Argued
February 7, 2019
Procedural
History
Appeal
from the plaintiff's assessment of damages filed in
connection with the taking by condemnation of certain of the
named defendant's real property, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the
court, Abrams, J., rendered judgment in
accordance with the parties' settlement agreement;
thereafter, the court denied the named defendant's motion
to reargue, and the named defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Teresa
B. Lagosz, self-represented, the appellant (named defendant).
Raul
A. Rodriguez, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the
brief, was George Jepsen, former attorney general, for the
appellee (plaintiff).
Lavine, Moll and Bear, Js.
OPINION
BEAR,
J.
The
defendant Teresa B. Lagosz[1] appeals from the judgment of the trial
court reassessing damages in the sum of $600, 000 for the
taking of her property by the plaintiff, the Commissioner of
Transportation, on May 4, 2015, in connection with the
improvement of the New Haven-Hartford-Springfield rail
corridor. The defendant's primary claim on appeal is that
the court improperly found and summarily enforced, after
conductinga hearing pursuant to Audubon Parking
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs,
Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993)
(Audubon), an oral settlement agreement in the
amount of $600, 000 as just compensation for the taking by
eminent domain of the defendant's real property.
Specifically, the defendant claims that (1) the settlement
agreement was not inclusive of all the essential terms of the
parties' agreement and (2) the court's finding that
an enforceable agreement existed was clearly erroneous
because it was based on unclear and ambiguous testimony
elicited at the Audubon hearing.[2] Conversely, the
plaintiff claims that the court, after the Audubon
hearing, correctly concluded that there was a settlement
agreement in the amount of $600, 000 that was just
compensation for the taking of the defendant's real
property. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are undisputed or
uncontested. On May 4, 2015, pursuant to General Statutes
§ 13b-36[3] and General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) §
13a-73, [4] the plaintiff took by eminent domain real
property owned by the defendant located at 468 Norton Lane in
Berlin. The real property consisted of approximately 11.64
acres, including all buildings, improvements and
appurtenances thereon. The defendant's husband, Joseph
Lagosz, also operated a business in one of the buildings on
the real property. On the date of the taking, the plaintiff
deposited with the court $420, 000 in compensation for the
taking.
On
September 28, 2015, the defendant appealed to the court from
the plaintiff's assessment of damages. See General
Statutes § 13a-76.[5] In that appeal, she stated that she was
‘‘aggrieved by [the $420, 000] assessment of
damages because the same is inadequate.'' No other
claims were set forth in her appeal.
On
November 3, 2015, the plaintiff filed his answer denying that
the assessment was inadequate. On November 6, 2015, a
certificate of closed pleadings and a claim to the trial list
were filed. The defendant subsequently was ordered to provide
an appraisal of the real property to the plaintiff on or
before April 1, 2016. The parties met on three occasions in
June, 2016, in an attempt to mediate a settlement on the
amount of the compensation to be paid to the defendant for
the taking.
The
plaintiff asserts that, during the third of those mediation
sessions, the parties entered into an oral agreement in which
the defendant would receive a total of $600, 000, less the
$420, 000 already paid by the plaintiff, as compensation for
the taking of her real property and, in turn, the defendant
and her husband would vacate the property by August 15, 2016,
without having to pay any postcondemnation use and occupancy
charges.[6] The plaintiff further states that the
court, during the third mediation session, spoke to the
defendant and her husband to ensure that they understood and
accepted the terms of that agreement. The court then informed
the plaintiff that the defendant had agreed to those terms.
After the reported settlement, the plaintiff and the
defendant's counsel prepared drafts of a written
settlement agreement memorializing the agreement reached
through the mediation, but the defendant refused to sign the
final version of the agreement, and the case was scheduled
for trial.[7] The defendant subsequently discharged her
counsel and elected to represent herself at the trial. Her
former counsel filed a motion to withdraw and requested a
status conference.
On July
21, 2017, the court, after the status conference, ordered,
sua sponte, that an Audubon hearing take place to
determine if the parties had reached an enforceable
settlement agreement, and the court postponed any trial until
after it made its determination. On August 14, 2017, the
court commenced the Audubon hearing. The defendant,
her husband, and the defendant's former attorneys were
present at the hearing. During the hearing, the following
colloquy between the court and Richard P. Healey, one of the
defendant's former attorneys, occurred:
‘‘The Court: Is it your position that there was
no settlement agreement?
‘‘[Attorney Healey]: No.
‘‘The Court: Okay.
‘‘[Attorney Healey]: No, not at all.''
Attorney Healey's cocounsel, John Bradley, and the court
had the following colloquy:
‘‘[Attorney Bradley]: I definitely agree, Your
Honor . . . that the settlement was for-they were going to
pay an ...