United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEHDI BELGADA, HORMOZ AKHUNDZADEH, and ADANIEL DZIEKAN, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
HY’S LIVERY SERVICE, INC., ROBERT LEVINE, MATTHEW LEVINE, and SHELLEY LEVINE, Defendants.
RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. Bolden United States District Judge.
February 20, 2019, Hy’s Livery Service, Inc., Robert
Levine, Matthew Levine, and Shelley Levine
(“Defendants”) moved for partial reconsideration
of the Court’s February 14, 2019 Ruling and Order.
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s
Decision Denying Costs, dated Feb. 20, 2019
(“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 123. Specifically,
Defendants ask the Court to reconsider its determination that
Defendants were not prevailing parties entitled to costs from
Mehdi Belgada, Hormoz Akhundzadeh, and Adaniel Dziekan
(“Plaintiffs”) as a result of the voluntary
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. Id.
reasons that follow, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
with the facts and prior proceedings, summarized in the
Court’s February 14, 2019 Ruling and Order, is assumed.
See Ruling and Order on Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal and Cross-Motion for Attorney’s Fees, dated
Feb. 14, 2019 (“Ruling & Order”), ECF No.
February 14, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion
to voluntarily dismiss their FLSA claims with prejudice.).
See Ruling & Order at 7–8 (“[T]he
reason for voluntary dismissal is simple . . . given recent
Second Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims may
no longer be viable.”). Having determined that all
federal claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction
should be dismissed, the Court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining
state-law claims. Id. at 13. The Court also
determined that Defendants were not prevailing parties with
respect to the dismissed FLSA claims and thus declined to
award them costs under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 8–10. Finally, the
Court denied Defendants’ cross-motion for
attorney’s fees for the dismissed FLSA claims.
Id. at 13–14.
February 20, 2019, Defendants moved for reconsideration of
the Court’s decision that Defendants were not
prevailing parties with respect to the dismissed FLSA claims.
March 13, 2019, Plaintiffs opposed reconsideration.
Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defs.’ Mot., dated Mar.
13, 2019, ECF No. 124.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see,
e.g., Lawyer v. Cota, No. 18-1136-cv, 2019 WL
1466936, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2019)
(“Defendants-Appellees argued below that the district
court was bound by Second Circuit precedent to apply the
corrected affidavit doctrine and determine whether
Cota’s probable cause affidavit still supported a
finding of probable cause when the false statements were
removed from the affidavit. But the district court did not
apply the corrected affidavit doctrine in adjudicating
Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss. The district
court therefore overlooked controlling precedent, giving
Chief Judge Crawford grounds to grant the motion for
reconsideration.”) (footnote and citations omitted).
is not intended for the court to reexamine a decision or the
party to reframe a failed motion.” Fan v. United
States, 710 F. App’x 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing
Questrom v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 192
F.R.D. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Shrader, 70
F.3d at 257 (“[A] motion to reconsider should not be
granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an
issue already decided.”).
argue that the Court’s decision “references only
the facts of Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach,
759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014), and not the legal standard
set forth therein.” Defs.’ Mot. at 1. “Had
the Court applied the Carter standard to the facts
of the present case, it would have concluded as many other
District Courts have, that defendants are prevailing parties
when some counts are dismissed with prejudice and others are
dismissed without prejudice, provided there is a material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”
Id. (quoting Carter, 759 F.3d at 165);
see Id. at 2 (“The standard . . . is whether a
party gained ‘a material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties.’ Total victory is not the
sine qua non of prevailing party status. ...