United States District Court, D. Connecticut
STEVEN C. CLARK, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
REVERSE (ECF NO. 17) AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AFFIRM
(ECF NO. 18)
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Preliminary
Statement
Plaintiff
Steven C. Clark, proceeding pro se, [1] brings this
appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). He appeals the
Defendant Commissioner's decision denying him
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the
Act”) based upon a finding that he is not
“disabled” under the Act. He seeks an order from
this Court reversing the Commissioner's decision. (ECF
No. 17.) The Commissioner, on the other hand, asks this Court
to affirm the decision. (ECF No. 18.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Plaintiff's motion is
DENIED. The Defendant Commissioner's
motion is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
The
Plaintiff sought a determination that he was disabled as of
March 18, 2013, the purported date of onset, through the date
of the hearing. A person is “disabled” under the
Act if that person is unable to “engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). A physical or
mental impairment is one that “results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3). In
addition, a claimant must establish that his “physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
[he] is not only unable to do [his] previous work but cannot,
considering [hi] age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy .... ” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis
to which an ALJ must adhere when evaluating disability
claims. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In brief, the five
steps are as follows: (1) the Commissioner determines whether
the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner determines whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if such a “severe impairment” is
established, the Commissioner next determines whether the
medical evidence establishes that the claimant's
impairment “meets or equals” an impairment listed
in Appendix 1 of the regulations; (4) if the claimant does
not establish the “meets or equals” requirement,
the Commissioner must then determine the claimant's
residual functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”)
to perform his or her past work; and (5) if the claimant is
unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner must
next determine whether there is other work in the national
economy which the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). The claimant bears the burden of proof
with respect to steps one through four. See Burgess v.
Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). The
Commissioner bears the burden as to step five, that is,
finding the existence of work in the national economy that
the claimant can perform. See McIntyre v. Colvin,
758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014).
The
fourth sentence of Section 405(g) of the Act provides that a
“[c]ourt shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings
and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner...,
with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). It is well-settled that the district
court will reverse an ALJ's decision only when it is
based upon legal error or when it is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. See Beauvoir v.
Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1433 (2d Cir. 1997); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .”).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations omitted). The Court does not inquire as
to whether the record might also support the Plaintiff's
claims, but only whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner's decision. See Selian v.
Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (“If
there is substantial evidence to support the [agency's]
determination, it must be upheld”).
The
ALJ's Decision
At step
one, although there was some evidence in the record that the
Plaintiff had worked after the onset date, the ALJ gave him
the benefit of the doubt and determined that any work
activity did not rise to the level of substantial gainful
activity after March 18, 2013. At step two, the ALJ found
that the Plaintiff had severe impairments, specifically,
osteoarthritis and allied disorders, knee pain/arthritis, and
disorder of muscle, ligament, and fascia. At step three, the
ALJ found that the Plaintiff did not establish an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of the listed impairments in the regulations at
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Specifically, the
ALJ determined that the Plaintiff did not meet listing 1.02,
which addresses major joint dysfunction, in that the
Plaintiff did not establish that he is unable to ambulate
effectively or unable to perform fine and gross movements
effectively. At step four, the ALJ determined that the
Plaintiff had an RFC “to perform light work, ” as
defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.967(b), “except sit and stand
at his job at his leisure, .… [and] the individual
should never climb ramps and stairs, never climb ropes,
ladders, and scaffolds, only occasionally balance, never
stoop, crouch, kneel or crawl, only occasionally handle and
finger bilaterally, … only occasionally use his hands
to grab or use his fingers to do fine manipulation.” In
view of these findings, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff
was “unable to perform any past relevant work.”
At step five, the ALJ, crediting the testimony of the
vocational expert, determined that there are a significant
number of jobs in the national economy that the Plaintiff
could perform. The ALJ therefore concluded that the Plaintiff
was not disabled on March 18, 2013, or at any time
thereafter, through the date of the hearing.
This
appeal followed. The Plaintiff asserts that he met his burden
at each stage of the sequential analysis and identifies those
parts of the record which support his disability claim. At
its core, the Plaintiff's argument is a factual
disagreement with the ALJ's findings and determination
that the Plaintiff is not disabled. As such, the Court
construes his claim as one challenging the existence of
substantial evidence in the record to support the
Commissioner's findings, and the Court examines the ALJ
decision under the standards set forth above.
Discussion
Because,
at step one, the ALJ gave the Plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt and determined that he had not been engaged in
substantial gainful activity after the onset date, the
Plaintiff's argument on this issue need not be addressed.
At step
two, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had several severe
impairments, to include osteoarthritis and related disorders,
knee pain/arthritis, disorder of muscle, ligament and fascia.
The Plaintiff asserts, however, that he also suffers from
dyspnea. The Plaintiff had an episode of dyspnea, or
shortness of breath, with chest pain in June 2011, almost two
years before the onset date. He was treated in the emergency
room at UConn Health Center. The records reflect that his
chest examination was normal; his respiration was normal; and
he had normal strength and range of motion in his
extremities. A CT scan of the chest also revealed normal
results. The Plaintiff was discharged with a diagnosis of
dyspnea nonspecific and chest pain. No. underlying condition
was revealed, and he was provided no additional treatment
recommendations other than to follow up with his primary care
physician if the symptoms returned. The ALJ's
determination not to include dyspnea as an impairment, let
alone a severe impairment, is therefore supported by
substantial evidence.
At step
three, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff's
impairments did not meet the 1.02 listing criteria for major
joint dysfunction insofar as the Plaintiff failed to
establish that he is unable to ambulate effectively. The
Plaintiff asserts that he has osteoarthritis in his knees;
that he saw Dr. Collins for “not being able to walk
properly”; and that Dr. Collins prescribed a cane. The
Plaintiff simply disagrees with the ALJ as ...