United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
VICTOR
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Sentenced
to twelve and a half years in prison on August 19, 2005,
Judgment, Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, ECF No. 111-5 at 5,
William Petaway (“Plaintiff”) obtained his
release from incarceration on July of 2016, in part, because
of sentence-reducing credits.[1] Compl., ECF No. 1, at 9.
On
January 3, 2017, Mr. Petaway, pro se, filed this
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his
sentence should have been reduced further and that the State
of Connecticut (the “State”) wrongfully continued
to confine him in violation of his constitutional rights.
Compl. at 9-10.
Defendants
now move for summary judgment. Def. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF
No. 111.[2]
For the
reasons discussed below, the Court now
GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, ECF No. 111.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Allegations
On
August 19, 2005, having been convicted of Robbery in the
First Degree, in violation of Connecticut General Statute
53a-134(a)(4), Mr. Petaway received a prison term of 150
months. State v. Petaway, NNH -CR04-0028093-T (J.
Gold) (Aug. 19, 2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-134(a)(4). He
received credit for jail time served, resulting in a sentence
scheduled to run until August of 2017. Judgment.
Three
years into his sentence, Mr. Petaway was allegedly
transferred to the Rhode Island Department of Corrections
under the terms of the New England Interstate Corrections
Compact. Compl. at 6; see also Conn. Gen. Stat.
18-102 (“The party states . . . declare that it is the
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities
and programs on a basis of cooperation with one another,
thereby serving the best interests of such offenders and of
society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and
operational costs.”).
While
incarcerated in Rhode Island, Mr. Petaway allegedly received
several disciplinary infractions, known as
“bookings.” Compl. at 6-7. Allegedly, Rhode
Island correctional officials did not give Mr. Petaway
written copies of his bookings or the evidence relied upon by
prison officials, or officials' reasons for finding Mr.
Petaway in violation of their rules. Compl. at 7. Rhode
Island correctional officials allegedly transmitted
information about Mr. Petaway's bookings to correctional
officials in Connecticut. Compl. at 8. Based upon those
reports, Connecticut officials allegedly reduced Mr.
Petaway's “good time” credits. Compl. 8-9.
Mr. Petaway alleges that had his “‘good time'
not been taken, or had it been returned, [he] would [have]
been released in May 2016[.]” Compl. at 9.
Mr.
Petaway obtained his release from prison in July 2016. Compl.
at 9.
B.
Procedural Background
On
January 3, 2017, Mr. Petaway sued prison officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. at 9-10. On February 3, 2017, the
Court granted Mr. Petaway leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Order Granting Mot. for Leave to Proceed
in forma pauperis, ECF No. 7.
On July
25, 2017, Defendants answered Mr. Petaway's Complaint.
Answer, ECF No. 28. On October 17, 2017, Defendants filed a
corrected Answer. Corrected Answer, ECF No. 68.
On
December 14, 2018, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 111. In support of this motion,
Defendants submitted the following: (1) “time
sheets” detailing Mr. Petaway's earned and
forfeited risk reduction credits and disciplinary
infractions, id., Ex. B; (2) the affidavit of
Correctional Counselor Supervisor Heidi Palliardi, allegedly
the final Connecticut approver of two Rhode Island
disciplinary reports, Affidavit of Heidi Palliardi
(“Palliardi Aff.”), id., Ex. C at 1-9;
(3) records of Mr. Petaway's disciplinary infractions and
sanctions, Connecticut Department of Correction Disciplinary
Records for William Petaway (“Petaway Disciplinary
Records”), id., Ex. C at 12-81; (4) the
affidavit of Correctional Counselor Supervisor Jaclyn Osden,
allegedly the final Connecticut approver of two Rhode Island
disciplinary reports, Affidavit of Jaclyn Osden (“Osden
Aff.”), id., Ex. D; (5) Rhode Island
Department of Corrections disciplinary policy documents,
id., Ex. E; (6) Connecticut Department of Correction
risk reduction earned credit policy documents, id.,
Ex. F; (7) the affidavit of Correctional Officer Andrezej
Iciak, who allegedly converted cassette tapes to MP3 files
for this case at the request of the Connecticut Attorney
General's office, id., Ex. G, and a letter
regarding the sending of those recordings to Mr. Petaway,
id.; and (8) documents related to the denial of Mr.
Petaway's application for restoration of risk reduction
earned credit, id., Ex. H.
On
April 18, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the motion for
summary judgment. Motion Hearing, Minute Entry, ECF No. 126.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a
motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish
that no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute and
that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is
“material” if it “might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law” and a factual
issue is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based
on it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). In reviewing the record, a court must
“construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
its favor.” Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v.
Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir.2013)
(citations omitted).
When a
motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary
evidence and sworn affidavits, the nonmoving party must do
more than speculate or vaguely assert the existence of
unspecified disputed material facts. Au New Haven, LLC v.
YKK Corp., No. 1:15-cv-3411-GHW-SN, 2019 WL 1437516, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019)(“To create a disputed fact
sufficient to deny summary judgment, the non-moving party
must produce evidence in the record and ‘may not rely
simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the
affidavits supporting the motion are not credible . . .
.' Instead, the response ‘must set forth specific
facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for
trial.'”)(quoting Wright v. Goord, 554
F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009)(“When a motion for summary
judgment is properly supported by documents or other
evidentiary materials, the party opposing summary judgment
may not merely rest on the ...