Argued
March 4, 2019
Procedural
History
Action
for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Fairfield, where the court, Hon. Howard T. Owens,
Jr., judge trial referee, entered an order in accordance
with the parties' pendente lite parenting plan
stipulation; thereafter, the court, Maureen M. Murphy,
J., entered an order in accordance with the parties'
pendente lite parenting plan stipulation; subsequently, the
matter was tried to the court, Sommer, J.; judgment
dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief in
accordance with the parties' pendente lite parenting plan
stipulation, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; judgment directed.
Roy W.
Moss, for the appellant (defendant).
George
J. Markley, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Lavine, Bright and Bear, Js.
OPINION
BEAR,
J.
The
defendant, Mohamad Nahlawi, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Rania
Nahlawi. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred
in (1) awarding periodic alimony in the absence of any
finding as to the actual amount of the parties' incomes,
expenses and liabilities, or the value of their respective
assets, (2) ordering the transfer of real property without
any finding as to the actual value thereof, and (3) entering
a final child custody and visitation order that referenced a
pendente lite parenting plan stipulation that had been
superseded by a subsequent pendente lite parenting plan
stipulation that the parties and the court had intended would
become the final order. The plaintiff concedes that the
court's child custody and visitation order should have
referred to the February 28, 2017 parenting plan stipulation
rather than the December 8, 2016 stipulation that was
referenced in the judgment. We reverse the judgment of the
court with respect to the child custody and visitation order.
We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
The
defendant, in his brief before this court, presents no facts
and virtually no legal analysis in support of his first two
claims. With respect to the alimony claim, the
defendant's entire analysis and argument is that
‘‘[t]he court made no findings as to the amount
of income or value of the parties' assets. It should be
noted [that] the court did not find any concealment or
misrepresentation of income, assets, or other financial
circumstances on the part of the defendant. The court has
broad discretion only so long as it considers all relevant
statutory criteria. . . . Under the foregoing circumstances,
the award of periodic alimony was unsupported by the record,
failed to adhere to the above comprehensive statutory
criteria [in General Statutes § 46b-82], and therefore
constituted an abuse of discretion.''[1] (Citation
omitted.) His analysis of his real property claim is
similarly limited.
It is
well established that ‘‘[w]e are not required to
review issues that have been improperly presented to this
court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather
than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid
abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. .
. . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider
claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must
clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.
. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle
without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the
case and the law cited.'' (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buhl, 321 Conn.
688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016); see also Estate of Rock v.
University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d
420 (2016) (‘‘[c]laims are inadequately briefed
when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with
no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations
from the record'' [internal quotation marks
omitted]). Accordingly, we decline to address the
defendant's first two claims on the ground that they are
inadequately briefed.
The
defendant next claims that the court erred in entering a
final child custody and visitation order that referenced a
pendente lite parenting plan stipulation that had been
superseded by a subsequent pendente lite parenting plan
stipulation that the parties and the court had intended would
become the final order. The plaintiff concedes that the court
incorrectly incorporated the earlier stipulation in its
order, and indicated both in her brief and during oral
argument before this court that she would not object to a
correction of this mistake.
In its
memorandum of decision filed August 9, 2017, the court
incorporated a parenting plan that had been agreed to by the
parties and made an order of the court, Hon. Howard T.
Owens, Jr., judge trial referee, on December 8, 2016.
Pursuant to this plan, the parties were to share joint legal
custody of the minor children who resided with the plaintiff,
the defendant was to have visitation rights as arranged by
the parties, and neither party was to take the children
outside the state of Connecticut without the agreement of the
other parent or an order of the court. Although the parties
initially had agreed to that plan, there is no dispute that
the parties subsequently agreed that the later parenting plan
dated and made an order of the court, Maureen M. Murphy,
J., on February 28, 2017, would be incorporated into the
final judgment. The court, however, incorrectly incorporated
the earlier stipulation when rendering its final judgment.
The
judgment is reversed only as to the child custody and
visitation order and the case is remanded with direction to
render judgment that incorporates the February 28, 2017
stipulation rather than the December 8, ...