January 10, 2019
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the
court, Hon. John F. Mulcahy, Jr., judge trial
referee; judgment denying the petition, from which the
petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
K. Garg, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant state's
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga,
state's attorney, and Emily D. Trudeau, assistant
state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Flynn, Js.
petitioner, Michael Holbrook, appeals from the judgment of
the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the
court improperly concluded that he failed to prove (1)
ineffective assistance of his prior habeas counsel, and (2)
that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence at his
criminal trial in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215 (1963). We affirm the judgment of the habeas
following facts and procedural history surrounding the
petitioner's conviction were set forth by this court in
our decision on direct appeal affirming the petitioner's
conviction: ‘‘John Fred Dean was shot and killed
inside a Bridgeport nightclub known as the Factory. The state
charged the [petitioner] . . . with Dean's murder. In
2003, the [petitioner's] first jury trial ended in a
mistrial. After a second trial, in 2004, the jury found the
[petitioner] not guilty of murder but found him guilty of the
lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree
with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §
53a-55a (a). The jury also made a finding that the
[petitioner] had committed a class A, B or C felony with a
firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-202k. The
trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict
and sentenced the [petitioner] to a total effective term of
thirty-five years incarceration.'' State v.
Holbrook, 97 Conn.App. 490, 492, 906 A.2d 4, cert.
denied, 280 Conn. 935, 909 A.2d 962 (2006).
June, 2007, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, which was denied by the court, T. Santos,
J., following a trial. On appeal, this court affirmed
the denial of the petition. Holbrook v.
Commissioner of Correction, 149 Conn.App. 901, 87
A.3d 631, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 952, 91 A.3d 464 (2014).
June, 2014, the petitioner, who was then self-represented,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter,
represented by counsel, the petitioner filed an amended
petition alleging ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel, Attorney Frank J. Riccio, for declining to call
Cherise Thomas as a witness; ineffective assistance of prior
habeas counsel, Attorney Michael Day, for failing to pursue a
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
Thomas as a witness; and the failure of the state to produce
exculpatory information to the petitioner. The court,
Hon. John F. Mulcahy, Jr., judge trial referee,
denied the petition. The court thereafter granted the
petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.
petitioner claims that the court erred in concluding that Day
did not render ineffective assistance for declining in the
prior habeas proceeding to pursue a claim that Riccio was
ineffective for failing to call Thomas as a witness in the
underlying criminal trial. We do not agree.
is well established that [a] criminal defendant is
constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal
proceedings . . . . This right arises under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and
article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . .
. As enunciated in Strickland v.Washington, [466 U.S. 668');">466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] . . . [a] claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel consists of two components: a performance prong
and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong . . .
the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney's
representation was not reasonably competent or within the
range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary
training and skill in the criminal law. . . . An ineffective
assistance of counsel claim will succeed only if both ...