March 28, 2018
information charging the defendant with the crime of murder,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Haven and tried to the jury before Blue, J.; verdict
and judgment of guilty; thereafter, the court denied the
defendant's motion for a new trial, and the defendant
appealed to this court; subsequently, the appeal was
transferred to the Appellate Court, Beach,
Sheldon and Flynn, Js., which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, and the defendant, on the
granting of certification, appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; judgment directed.
J. Foster, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney,
Maxine Wilensky, senior assistant state's attorney, and
Mary Elizabeth Baran, former senior assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and
Vertefeuille, Js. [*]
appeal, the defendant, Kenneth Lee McCoy, challenges the
judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of
conviction rendered after a jury trial of one count of murder
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). On
appeal, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that (1) he was not deprived of a fair
trial due to prosecutorial improprieties, and (2) the trial
court properly denied his motion for a new trial for lack of
jurisdiction. We disagree but conclude that the form of the
trial court's judgment is improper in that the trial
court should have dismissed rather than denied the motion for
a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of
the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with
direction to render judgment consistent with this opinion.
following underlying relevant facts and procedural history
are set forth in the Appellate Court's decision.
‘‘During the fall of 2011, the victim, Dallas
Boomer, saw both the defendant and Tramont Murray, his close
friends, on a daily basis. The three men often conducted drug
deals together out of rental cars . . . . During November,
2011, the defendant became estranged from both the victim and
Murray. . . .
December 6, 2011, at approximately 1 o'clock in the
morning, the victim was sitting in the driver's seat of a
parked rental car on a residential street in New Haven.
Murray was sleeping in the reclined passenger seat. The
victim saw the defendant's car pull over to the side of
the road and idle nearby, so he shook Murray awake. Murray
instructed the victim to drive away. The defendant then
approached the victim's parked vehicle with his hand in
his sleeve and began shooting at the windshield. The victim
attempted to drive away, but could not. Six bullets struck
the rental car, and the victim suffered fatal injuries as a
after the shooting, Murray, the sole witness, was questioned
by the police. When the police asked Murray to identify the
shooter, he stated that he had not seen the shooter . . . .
Three weeks later, on December 27, Murray made a second
statement to the police in which he identified the defendant
as the shooter. Murray testified consistently with this
statement at the defendant's trial.'' State
v. McCoy, 171 Conn.App. 311, 312-13, 157 A.3d
the jury returned its verdict, but prior to the sentencing
date, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.
Id., 323. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant
sought to have the motion heard by the trial court; however,
the parties and the trial court subsequently agreed to go
forward with the sentencing and to hear the motion at a later
date. Id., 323-24. As a result, the sentencing
hearing went forward, and the court sentenced the defendant
to sixty years incarceration. Id., 324.
after the sentencing, the defendant attempted to have his
motion for a new trial heard. Because the defendant's
sentence already had been executed, however, the court denied
the motion without a hearing on the ground that it had lost
jurisdiction. Id. The defendant then appealed from
the judgment of conviction, asserting that the
prosecutor had engaged in a series of improprieties that
deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial and
that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new
trial for lack of jurisdiction. Id., 312.
Appellate Court concluded that, regardless of any
improprieties that may have been committed by the state
during the trial, the defendant was not deprived of his due
process right to a fair trial. Id., 314-23. The
Appellate Court also concluded that the trial court lost
jurisdiction once the defendant's sentence was executed
and, therefore, that the trial court did not improperly deny
the defendant's motion for a new trial. Id.,
323-27. This certified appeal followed. Additional facts
will be set forth as necessary.
defendant first claims that the Appellate Court improperly
determined that he was not deprived of a fair trial by
prosecutorial improprieties committed during his trial.
Specifically, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that the prosecutor did not deprive him
of a fair trial when she (1) violated a court order by
attempting on three occasions to elicit inadmissible prior
consistent statements made by Murray, and (2) asked the jury
during closing argument to speculate about the contents of a
conversation between Murray and his mother that was not in
evidence. In response, the state asserts that the Appellate
Court properly concluded that these claimed improprieties did
not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair
trial. We agree with the state.
respect to the defendant's claim that the prosecutor
thrice violated the trial court's order related to the
inadmissibility of Murray's prior consistent statements,
the Appellate Court's decision sets forth the following
relevant facts. ‘‘On the first day of trial,
outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor asked the
court whether Murray's second statement to the police, in
which he identified the defendant as the shooter, would be
admissible as a prior consistent statement. The court
responded: ‘Well, again, without finally ruling on
that, the answer is not necessarily because the rule
generally is that when a witness is impeached for a prior
inconsistent statement, prior consistent statements are not
normally admissible. They can be admissible under the
discretion of the court, particularly-and I emphasize
particularly-where the prior consistent statement precedes
the prior inconsistent statement. . . . [W]e may have to see
what develops, but certainly the answer to what you just said
is not necessarily.' The court further stated: ‘I
haven't given my final rulings on this because I have to
see what the witness says on direct, obviously, but I think
you must be aware of the general way that I look at this so
that you are not surprised, and I think that I have said
so.' '' (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 315-16.
the state's direct examination of Murray, after
establishing that Murray had failed to identify the defendant
as the shooter in his initial encounter with the police, the
prosecutor engaged in the following colloquy with Murray:
‘‘ ‘[The Prosecutor]: Did there come a time
about three weeks later when you went back into the police
department and gave another statement?
‘‘ ‘[Murray]: Yes.
‘‘ ‘[The Prosecutor]: And in that
statement, did you essentially tell the police what you have
testified to today in court?
‘‘ ‘[Murray]: Yes.' ''
Id., 322 n.4
counsel did not object to this testimony.
this testimony, the prosecutor committed the first of the
alleged improprieties when she asked: ‘‘
‘Now, with regard to giving that statement [to the
police] on December 27, which is essentially what you spoke
about today . . . .' Defense counsel objected, and the
court sustained the objection, noting that ‘[t]he
contents of the second interview should not be divulged
further than they already have been without [express]
permission of the court. As you know, there are evidentiary
rules pertaining thereto.' '' Id., 316.
during that same direct examination, the second alleged
impropriety occurred when ‘‘the prosecutor asked
Murray: ‘And let me just ask you this: when you spoke
to the police again, what did you tell them with regard to
who was the shooter?' The court sua sponte excused the
jury and addressed the prosecutor, stating: ‘I
don't know how many times I have told you on the record,
and, I believe, explicitly, that . . . prior consistent
statements are not admissible into evidence unless they
precede prior inconsistent statements. . . . I have told you,
with respect to the second interview, on multiple occasions,
multiple occasions do not get into the contents.'
the prosecutor indicated that she did not think that the
court had been explicit in ruling that Murray's prior
consistent statements were inadmissible, the court stated
that ‘[u]nder no circumstances without prior permission
of the court . . . may you ask this witness about any prior
consistent statement postdating the original inconsistent
statement of December 6. You may not ask him about the
substance of that without prior permission of the court, that
includes, but is not limited to . . . the substance of his
statement to the police on December 27. I had thought that I
was explicit, but perhaps I was not, and if so, please
forgive me.' The court continued, stating: ‘I have
told you repeatedly not to go there. If you go there again,
without prior permission of the court, you are asking-you are
basically going to require me to do things that, believe me,
I do not want to do. So, don't go there.' ''
the prosecutor engaged in the third alleged impropriety
related to prior consistent statements. This impropriety
occurred when, ‘‘after asking Murray whether he
had visited the victim's family the day after the
victim's murder, the prosecutor asked: ‘With regard
to what had occurred with [the victim's] murder, did you
tell them what happened?' Defense counsel objected, and
the court sustained the objection, instructing the prosecutor
to ‘[a]sk your next question, keeping in mind rulings
that the court has already made.' ''
respect to the claim that the prosecutor improperly referred
to facts not in evidence, the factual underlayment is as
follows. During the trial, the state presented evidence that
Murray's mother encountered Murray crying at his
girlfriend's home. The prosecutor asked Murray's
mother to describe Murray's demeanor as she spoke to him,
and she began to tell the jury what Murray had said to her
during that encounter. Defense counsel objected. The court
sustained the objection and did not permit Murray's
mother to testify about what Murray had said. Then, in
closing argument, when referring to Murray's encounter
with his mother at his girlfriend's home, the prosecutor
argued: ‘‘ ‘They talked, and he told her
things, I can't say what they were, but I think you can
think about it.' Defense counsel objected, and the court
instructed the jury that ‘[t]his is not in evidence. Do
not speculate. That is improper argument.' ''
analyzing these alleged improprieties, the Appellate Court
assumed that the prosecutor had improperly disregarded the
trial court's evidentiary rulings related to Murray's
prior consistent statements. Id., 318. As to the
prosecutor's closing argument inviting the jurors to
speculate about statements not in evidence regarding
Murray's conversation with his mother, the Appellate
Court determined, consistent with a concession by the state,
that this argument was improper. Id., 319. The
Appellate Court concluded, however, that these improprieties
did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id.,
present appeal, the defendant asserts that the Appellate
Court improperly concluded that the alleged improprieties did
not deprive him of a fair trial. We disagree and conclude
that the Appellate Court properly determined that the claimed
improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Because the Appellate Court either assumed that these actions
of the prosecutor were improper or accepted the state's
concession to that effect, we need only address whether the
Appellate Court properly concluded that these claimed
improprieties constituted a violation of the defendant's
right to due process.
begin with the standard of review. ‘‘[T]he
touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged
prosecutorial [impropriety] is the fairness of the trial, and
not the culpability of the prosecutor. . . . The issue is
whether the prosecutor's conduct so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process. . . . In determining whether the defendant
was denied a fair trial [by virtue of prosecutorial
impropriety] we must view the prosecutor's comments in
the context of the entire trial.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 543, 180 A.3d 882 (2018).
determination of whether any improper conduct by the
state's attorney violated the defendant's fair trial
rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State
v. Williams, [204 Conn. 523');">204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653
(1987)], with due consideration of whether that [impropriety]
was objected to at trial. . . . Those factors include the
extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by defense
conduct or argument . . . the severity of the [impropriety] .
. . the frequency of the [impropriety] . . . the centrality
of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case . . .
the strength of the curative measures adopted . . . and the
strength of the state's case.'' (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Campbell, supra, 328 Conn. 542.
consider each of these factors in turn. First, there is no
dispute that the comments of the prosecutor were not invited
by either the argument or conduct of defense counsel.
we conclude that the claimed improprieties were not severe.
With respect to the prosecutor's allegedly improper
comments regarding Murray's prior consistent statements,
the severity of the alleged improprieties is belied by the
fact that Murray's prior consistent statement identifying
the defendant as the shooter already had been admitted into
evidence without objection. Indeed, the jury already had
heard that Murray had given a second statement to the police
that was consistent with his testimony at trial. The fact
that evidence regarding Murray's prior consistent
statement was already admitted into evidence without
objection demonstrates both that it was not severe, in that
it did not elicit an objection when it was first introduced
by the state, and that the impact of the prosecutor's
allegedly improper questions was lessened by the fact that
the jury had already heard evidence pertaining to that
it is important to note that Murray did not answer any of the
prosecutor's questions. It is axiomatic that questions
are not evidence, only the answers to the questions are
evidence. In the present case, the fact that the witness did
not answer these allegedly improper questions supports the
Appellate Court's conclusion that the alleged
improprieties were not severe. Accordingly, we conclude that
the severity factor weighs in favor of the state.
respect to the third factor, namely, the frequency of the
impropriety, we conclude that this factor also weighs in
favor of the state. The defendant points to three instances
in which the prosecutor may have improperly referred to
Murray's prior consistent statements, and one instance in
which the prosecutor improperly commented on statements not
in evidence. Therefore, over the course of a weeklong trial,
the defendant claims four instances of prosecutorial
impropriety. Thus, we cannot conclude that these
improprieties were pervasive.
we consider whether the claimed improprieties involved a
critical issue in the case. We conclude that the statements
made by the prosecutor in the present case did involve a
critical issue-namely, the credibility of Murray, the
state's key witness and the primary source of evidence
used to obtain a conviction of the defendant. Accordingly, we
conclude that this factor weighs in favor of the defendant.
respect to the fifth factor, we conclude that the trial court
adopted curative measures in response to the alleged
improprieties. In response to the prosecutor's improper
comments regarding Murray's prior consistent statements,
the trial court sustained each of the defendant's
objections and once even interjected, sua sponte, to prevent
Murray from answering an inappropriate question. Moreover,
the trial court provided an instruction prior to jury
deliberations as follows: ‘‘[i]t is the answer,
not the question or the assumption made in the question that
is the evidence.''
connection with the prosecutor's improper reference to
facts not in evidence during the closing argument, defense
counsel immediately objected and the trial court gave a
curative instruction. The court instructed as follows:
‘‘Do not speculate on this. This is not in
evidence. Do not speculate. That is improper
argument.'' ‘‘[W]e have previously
recognized that a prompt cautionary instruction to the jury
regarding improper prosecutorial remarks or questions can
obviate any possible harm to the defendant. . . . Moreover,
[i]n the absence of an indication to the contrary, the jury
is presumed to have followed [the trial court's] curative
instructions.'' (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 413, 832 A.2d 14 (2003).
Therefore, we conclude that the strength of the prompt
curative measures weighs in favor of the state.
we consider the sixth factor, namely the strength of the
state's case. We cannot conclude that the state's
case was particularly strong. There was limited physical
evidence, and no murder weapon was ever recovered.
Nevertheless, ‘‘we have never stated that the
state's evidence must have been overwhelming in order to
support a conclusion that prosecutorial [impropriety] did not
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 596, 849 A.2d 626 (2004).
Under the circumstances presented in this case, in which the
objectionable evidence already was before the jury, the
witness was never permitted to answer the improper questions,
and prompt curative instructions were given, we simply cannot
conclude that the defendant's right to due process was
violated. Accordingly, because the majority of the
Williams factors weigh in favor of the state, we
conclude that the claimed improprieties in the present case
did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
defendant next argues that the Appellate Court improperly
upheld the trial court's denial of his motion for a new
trial on the ground that the trial court lost jurisdiction
upon the execution of the defendant's sentence. In
particular, the defendant asserts that a trial court
continues to have jurisdiction over a criminal matter for
four months after judgment pursuant to State v.
Myers, 242 Conn. 125, 136, 698 A.2d 823 (1997), and,
therefore, should have ruled on the merits of his timely
filed motion for a new trial. The state counters that the
Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's denial
of that motion because the trial court lost jurisdiction upon
execution of the defendant's sentence. We agree with the
state's jurisdictional conclusion. In light of that
jurisdictional defect, however, we further conclude that, as
a matter of form, the trial court should have dismissed
rather than denied the defendant's motion for a new
following additional facts set forth in the Appellate
Court's decision are relevant to the defendant's
claim. ‘‘On March 18, 2013, one week after the
defendant was convicted of murder, he filed a motion for a
new trial alleging that the prosecutor had ‘continually
elicited hearsay statements that the court had precluded by
an earlier ruling and offered inadmissible hearsay statements
during closing [argument].' . . .
at] the defendant's sentencing hearing . . . defense
counsel attempted to argue the defendant's motion for a
new trial, but was stymied by the unavailability of the trial
transcript. Both defense counsel and the court agreed to
postpone arguments until the transcript became available.
Defense counsel stated that, so long as the motion was heard
at a later date, he did not have a problem going forward with
the defendant's sentencing. The court agreed, stating:
‘[T]he proper way to consider this argument, which . .
. let me just say I view as colorable . . . [i]s to have
[defense counsel] file a memorandum with transcript
references . . . give the state a fair opportunity to file a
memorandum of [its] own with transcript references, and then
perhaps schedule argument, you know, at a convenient time.
Obviously, there are a lot of family members here that are
here to see the sentencing, and you're not proposing
postponing the sentencing. You're just proposing having
the-having the motion for [a] new trial heard at a [later]
date.' The court then sentenced the defendant to sixty
three months later on September 3, 2013, the defendant
amended his motion for a new trial to include a claim that
the prosecutor had, in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215 (1963), failed to disclose consideration given to Murray
in exchange for his testimony. On September 20, 2013, the
court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial for
lack of jurisdiction, citing State v.
Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427, 646 A.2d 85 (1994), for the
proposition that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a
criminal case once the defendant has been sentenced. As a
result, the court did not reach the merits of the
defendant's motion.'' (Footnote omitted.)
State v. McCoy, supra, 171
defendant [then] filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that the court retained jurisdiction under State v.
Myers, [supra, 242 Conn. 125]. The court
granted the motion for reconsideration, but again denied the
motion for a new trial for lack of jurisdiction, stating that
Myers ‘does not address the jurisdictional
issue.' '' State v. McCoy,
supra, 171 Conn.App. 324-25. The Appellate Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the
trial court had lost jurisdiction upon execution of the
defendant's sentence and, thus, properly denied the
motion for a new trial. Id., 327.
begin with the standard of review. ‘‘Because a
determination regarding the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction raises a question of law, our review is
plenary.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 326 Conn. 438,
448-49, 165 A.3d 1137 (2017). ‘‘The Superior
Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction. . .
. In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions,
the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common
law.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 834, 992
A.2d 1103 (2010). There is no legislative or constitutional
provision governing when a trial court loses jurisdiction
following the execution of a criminal sentence; therefore,
the issue is governed by the common law.
central issue in the present case is whether the trial court
lost jurisdiction upon the execution of the defendant's
sentence. To resolve this issue, some context on the
jurisdiction of criminal courts relating to sentencing is
case law explains that a court's jurisdiction over a case
ends when the term of that court ends.State v.
Pallotti, 119 Conn. 70, 74, 174 A. 74 (1934)
(‘‘[t]he established rule is that a sentence in a
criminal case may be modified at any time during the term of
court at which it was imposed, if no act has been done in
execution of it''). More specifically, early cases
recognized that, even when the term had not yet ended, the
trial court lost jurisdiction when a person had begun to
serve his or her sentence. See State v.
Vaughan, 71 Conn. 457, 461, 42 A. 640 (1899) (noting
that common-law power of King's Bench to admit bail
belongs to Superior Court and ceases when sentence is
executed); State v. Henkel, 23 Conn. Supp.
135, 138, 177 A.2d 684 (Conn. Cir. 1961)
(‘‘[w]hile the established rule is that sentence
in a criminal case may be modified at any time during the
term of court at which it was imposed, such modification
cannot be made after an act has been done in execution of
it'' [internal quotation marks omitted]);
Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 84 Mass. (2
Allen) 144, 145-46 (1861) (explaining and adopting practice
exercised by courts in England that court could modify
sentence during court term but could not modify sentence once
term was over).
rationale for this rule was that once sentence was executed,
double jeopardy protected a defendant from having his
sentence increased. United States v. Benz,
282 U.S. 304, 307-308, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931).
Another separate, but related, rationale underlying this rule
is the importance of protecting the finality of judgments.
See, e.g., Carpentier v. Hart, 5 Cal. 406,
407 (1855) (reason for rule that court loses jurisdiction
when term of court ends ‘‘is obvious . . . [in
that] there must be some finality in legal proceedings, and a
period beyond which they cannot extend'').
1934, this court expressly recognized this common-law rule.
In State v. Pallotti, supra, 119
Conn. 74, this court explained that ‘‘[t]he
established rule is that a sentence in a criminal case may be
modified at any time during the term of court at which it was
imposed, if no act has been done in execution of
it.'' (Emphasis added.)
in 1962, this court decided Kohlfuss v.
Warden, 149 Conn. 692, 695-96, 183 A.2d 626, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 298, 9 L.Ed.2d 235 (1962), in
which this court again noted its approval of the rule in
Pallotti, explaining as follows:
‘‘Another generally accepted rule of the common
law is that a sentence cannot be modified by the trial court,
even at the same term, if the sentence was valid and
execution of it has commenced. . . . The reason for this rule
has been variously assigned. According to one view, the rule
rests on the principle of double jeopardy. According to
another view, the rule is based on the proposition that the
trial court has lost jurisdiction of the case.''
we recognized the two rationales for this common-law rule,
after Kohlfuss, case law reveals a movement away
from double jeopardy as a primary basis for the rule. See
Wilson v. State, 123 Nev. 587, 591-92, 170
P.3d 975 (2007) (explaining Supreme Court's gradual
retreat from prohibition against increasing sentence after
defendant had begun to serve it and pointing to North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721, 89 S.Ct.
2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , which permitted court to impose
a more severe sentence after reconviction without violating
double jeopardy). Additionally, the concerns related to
double jeopardy being one of the animating principles behind
this rule have lessened over the years, as the law regarding
the ability of courts to modify illegal sentences became
clearer. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (concluding that
concurrent sentences doctrine did not preclude court from
exercising jurisdiction over appeal claiming double jeopardy
the underlying rationale that the rule is supported by the
interest in protecting the finality of judgments remains
solid. See, e.g., People v. Karaman, 4
Cal.4th 335, 348, 842 P.2d 100, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 (1992)
(recognizing common-law rule ‘‘that the trial
court may change its judgment only during the term in which
the judgment was rendered, but not thereafter . . . was
established in order to provide litigants with some finality
to legal proceedings'' [citations omitted; footnote
omitted]). Indeed, this court recognized the rule again in
1982, when we reiterated that ‘‘[o]rdinarily a
sentence may not be modified if any act [has been] done in
execution of it.'' State v.
Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 123, 445 A.2d 304 (1982).
this well established rule, in 1986, this court decided
State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 513 A.2d
620 (1986). In that case, this court addressed whether the
trial court could amend its written decision over three years
after the defendant was sentenced, in response to a motion
for rectification. Id., 432-34. This court explained
that ‘‘[n]either our General Statutes nor our
[rules of practice] define the period during which a trial
court may modify or correct its judgment in a criminal case.
On the civil side, however, [our rules of practice provide]
that any civil judgment or decree may be opened or set aside
within four months succeeding the date on which it was
rendered or passed. We see no reason to distinguish between
civil and criminal judgments in this respect, and we
therefore hold that, for purposes of the [common-law] rule, a
criminal judgment may not be modified in matters of substance
beyond a period of four months after the judgment has become
final.'' (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 437; see also Practice Book §
17-4; Practice Book (1978-97) § 326.
making this pronouncement, this court did not use the four
month rule to find that the trial court had jurisdiction.
Instead, this court concluded that the trial court in that
case was without jurisdiction to modify the
judgment. State v.Wilson, supra,
199 Conn. 438. This court explained that ‘‘the
judgment in this case became final when the defendant was
sentenced . . . . The trial court, when it filed its amended
memorandum of decision [over three years later] was clearly