United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
Stefan
R. Underhill United States District Judge
In this
Social Security appeal, Anne Marie Didio
(“Didio”) moves to reverse the decision by the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying
her disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner of Social
Security moves to affirm the decision. I find that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not
sufficiently consider the opinions of Didio's treating
physicians and mental health providers. Therefore, remand is
warranted. Accordingly, I grant Didio's
motion and deny the Commissioner's.
I.
Standard of Review
The SSA
follows a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.
Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam). First, the Commissioner determines whether the
claimant currently engages in “substantial gainful
activity.” Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 373
n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(b)). Second, if the claimant is not working, the
Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a
“‘severe' impairment, ” i.e., an
impairment that limits his or her ability to do work-related
activities (physical or mental). Id. (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521). Third, if the
claimant does have a severe impairment, the Commissioner
determines whether the impairment is considered “per se
disabling” under SSA regulations. Id. (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526). If
the impairment is not per se disabling, then, before
proceeding to step four, the Commissioner determines the
claimant's “residual functional capacity”
based on “all the relevant medical and other evidence
of record.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), (e), 404.1545(a)). “Residual functional
capacity” is defined as “what the claimant can
still do despite the limitations imposed by his [or her]
impairment.” Id. Fourth, the Commissioner
decides whether the claimant's residual functional
capacity allows him or her to return to “past relevant
work.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e), (f), 404.1560(b)). Fifth, if the claimant cannot
perform past relevant work, the Commissioner determines,
“based on the claimant's residual functional
capacity, ” whether the claimant can do “other
work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy.” Id. (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 404.1560(b)). The process is “sequential,
” meaning that a petitioner will be judged disabled
only if he or she satisfies all five criteria. See
id.
The
claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove that he or she
was disabled “throughout the period for which benefits
are sought, ” as well as the burden of proof in the
first four steps of the inquiry. Id. at 374 (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)); Selian, 708 F.3d at
418. If the claimant passes the first four steps, however,
there is a “limited burden shift” to the
Commissioner at step five. Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). At step five, the
Commissioner need only show that “there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do; he need not
provide additional evidence of the claimant's residual
functional capacity.” Id.
In
reviewing a decision by the Commissioner, I conduct a
“plenary review” of the administrative record but
do not decide de novo whether a claimant is
disabled. Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r,
683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see
Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (“[T]he reviewing court is required to
examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence
and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be
drawn.”). I may reverse the Commissioner's decision
“only if it is based upon legal error or if the factual
findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole.” Greek, 802 F.3d at 374-75.
The “substantial evidence” standard is
“very deferential, ” but it requires “more
than a mere scintilla.” Brault, 683 F.3d at
447-48. Rather, substantial evidence means “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'” Greek,
802 F.3d at 375. Unless the Commissioner relied on an
incorrect interpretation of the law, “[i]f there is
substantial evidence to support the determination, it must be
upheld.” Selian, 708 F.3d at 417.
II.
Facts
Anne
Marie Didio applied for Social Security disability insurance
benefits on April 22, 2014, alleging that she had been
disabled since August 10, 2013. ALJ Decision, R. at 66. Didio
filed her disability claim based on her history of bipolar
disorder and bilateral knee replacements. See
Disability Determination Explanation, R. at 155.
The SSA
initially denied Didio's claim on August 4, 2014, finding
that although Didio's “condition results in some
limitations in [her] ability to perform work related
activities . . . . We have determined that your condition is
not severe enough to keep you from working.”
Id. at 165. In the agency's view, Didio was not
disabled. Id. Didio sought reconsideration, but the
SSA adhered to its initial decision on November 25, 2014.
Disability Determination Explanation (Reconsideration), R. at
184.
Didio
requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on February
4, 2016. Tr. of ALJ Hr'g, R. at 87. At the hearing, ALJ
Matthew Kuperstein questioned Didio about her employment
history, specifically asking her how much weight she lifted
at various prior jobs, what kinds of tasks her positions
entailed, and her reasons for ever being
terminated.[1] Id. at 100-01. Didio testified
that due to her mental illness she has difficulty retaining
employment. Id. at 102. “I can't work
because I process my thoughts very slowly . . . . I can't
multi-task, my concentration isn't that good, I jump from
one thing to another [and] I can't focus on what I'm
doing.” Id. The ALJ also questioned Didio
about her workout regime, her medications and their side
effects, and her daily activities. Id. at 103-08.
Didio acknowledged that she wants to work full-time but
“[e]very time I try to get myself on the right track,
it just falls apart on me.” Id. at 105.
The ALJ
then called a vocational expert, Jeffrey Joy. Id. at
115. The ALJ asked Joy to “assume a hypothetical
individual” with Didio's past work history.
Id. at 123. He asked Joy to further assume that the
individual was limited to light exertional work “that
involves only a frequent climbing of ramps or chairs, and
only occasional climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds,
kneeling, crouching or crawling.” Id.
“The individual would have a further limitation to,
work that could be learned within 30 days and was [] of a
routine or repetitive in nature.” Id. The work
would be limited to “a low demand environment without
[] strict time or productivity requirements.”
Id. Finally, the work would not require “any
constant, direct public contact, or [] team work. The
individual would be eluded to work with supervisors and
co-workers for routine work purposes where the interactions
are [] brief and superficial.” Id. at 124.
Joy
opined that “an individual with these
limitations” would not be able to perform work
previously performed by Didio in the national economy.
Id. Joy later stated however, that Didio could
perform other “light exertional level”
occupations under the same limitations described above.
Id. Those occupations included “housekeeper, .
. . mailroom clerk, . . .[or] a laundry and linen
folder.” Id.
Didio's
counsel then examined the vocational expert. She asked Joy to
consider a hypothetical person with the restrictions already
provided by the ALJ, who also “about 50 percent of the
time depending on the situation, is not able to carry out
very simple instructions.” Id. at 128. Joy
testified that there would be no work for such a person in
the national economy. See id.
On May
19, 2016, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he stated that
“[a]fter considering the record as a whole, the
undersigned is unable to find sufficient evidence to support
[Didio's] allegations of disabling mental and physical
impairments.” ALJ Decision, R. at 72. Thus, Didio
“ha[d] not been under a disability defined in the
Social Security Act, from August 10, 2013, through the date
of this decision.” Id. at 80. At the first
step, the ALJ found that Didio “ha[d] not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since August 10, 2013, the
alleged onset date.” Id. at 68. At the second
step, the ALJ found that Didio's “obesity, bipolar
disorder; obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and history of
bilateral knee replacement” were “severe”
impairments that “more than minimally affected
[Didio's] ability to perform basic work-related
activities.”[2] Id. at 69. At the third step, the
ALJ determined that Didio's impairments were not per se
disabling because Didio “d[id] not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that me[t] or medically
equal[ed] the severity of one of the listed
impairments.”[3] Id.
The ALJ
then assessed Didio's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), and found that she could “perform
light work . . . except that [she was] limited to frequent
climbing of ramps or stairs, but no more than occasional
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, kneeling, crouching
or crawling, ” and was “further limited to work
that c[ould] be learned within 30 days and [was] routine and
repetitive in nature.” Id. at 71. In addition,
she was limited to “to work that c[ould] be performed
in a low demand environment without strict time or
productivity requirements, ” and also limited to
“work that does not require constant, direct public
contact or teamwork, but she c[ould] have brief and
superficial interactions with supervisors and coworkers for
routine work purposes.” Id. Lastly, the ALJ
ruled that Didio was “limited to work that requires no
more than minor work adjustments in a stable setting and
routine.” Id.
Although
Didio's residual functional capacity rendered her
“unable to perform any past relevant work, ” the
ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering [Didio's] age,
education, [and] work experience . . . there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
[Didio] can perform, ” given her residual functional
capacity. Id. at 78. Therefore, the ALJ ruled that
Didio “ha[d] not been under a disability, as defined in
the [SSA], from August 10, 2013, through the date of this
decision.” Id. at 80.
Didio
requested a review of the ALJ's decision by the SSA's
Appeals Council on May 27, 2016. Request for Review of
Hearing Decision/Order, R. at 279. Finding that there was
“no reason . . . to review the [ALJ]'s decision,
” the Appeals Counsel “denied [Didio's]
request for review” on July 27, 2017. Notice of Appeals
Council Action, R. at 1. Didio filed a complaint with this
Court on September 13, 2017, requesting that I reverse the
Commissioner's decision, or remand for further
administrative proceedings. See Compl., Doc. No. 1.
III.
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