United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Gladys Feliciano Velez (“plaintiff”), brings this
appeal under §205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g),
seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner” or “defendant”)
denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under the Act. Plaintiff has moved for an
order reversing the decision of the Commissioner. [Doc. #24].
Defendant has filed a cross-motion seeking an order affirming
the decision of the Commissioner. [Doc. #26].
reasons set forth below, defendant's Motion for an Order
Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [Doc.
#26] is GRANTED, and
plaintiff's Motion for Order Reversing the Decision of
the Commissioner [Doc. #24] is
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
filed an application for DIB on January 14, 2015, alleging
disability beginning January 1, 1999. See Certified
Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #19, compiled
on August 9, 2018, (hereinafter “Tr.”) at 220-26.
Plaintiff later amended her alleged onset date to June 30,
2013. See Tr. 42.Plaintiff's application was denied
initially on June 30, 2015, see Tr. 95-98, and upon
reconsideration on November 5, 2015, see Tr. 101-03.
the denial of plaintiff's application, on October 5,
2017, plaintiff, represented by Attorney Kerin M. Woods,
appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Ryan A. Alger. See Tr.
38-60. Plaintiff testified with the assistance of
a Spanish-language interpreter. See Tr. 40. Vocational Expert
(“VE”) Hank Lerner also testified at the hearing.
See Tr. 55-59; see also Tr. 408-13. On
November 1, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.
See Tr. 9-30. On May 10, 2018, the Appeals Council
denied plaintiff's request for review, thereby making the
ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
See Tr. 1-8. The case is now ripe for review under
42 U.S.C. §405(g).
timely filed this action for review. See Doc. #1. She now
moves to reverse the Commissioner's decision. [Doc. #24].
On appeal, plaintiff argues:
1. The ALJ erred when determining plaintiff's Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”);
2. The ALJ erred when assessing plaintiff's credibility;
3. The ALJ's step four findings are not supported by
See generally Doc. #24-1. As set forth below, the
Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence and there is no reversible error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
review of a Social Security disability determination involves
two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles
in making the determination. Second, the Court must
decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d
75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Substantial
evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a
“mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing
court's responsibility is to ensure that a claim has been
fairly evaluated by the ALJ. See Grey v. Heckler,
721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
Court does not reach the second stage of review - evaluating
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
conclusion - if the Court determines that the ALJ failed to
apply the law correctly. See Norman v. Astrue, 912
F.Supp.2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Court first
reviews the Commissioner's decision for compliance with
the correct legal standards; only then does it determine
whether the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence.” (citing Tejada v.
Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999))).
“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the
substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no
disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will
be deprived of the right to have her disability determination
made according to the correct legal principles.”
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).
crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with
sufficient specificity to enable [a reviewing court] to
decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582,
587 (2d Cir. 1984) (alterations added) (citing Treadwell
v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983)). The ALJ
is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, but
a “finding that the witness is not credible must
nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to
permit intelligible plenary review of the record.”
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255,
260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Carroll v. Sec. Health and
Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983)).
“Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on
the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to
enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial
evidence exists to support that finding.” Johnston
v. Colvin, No. 3:13CV00073(JCH), 2014 WL 1304715, at *6
(D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Peoples v. Shalala,
No. 92CV4113, 1994 WL 621922, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 4,
important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision,
this Court's role is not to start from scratch. “In
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited
to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507
(2d Cir. 2009)). “[W]hether there is substantial
evidence supporting the appellant's view is not the
question here; rather, we must decide whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision.” Bonet ex
rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013)
(summary order) (citations omitted)
SSA LEGAL STANDARD
the Social Security Act, every individual who is under a
disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42
considered disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to
benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is unable to
work after a date specified “by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment
or impairments must be “of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§404.1520(c) (requiring that the impairment
“significantly limit ... physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities” to be considered
“severe” (alterations added)).
is a familiar five-step analysis used to determine if a
person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. In the
Second Circuit, the test is described as follows:
First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is
not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a
“severe impairment” which significantly limits
his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry
is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant
has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
Secretary will consider him disabled without considering
vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is
afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to
perform substantial gainful activity.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). If and only if the claimant does not have a
listed impairment, the Commissioner engages in the fourth and
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to
perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether
there is other work which the claimant could perform. Under
the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden
of proof as to the first four steps, while the Secretary must
prove the final one.
the fourth step, the claimant carries the burdens of
production and persuasion, but if the analysis proceeds to
the fifth step, there is a limited shift in the burden of
proof and the Commissioner is obligated to demonstrate that
jobs exist in the national or local economies that the
claimant can perform given [her] residual functional
capacity.” Gonzalez ex rel. Guzman v. Dep't of
Health and Human Serv., 360 Fed.Appx. 240, 243 (2d Cir.
2010) (alteration added) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 51155 (Aug. 26,
2003)); Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d
Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). The RFC is what a person is still
capable of doing despite limitations resulting from her
physical and mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R.
assessing disability, factors to be considered are (1) the
objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions
based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or
disability testified to by the claimant or others; and (4)
the claimant's educational background, age, and work
experience.” Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d
908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978). “[E]ligibility for benefits is
to be determined in light of the fact that ‘the Social
Security Act is a remedial statute to be broadly construed
and liberally applied.'” Id. (quoting
Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir.
THE ALJ'S DECISION
the above-described sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
concluded that since the amended alleged onset date of June
30, 2013, through the date of his decision, plaintiff was not
disabled under the Act. See Tr. 23. At step one, the
ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the amended alleged onset date of June
30, 2013. See Tr. 17. At step two, the ALJ found
that plaintiff had the severe impairments of
“fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease of the
cervical and lumbar spine, and osteoarthritis of her left
shoulder[.]” Id. The ALJ found plaintiff also
suffered from the following non-severe impairments: breast
fibrosclerosis; hypertension; asthma; diverticulosis;
“gastoesophageal reflux disease”; and cataracts.
See Tr. 17-18.
three, the ALJ found that plaintiff's impairments, either
alone or in combination, did not meet or medically equal the
severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1. See Tr. 18-19. The ALJ
specifically considered listings 1.04 (disorders of the
spine) and 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint). See
Id. The ALJ considered plaintiff's fibromyalgia
“under the requirements of SSR 12-2p.” Tr. 19.
The ALJ next found plaintiff had the RFC
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except
she could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, never
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding, perform no overhead work
with her bilateral upper extremities, and perform no work
around unprotected heights.
Id. At step four, the ALJ concluded: “The
claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a
Social Worker. This work does not require performance of
work-related activities precluded by the claimant's
residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).” Tr.
23. Thus, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has not
been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from June 30, 2013, through the date of his
raises several arguments in support of reversal or remand.
See generally Doc. ...