United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO REVERSE [ECF NO. 28] AND THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
AFFIRM [ECF NO. 34]
KARI
A. DOOLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The
Plaintiff, Lorilynn Saad, (“Saad”) brings this
administrative appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
She appeals the decision of defendant Nancy A. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,
(the “Commissioner”) denying her application for
disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”). Saad moves to
reverse the Commissioner's decision based on (1)
perceived defects in the Administrative Law Judge's
(“ALJ”) analysis at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process for assessing disability claims, (2) the
ALJ's purported failure to develop the administrative
record, and (3) the weight the ALJ afforded the opinions of
three psychologists in his decision The Commissioner opposes
each of these claims of error and moves for an order
affirming its decision. For the reasons set forth below,
Saad's Motion to Reverse is DENIED and the
Commissioner's Motion to Affirm is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
It is
well-settled that a district court will reverse the decision
of the Commissioner only when it is based upon legal error or
when it is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1433
(2d Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive. . . .”). “Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). The court
does not inquire as to whether the record might also support
the plaintiff's claims but only whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's
decision. Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523
Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013). Substantial evidence can
support the Commissioner's findings even if there is the
potential for drawing more than one conclusion from the
record. See Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114, 1120
(8th Cir. 2017). The court can reject the Commissioner's
findings of facts “only if a reasonable factfinder
would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Social
Sec. Admin. 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). Stated
simply, “if there is substantial evidence to support
the [Commissioner's] determination, it must be
upheld.” Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417
(2d Cir. 2013).
Factual
and Procedural History
On
March 4, 2013, Saad filed an application for disability
insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Act, alleging
an onset date of January 8, 2012. The claim was denied
initially on June 27, 2013 and upon reconsideration on August
30, 2013. Thereafter, a hearing was held before an ALJ on
March 24, 2015. On July 23, 2015, the ALJ issued a written
decision denying Saad's application.
In his
decision, the ALJ followed the sequential evaluation process
for assessing disability claims.[1] At Step 1, the ALJ found
that Saad had not been engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the claimed onset date. At Step 2, the ALJ
determined that Saad had a severe combination of impairments,
which included generalized anxiety disorder, depressive
disorder, alcohol dependence disorder, recurring left wrist
ganglion, and right knee patella bursitis. At Step 3, the ALJ
concluded that Saad's impairments, including her
substance abuse, met or medically equaled the severity of one
of the listed impairments in Appendix 1. At Step 3, the ALJ
was also required to determine the severity of Saad's
impairments without consideration of the substance abuse
disorder.[2] The ALJ concluded that if Saad ended her
substance abuse she would continue to have a severe
combination of impairments, but any such impairments would
not meet or equal the severity of one of the listed
impairments in Appendix 1. At Step 4, the ALJ concluded that
Saad would have a residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work, subject to certain
exceptions and limitations, if she stopped her substance
abuse. The ALJ further found that Saad did not have the RFC
to perform her past relevant work as a manicurist, even if
she ceased her substance abuse. Finally, at Step 5, the ALJ
concluded that there would be a significant number of jobs in
the national economy that Saad could perform if she stopped
her substance abuse. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Saad was
not disabled within the meaning of the Act. This appeal
followed.
Discussion
The
ALJ's Analysis at Step 5
Saad
raises two general challenges to the ALJ's analysis at
Step 5. First, Saad argues that the ALJ's hypothetical to
the vocational expert did not account for several of her
limitations and, therefore, was patently defective. Second,
Saad argues that the vocational expert's testimony
concerning the number of jobs available in the national
economy was inaccurate and, therefore, the ALJ erred by
relying on his testimony.
The
ALJ's Hypothetical to the Vocational Expert
Saad
argues that the ALJ's hypothetical to the vocational
expert was defective in three respects. First, Saad argues
that the hypothetical did not account for her recurring left
wrist ganglion or her right knee patella bursitis. Second,
Saad argues that the hypothetical failed to address the
extent to which off-task behavior or absences would be
permitted by an employer. Third, and finally, Saad contends
that the ALJ's hypothetical to the vocational expert,
which assumed that she could perform “simple, routine,
repetitious tasks, ” was defective because the ALJ
found that she has “moderate difficulties” in
concentration, persistence, and pace. The Commissioner
responds that the ALJ's hypothetical adequately accounted
for each of the limitations included in Saad's RFC, which
Saad has not challenged, and was therefore not defective. The
Court agrees with the Commissioner.
At Step
2, the ALJ found that Saad had recurring ganglion cysts on
her left wrist. After a surgery in March 2013, however,
Saad's condition improved. The ALJ acknowledged that Saad
re-injured her wrist in a fall in June 2013[3] but noted that
she received no significant treatment for her wrist after
that accident and had only “infrequent”
complaints regarding her wrist after that accident. After
June 2013, there was a gap in Saad's orthopedic records
until July 2014, when Saad injured her knee in another
slip-and-fall incident. The ALJ noted that, although Saad
reported continuing pain, her “medical imaging and
clinical signs were unimpressive and did not reflect
disabling limitations.” Moreover, by September 2014,
Saad was complaining of “only intermittent pain,
” “on examination her right knee was stable with
full range of motion, ” and she “reported no
mechanical issues.” Saad does not challenge any of
these findings, which are all consistent with the ALJ's
conclusion that Saad is capable of performing light work. The
regulations define light work as “lifting no more than
20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.967(b). Consequently, although the ALJ did not expressly
include Saad's wrist and knee impairments in his
hypothetical to the vocational expert, the hypothetical did
include the restriction to light work and therefore
adequately accounted for those impairments.[4]
Next,
Saad faults the ALJ for not addressing permissible off-task
behavior or absences in his hypothetical to the vocational
expert. As the Commissioner correctly observes, however, the
ALJ did not make any finding that Saad would be off-task or
absent to a significant extent, and Saad has not challenged
the omission of this limitation ...