Argued
November 27, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
to recover damages for defamation and fraud, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, where the court, Wahla, J., granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Debra
Cohen, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Philip
Miller, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief,
was George Jepsen, former attorney general, for the appellee
(defendant).
Lavine, Keller and Beach, Js.
OPINION
PER
CURIAM.
The
self-represented plaintiff, Debra Cohen, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss
filed by the defendant, Patricia A. King. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding
that the doctrine of litigation privilege barred her action
sounding in defamation and fraud. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to our
decision. The defendant was the chief disciplinary counsel
for the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The plaintiff
was terminated from her position as a staff attorney for the
Office of the Probate Court Administrator following a
disciplinary proceeding conducted pursuant to the Connecticut
Judicial Branch Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual
Policy 612, titled ‘‘Corrective
Discipline.'' While the proceeding was pending, the
Probate Court Administrator notified the defendant of the
matter.
The
defendant then assigned an assistant chief disciplinary
counsel to investigate the matter. Thereafter, the defendant
initiated grievance proceedings against the plaintiff. A
reviewing committee issued a reprimand to the plaintiff. The
Statewide Grievance Committee (committee) and the Superior
Court affirmed the reprimand.[1]
During
the pendency of the grievance proceeding, the plaintiff filed
her own grievance complaint against the defendant. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's decision to file a
grievance ‘‘violated several sections of the
Practice Book, the duties and responsibilities of her office,
and the public's trust . . . .'' In response, the
defendant contended that the plaintiff's grievance
complaint was without merit. The grievance panel found no
probable cause and dismissed the complaint against the
defendant.
The
plaintiff then instituted the present civil action against
the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
‘‘published false and defamatory statements and
remarks about the plaintiff in her (defendant's) answer
to [the plaintiff's] Grievance Complaint [against the
defendant] . . . .''[2] The defendant moved to dismiss
the action on the ground of litigation privilege. The court
concluded that the litigation privilege barred the action and
granted the motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
The
issue presented is whether the court erred in concluding that
the litigation privilege extends absolute immunity to
statements made to the attorney disciplinary authority by an
attorney who is the subject of a grievance complaint. In
deciding a motion to dismiss, a ‘‘court must take
the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including
those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader . .
. . The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are
well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided
upon that alone.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186,
200-201, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). ‘‘Additionally,
whether attorneys are protected by absolute immunity for
their conduct during judicial proceedings is a question of
law over which our review is plenary.'' Simms v.
Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 530, 69 A.3d 880 (2013).
Connecticut
has long recognized the litigation privilege. See
id., 535-39. ‘‘[T]he purpose of
affording absolute immunity to those who provide information
in connection with judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is
that in certain situations the public interest in having
people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will
occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and
malicious statements. . . . Put simply, [litigation
privilege] furthers the public policy of encouraging
participation and candor in judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings. This objective would be thwarted if those
persons whom the common-law doctrine [of litigation
privilege] was intended to protect nevertheless faced the
threat of suit. In this regard, the purpose of the absolute
immunity afforded participants in judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings is the same as the purpose of the sovereign
immunity enjoyed by the ...