United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
STEFAN
R. UNDERHILL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In this
Social Security appeal, Reginald Keaton moves to reverse the
decision by the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denying his claim for disability
insurance benefits. The Commissioner of Social Security moves
to affirm the decision. Because the Administrative Law
Judge's (“ALJ”) determination was supported
by substantial evidence, I grant the Commissioner's
motion and deny Keaton's.
I.
Standard of Review
The SSA
follows a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.
Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam). First, the Commissioner determines whether the
claimant currently engages in “substantial gainful
activity.” Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 373
n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(b)). Second, if the claimant is not working, the
Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a
“‘severe' impairment, ” i.e., an
impairment that limits his or her ability to do work-related
activities (physical or mental). Id. (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521). Third, if the
claimant does not have a severe impairment, the Commissioner
determines whether the impairment is considered “per se
disabling” under SSA regulations. Id. (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526). If
the impairment is not per se disabling, then, before
proceeding to step four, the Commissioner determines the
claimant's “residual functional capacity”
based on “all the relevant medical and other evidence
of record.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), (e), 404.1545(a)). “Residual functional
capacity” is defined as “what the claimant can
still do despite the limitations imposed by his [or her]
impairment.” Id. Fourth, the Commissioner
decides whether the claimant's residual functional
capacity allows him or her to return to “past relevant
work.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e), (f), 404.1560(b)). Fifth, if the claimant cannot
perform past relevant work, the Commissioner determines,
“based on the claimant's residual functional
capacity, ” whether the claimant can do “other
work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 404.1560(b)). The process is “sequential,
” meaning that a petitioner will be judged disabled
only if he or she satisfies all five criteria. See
id.
The
claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove that he or she
was disabled “throughout the period for which benefits
are sought, ” as well as the burden of proof in the
first four steps of the inquiry. Id. at 374 (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)); Selian, 708 F.3d at
418. If the claimant passes the first four steps, however,
there is a “limited burden shift” to the
Commissioner at step five. Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). At step five, the
Commissioner need only show that “there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do; he [or she] need
not provide additional evidence of the claimant's
residual functional capacity.” Id.
In
reviewing a decision by the Commissioner, I conduct a
“plenary review” of the administrative record but
do not decide de novo whether a claimant is
disabled. Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r,
683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see
Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (“[T]he reviewing court is required to
examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence
and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be
drawn.”). I may reverse the Commissioner's decision
“only if it is based upon legal error or if the factual
findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole.” Greek, 802 F.3d at 374-75.
The “substantial evidence” standard is
“very deferential, ” but it requires “more
than a mere scintilla.” Brault, 683 F.3d at
447-48. Rather, substantial evidence means “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Greek, 802
F.3d at 375. Unless the Commissioner relied on an incorrect
interpretation of the law, “[i]f there is substantial
evidence to support the determination, it must be
upheld.” Selian, 708 F.3d at 417.
II.
Facts
Reginald
Keaton filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
benefits on June 10, 2014. ALJ Decision, R. at
44.[1]
In his application, Keaton alleged a disability onset date of
June 1, 2013. At the time of the alleged disability onset,
Keaton was 49 years old. Keaton identified his disability as
arthritis in back, left hand injury, dislocated shoulder,
neck problems, pain in left side due to stabbing, muscle
spasms in left leg, asthma, allergies, headaches, and high
cholesterol. Disability Report - Adult, from SSA, R. at 232.
The SSA initially denied his claim on July 17, 2014, and
again on reconsideration on September 22, 2014, finding that
Keaton's “condition [was] not severe enough to be
considered disabling.” T16 Notice of Disapproved Claim,
R. at 148.
Keaton
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on September 25, 2014, and a hearing was
held before ALJ Louis Bonsangue on April 27, 2016. ALJ
Decision, R. at 44. At the hearing, the ALJ questioned Keaton
about his conditions, work history, treatment history, and
ability to perform daily working and living functions. Tr. of
ALJ Hr'g, R. at 64-103.
Keaton
responded that he walked with a cane, but that he did not
have it with him the day of the hearing because he had
forgotten it. Id. at 71. Further, he testified that
his girlfriend handled laundry, cooking, shopping, and
cleaning his apartment because it “bother[ed]”
his back to “bend down too much[.]” Id.
at 74. Keaton stated that he did not drive. Id. at
71. He told the ALJ that he had “muscle spasms in [his]
back” and that, during the hearing, he could feel
“lower case and higher case pain from [his]
neck.” Id. at 81. Keaton told the ALJ that to
treat his back pain, he took “a lot of hot baths”
as well as Percocet. Id. at 81-82. He stated that he
had arthritis in his back, as well as “rotary cuff
damage” to his right arm, which impeded his ability to
lift boxes in his job while loading and unloading trucks.
Id. at 82. He testified that he had “a lot of
agony, and [] a lot of tingling” and that sometimes his
arm would fall asleep. Id. at 84. He also stated
that he could not lift anything using his arm because his
left middle finger would not bend, and he had difficulty
bending his left ring finger. Id. He also stated
that his right fingers would become numb and cramp up, and
pain would shoot into his arm and shoulder. Id. at
85. He first testified that his right leg cramped up, but
pointed to his left leg. Id. He then corrected his
statement and said that his right leg cramped. Id.
The ALJ
then heard testimony from Vocational Expert Renee Jubreys,
who testified that Keaton's prior work as truck driver
helper was considered heavy work; his past work as a
sandblaster was considered medium work; and his past work as
a carpenter was considered medium work. Id. at
90-91.
The ALJ
asked Jubreys to consider a hypothetical individual of the
same age, education, and experience as Keaton, who was
limited to performing medium exertion level work with the
following limitations: could frequently climb ramps and
stairs; never climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; frequently
balance, but only occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, or
crawl. Tr. of ALJ Hearing, R. at 91.
The ALJ
asked Jubreys whether that hypothetical individual could
perform any of Keaton's prior jobs, and she testified
that sandblaster was the only prior job that this
hypothetical individual could perform. Id. at 91.
The ALJ then asked Jubreys whether there were other
occupations that such an individual could perform. Jubreys
testified that the hypothetical individual could work: as a
hospital cleaner, with approximately 150, 000 jobs in the
national economy; as a cook helper, with approximately 265,
000 jobs in the national economy; and as a hand packager,
with approximately 45, 000 jobs in the national economy.
Id. at 92.
The ALJ
then changed the hypothetical, adding that the hypothetical
individual: would be limited to no overhead reaching of the
right upper extremity, which is also the dominant arm.
Id. at 93. With this additional restriction, Jubreys
testified that the hypothetical individual could still
perform work as a hospital cleaner, a cook helper, or a hand
packager, but could not perform work as a sandblaster.
Id. The ALJ then changed the hypothetical again,
adding that the hypothetical individual: would be limited to
frequent handling and fingering of the left upper extremity
as well. Id. at 94. Jubreys testified that the only
remaining job previously listed that the hypothetical
individual could perform would be the hospital ...