United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. 46]
Hon.
Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge.
Before
the Court is Plaintiff Laurence Washington's
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint [Dkt. 46 (Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl.)].
Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add an additional
claim and to add an additional defendant. Defendant
Detectives Frank Napolitano and Daniel Ortiz (collectively,
“Defendants”) oppose the motion on the grounds
that it is untimely, unduly prejudicial, and futile. For the
following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On
August 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action pro se.
See [Dkt. 1 (Compl.) at 1]. He alleged that he
witnessed the robbery and murder of Marshall Wiggins by
Michael Gaston, provided information to police against
Gaston, and was placed in witness protection. Several months
later, Plaintiff called the Superior Court in Manchester, CT
and left a voicemail message stating he would not testify
against Gaston unless his girlfriend, who was being held on
an unrelated matter, was released from jail. Soon after, he
was arrested for felony murder, first degree robbery, and
conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. He brought
claims against Judge Julia Dewey, Assistant State's
Attorney David Zagaja, the East Hartford Police Department,
Detective Napolitano, Detective Ortiz, and Lieutenant Francis
McGeough alleging that his arrest was retaliatory. The Court
conducted its initial review and found that the Fourth
Amendment false arrest and malicious prosecution claims could
proceed against Detectives Napolitano and Ortiz in their
individual capacities. See [Dkt. 9 (Initial Review
Order) at 1]. All other claims and defendants were dismissed.
Id.
On
April 19, 2018, counsel was appointed for Plaintiff. He now
seeks to amend his original pro se complaint to add
a retaliation claim against Defendants and to assert all
claims against Lieutenant McGeough. Plaintiff also notes that
the proposed amended complaint has been redrafted to the
traditional format which he claims will benefit the parties
and the Court. Defendants oppose the motion and argue that it
is untimely, unduly prejudicial, and futile.
II.
Standard of Review
Under
Rule 15(a), “[t]he court should freely give leave [to
amend pleadings] when justice so requires.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Courts should grant applications to amend
unless there is good reason to deny the motion such as
“futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice
to the opposing party.” Min Jin v. Metro Life Ins.
Co., 310 F.3d 84, 101 (2d Cir. 2002). A pro se
plaintiff's motion to amend should be considered with
even greater leniency because “a pro se
litigant should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate that he has a valid claim.” Satchell v.
Dillworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1984). “A
pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly
the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend
at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives
any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
instructed that leave to amend should be granted
“absent any apparent or declared reason-such as undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of the
amendment[.]” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962).
The
Second Circuit has “referred to the prejudice to the
opposing party resulting from a proposed amendment as among
the ‘most important' reasons to deny leave to
amend.” AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank
of Am. N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted); see also State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981). An
“[a]mendment may be prejudicial when, among other
things, it would require the opponent to expend significant
additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for
trial or significantly delay the resolution of the
dispute.” AEP Energy, 626 F.3d at 725-26
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts have
granted motions to amend where the litigation has progressed
significantly, even past discovery, on the grounds that
absent a showing of prejudice, leave to amend should be
freely given. See e.g., State Teachers Ret. Bd., 654
F.2d at 845-46 (amendment allowed after three-year interval);
Middle Atl. Utils. Co. v. S.M.W. Dev. Corp., 392
F.2d 380, 385 (2d Cir. 1968) (amendment allowed after
three-year interval and notice of trial readiness and
plaintiff was aware of facts supporting new claims two years
before filing of original complaint).
III.
Analysis
A.
Undue Delay
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff unduly delayed in seeking to amend the
complaint because Plaintiff's counsel first appeared in
May 2018 - nine months prior to the instant motion.
Specifically, they claim that Plaintiff has shown no good
cause to amend because he could have amended the complaint
much sooner since it is based on information contained in
Plaintiff's original pro se complaint.
Defendants also claim that the deference traditionally given
to pro se litigants should not be extended to
Plaintiff's counsel.
In
response, Plaintiff claims he did not receive a significant
portion of the documentary discovery until September 2018 and
the transcript from Michael Gaston's criminal trial until
January 2, 2019. See [Dkt. 51 (Reply to Response to
Motion) at 3]. Plaintiff also argues that he did not know the
extent of McGeough's involvement until Defendant
Napolitano's deposition on January 17, 2019 where
Napolitano testified that McGeough supervised the Defendants
and the investigation into Plaintiff, participated in an
interview with Plaintiff, and participated in the decision to
seek an arrest warrant against him. Plaintiff filed his
motion on January 25, 2019, within weeks of learning the
extent of McGeough's involvement. Therefore, the Court
finds that Plaintiff did not unduly delay in filing the
motion for leave to amend.
B.
Futility
Defendants
claim that Plaintiff's motion should be denied because
the proposed First Amendment retaliation claim is futile.
“Leave to amend may be denied on grounds of futility if
the proposed amendment fails to state a legally cognizable
claim or fails to raise triable issues of fact.”
AEP Energy, 626 F.3d at 726. The Court should
dismiss claims for futility “only where it is beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his amended claims.” Pangburn v.
Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). As the ...