GARDEN HOMES PROFIT SHARING TRUST, L.P.
v.
ROBERT CYR
Submitted on briefs January 4, 2019
Procedural
History
Summary
process action brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Danbury, Housing Session, where the court,
Winslow, J., rendered judgment for the defendant; thereafter,
the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reargue, and
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; further
proceedings.
Thomas
T. Lonardo and Colin P. Mahon filed a brief for the appellant
(plaintiff).
Keller, Bright and Moll, Js.
OPINION
KELLER, J.
The
plaintiff, Garden Homes Profit Sharing Trust, L.P., appeals
from the trial court's judgment in favor of the
defendant, Robert Cyr.[1] The plaintiff claims that the court erred
by (1) concluding that the plaintiff lacked statutory
authority to proceed with the summary process action against
the defendant in the absence of Susan Scribner, the owner of
the mobile home where the defendant resides, (2) rendering
judgment in favor of the defendant after concluding that the
owner of the mobile home where the defendant resides was a
necessary party to the action, and (3) denying the
plaintiff's Practice Book § 11-11 motion to reargue
the court's initial decision to dismiss the
plaintiff's action. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
We
briefly set forth the procedural course of the case. The
plaintiff commenced this summary process action against the
defendant by writ of summons and complaint dated August 3,
2017. The complaint alleged that ‘‘[o]n or about
August 18, 2014, the defendant . . . took occupancy ofa
certain mobile home located at 68 Apple Blossom Lane,
Danbury, Connecticut, in the plaintiff's mobile home
community.'' The complaint also alleged that the
defendant ‘‘took occupancy of the premises
pursuant to approval from the plaintiff community owner,
'' and that the defendant ‘‘failed to
comply with the community guidelines . . . .'' In
particular, the complaint alleged that the defendant violated
the following guideline: ‘‘Activity that
threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment
of their residences by persons residing in the immediate
vicinity of the premises; and/or any activity that threatens
the health or safety of any onsite property management staff
responsible for managing the
premises.''[2] The complaint further alleged that despite
the plaintiff causing ‘‘notice to be duly served
on the defendant to quit occupancy of the premises on or
before July 21, 2017, '' the defendant
‘‘still continues to occupy [the
premises].'' Accordingly, the plaintiff sought
‘‘[j]udgment for possession of the
premises.''
The
defendant filed his answer to the plaintiff's complaint
on August 11, 2017, in which he indicated that he either
disagreed with or had no knowledge of the allegations set
forth in the complaint. He did not set forth any special
defenses.
After
one continuance was granted, the case was scheduled for trial
on October 16, 2017. That morning, the defendant filed
another motion for a continuance, which was denied by the
court. When the case was called, the defendant reiterated his
request to continue the case. He informed the court that he
was in severe pain and in need of medical treatment. The
plaintiff's counsel indicated to the court that he was
prepared for trial. While reconsidering the defendant's
request for a continuance, the court sought to clarify the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant. The
plaintiff's counsel indicated to the court that the
defendant is a guest of Scribner, the owner of a mobile home
who leases a lot in the mobile home community owned by
plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel further stated that
the defendant is neither a resident nor a tenant but was
approved by the plaintiff to ‘‘stay with
[Scribner] as a guest only.'' The court expressed
concern that the plaintiff might have ‘‘standing
issues'' because the plaintiff was seeking to evict a
co-occupant who neither rented directly from the plaintiff
nor owned a mobile home situated in the plaintiff's
mobile home park. The plaintiff's counsel indicated to
the court that he had filed a brief that day addressing the
court's concerns. The court then continued the matter for
one week and indicated that it would consider the issue of
‘‘standing'' at the next hearing.
On
October 23, 2017, the parties again appeared before the
court. At the outset, the plaintiff's counsel indicated
to the court that he was prepared to call two witnesses to
testify in the matter. The defendant, however, made an oral
motion to dismiss but stated no particular ground for his
motion. The court then questioned how the plaintiff could
seek to evict the defendant without also naming Scribner, the
mobile home owner, with whom the defendant resided. The
plaintiff's counsel argued that the plaintiff was not
trying to take possession of the mobile home but, rather, the
land underneath the mobile home. The plaintiff's counsel
indicated to the court that the plaintiff was seeking
‘‘possession of it as it pertains to [the
defendant].'' The court stated: ‘‘You
need to bring an action against [the mobile home owner] in
order to get the mobile home off the land. . . . [Y]ou've
got the land. But what you want to get rid of is the mobile
home that houses [the defendant].'' The
plaintiff's counsel responded: ‘‘No, Your
Honor, we want to get rid of [the defendant].'' The
court indicated that the plaintiff is unable to evict the
defendant without bringing an action against Scribner. It
then stated that the ‘‘[m]atter is dismissed as
to [the defendant].''
After
the hearing was over, the court went back on the record
without notice to and in the absence of the parties. The
court indicated: ‘‘I believe I misspoke a few
minutes ago when I stated that I was dismissing the case. I
do not think this is a matter of jurisdiction. And I want to
clarify that I am granting judgment to the defendant . . . on
the basis of lack of statutory authority to proceed on the
summary process action.
‘‘The
plaintiff has brought the action against a man who is neither
a tenant of [the plaintiff] nor [does it] own the mobile home
in which [the defendant] resides. So, [it is] not the owner
either.
‘‘[The
plaintiff] represent[s] that [it is] the [owner] of the land
on which the mobile home sits. But in order to evict . . . an
occupant of a mobile home that's not owned by [the
plaintiff, it has] to evict the owner of the mobile home as
well as the tenant[3] or at ...