . . to [control] his conduct to the requirements
of law.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Porter v. Commissioner of
Correction, 120 Conn.App. 437, 449-50 n.17, 991 A.2d
720, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 71 (2010). The
matter subsequently was tried to the court over the course of
two days.
In its
oral decision, the court rejected the defendant's
insanity defense and found him guilty of the charged
offenses. With respect to the insanity defense, the court
found that there was credible evidence that the defendant did
suffer from a mental disease or defect, specifically,
psychosis of an unspecific nature. Nevertheless, the court
determined that the defendant had failed to establish that,
as a result of his psychosis, he lacked substantial capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control
his conduct within the requirements of the law.
With
regard to the volitional prong in particular-the only prong
at issue in this appeal-the court found that
‘‘the defendant's mental disease did not
diminish his ability to conform his behavior. The
defendant's actions in shooting [the victim] were not
borne out of his psychosis. Simply put, he was acting out of
frustration and anger. The defendant was faced with a
multitude of stressful and emotional hurdles in his life not
of a psychiatric nature which motivated his actions that day.
. . . The evidence suggests that he made overtures for a job,
and when he was directed to make an application elsewhere, he
felt rebuffed and in his own words, felt that he had been
brushed off.'' The court further found that the
defendant had obeyed police commands and that
‘‘there was nothing remarkable, untoward or
aberrant about the defendant's conduct'' during
the police interview.[8] On the basis of these findings, the court
determined that ‘‘the credible evidence [did] not
support a finding that as a result of his mental disease, the
defendant lacked the substantial capacity to control his
conduct within the requirements of the law.'' The
court rendered judgment accordingly and sentenced the
defendant to a total effective term of imprisonment of
forty-five years. This appeal followed.
I
On
appeal, the defendant first claims that the court's
rejection of his affirmative defense of mental disease or
defect was not reasonably supported by the evidence. He
argues that the court improperly rejected his expert
witnesses' conclusions that he lacked substantial
capacity to conform his conduct within the law. He further
argues that the court made certain clearly erroneous findings
of fact.[9] We disagree.
As an
initial matter, we set forth our standard of review.
‘‘The evaluation of . . . evidence on the issue
of legal insanity is [within] the province of the finder of
fact . . . . We have repeatedly stated that our review of the
conclusions of the trier of fact . . . is limited. . . . This
court will construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the trial court's [judgment] and will
affirm the conclusion of the trier of fact if it is
reasonably supported by the evidence and the logical
inferences drawn therefrom. . . . The probative force of
direct and circumstantial evidence is the same. . . . The
credibility of expert witnesses and the weight to be given to
their testimony and to that of lay witnesses on the issue of
sanity is determined by the trier of fact. . . .
‘‘The
affirmative defense of mental disease or defect is codified
in . . . § 53a-13 (a) and provides that [i]n any
prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative
defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the
proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a
result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within
the requirements of the law. Whereas an affirmative
defense requires the defendant to establish his claim by
a preponderance of the evidence, a properly raised
defense places the burden on the state to disprove
the defendant's claim beyond a reasonable
doubt.'' (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Campbell, 169 Conn.App. 156,
161-62, 149 A.3d 1007, cert. denied, 324 Conn. 902, 151 A.3d
1288 (2016).[10]
To the
extent that the defendant challenges the court's factual
determinations, ‘‘[o]ur review . . . is limited
to whether those findings are clearly erroneous. . . . A
court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its
conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficient evidence
when there is no evidence in the record to support
it or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.'' (Citation omitted; emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Altayeb, 126 Conn.App. 383, 387-88, 11 A.3d 1122,
cert. denied, 300 Conn. 927, 15 A.3d 628 (2011).
The
following additional facts are relevant to this issue. In
support of his affirmative defense, the defendant presented
the testimony of two expert witnesses, David Lovejoy and Paul
Amble, both of whom produced written evaluations that were
admitted into evidence.[11]Lovejoy, a board certified
neuropsychologist hired by the defense, examined the
defendant on three separate occasions in July, September, and
November, 2015. Lovejoy also reviewed a variety of records,
conducted interviews with the defendant's wife and two of
his friends, and watched the video recording of the police
interview.
According
to Lovejoy, the defendant and his wife reported that in the
two years leading up to the offense, the defendant had been
experiencing multiple ongoing stressors. Lovejoy's
evaluation revealed that the defendant had lost his job as a
truck driver in 2013 and that he had remained unemployed
thereafter, despite continuing efforts to secure employment.
Following the loss of his job, the defendant began drinking
heavily, which resulted in criminal charges for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs. In January, 2015, the defendant, aware that
there was a warrant out for his arrest in connection with
these charges, turned himself in to authorities. The
defendant remained in prison until his wife was able to
secure a bail bond in March, 2015-shortly before the offense
in question took place. According to the defendant's
representations to Lovejoy, after his release from prison, he
began to worry about his family's finances and, over
time, started to ‘‘feel crazy'' and
experience thoughts of suicide. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)
According
to Lovejoy, ‘‘[i]nformation collected during the
clinical interviews with [the defendant] and the collateral
interviews with his wife and friends indicated that [the
defendant] began to decompensate psychiatrically, beginning
on [March 22 or 23, 2015]. Strange behaviors, disrupted
sleep, ruminative pacing, tangential and confused thinking,
and moments of appearing ‘spaced out' were observed
by those who were with him.'' The defendant's
wife also indicated to Lovejoy that she had observed the
defendant begin to espouse paranoid thoughts related to a
belief that she wanted to hurt or kill him.
Regarding
the defendant's conduct and state of mind later that
week, Lovejoy's interviews with the defendant revealed
that ‘‘[b]y the evening [before and/or morning of
the offense, the defendant] appeared to be under the
influence of strong beliefs that were not based in reality
(delusions).'' More specifically, the defendant
reported to Lovejoy that he had begun to believe that he was
receiving messages via flashing lights emanating out of his
computer screen. In Lovejoy's view, ‘‘[t]hese
beliefs had become a prominent part of [the defendant's]
clinical presentation, at that time.'' The defendant
also reported to Lovejoy that he had begun to hear voices
that made critical comments about him. He described these
voices as sounding like ‘‘me talking to myself
from the inside.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) The defendant further represented to Lovejoy that,
by the night before the offense, he had resolved to kill
himself because he ‘‘was tired of trying to get
[his] thoughts together and . . . wanted the voices to go
away, '' but he decided against doing it at that time
because he did not want his wife and daughter to have to find
his body in the house. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lovejoy's
interviews with the defendant further revealed that, by the
morning of the offense, ‘‘auditory
hallucinations, delusions and suicidal thinking were present
and appeared to be overarching influences on [the
defendant's] thinking and behavior.'' More
specifically, the defendant reported to Lovejoy that, on the
morning of the offense, he had believed that the flashing
lights from his computer screen were sending him a message
indicating, ‘‘[g]et your gun. You are worthless
and others are evil.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) The defendant reported that the message also had
indicated that he would receive additional messages from
lights outside of his home. The defendant reported that, by
this point, he had decided to kill himself at a local
cemetery. He further reported, however, that he came upon a
construction site displaying a range of colored lights that
were flashing at him and that these lights and the voices
inside of him told him to stop. ...