Marino v. Statewide Grievance Committee

          Argued December 4, 2018

         Procedural History

         Appeal from the decision of the defendant's reviewing committee imposing sanctions on the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Robaina, J., dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.

          Barbara M. Schellenberg, with whom, on the brief, was David B. Zabel, for the appellant (plaintiff).

          Leanne M. Larson, assistant chief disciplinary counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Beth L. Baldwin, assistant chief disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (defendant).

          Alvord, Prescott and Eveleigh, Js.

          OPINION

          ALVORD, J.

         The plaintiff, Debra B. Marino, an attorney, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from the sanctions imposed by the reviewing committee of the defendant, the Statewide Grievance Committee, for violating rule 4.4 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.^[1] The plaintiff claims that the court improperly upheld the defendant's conclusion that the motion for a capias that she filed while representing a client in a family proceeding had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden the complainant, Melissa Mathison.^[2] We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

         The following relevant facts largely are undisputed. The plaintiff represented the complainant's former husband, Jeffrey Samoncik, in connection with postjudment proceedings following the dissolution of the Samonciks' marriage on April 24, 2009. In September, 2013, the complainant filed a motion to modify child support. On March 15, 2015, the complainant filed a self-represented appearance in the matter. A hearing on the complainant's motion for modification was scheduled for August 4, 2015. The discovery process in connection with the complainant's motion for modification had been somewhat prolonged and engendered communications between the plaintiff and the complainant that were sometimes strained. They exchanged a series of e-mails that addressed the issue of conducting a deposition of the complainant prior to the scheduled August hearing.

         The plaintiff noticed the complainant's deposition for July 7, 2015. On July 3, 2015, a marshal served a subpoena duces tecum on the complainant with respect to the noticed deposition. That same day, the complainant e-mailed the plaintiff and informed her that she would not be attending the scheduled deposition. The complainant's July 3, 2015 e-mail reads as follows:

‘‘Please find motions that were recently filed by me.

‘‘Please make note that I will be unable to attend a deposition on July 7. My resources are limited for child care costs.

‘‘In regards to the deposition items, 1-8 are erroneous requests as this information has been supplied to your office on more than one occasion and there are no new documents to produce. Items 9-11 are irrelevant requests and have no bearing on this case. I will be filing an objection to your deposition.

‘‘Have a great weekend.''

         A few minutes later, the plaintiff responded: ‘‘You will need to appear. I'm proceeding.'' The complainant immediately e-mailed the following response: ‘‘I will not be attending on the 7th. Proceed as you please.''

         On July 7, 2015, the plaintiff commenced the deposition for the purpose of noting on the record that the complainant had failed to appear. That same day, the plaintiff prepared and filed a ‘‘Postjudgment Motion/ Application for Capias/Civil Arrest Warrant.'' In her motion, the plaintiff made the representation that the complainant ‘‘was duly subpoenaed for a deposition [and] . . . failed to appear for said deposition in violation of a valid subpoena duces tecum and no motion to quash or for protective order was filed.'' In addition to requesting that the complainant pay for the costs of the subpoena, court ...