United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff
Beverly Jackson brings this action against the Connecticut
State Department of Health (“DPH”); Raul Pino,
the Commissioner of DPH; and Adrienne Anderson, an
investigations supervisor with DPH. (ECF No. 1.) She alleges
that the Defendants violated her rights under the First
Amendment by issuing a cease and desist order accusing her of
practicing medicine without a license and directing her to
refrain from “engaging in the Nedicine sacramental
rites of [her] religion.” (ECF No. 2 at 1.) She filed
an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction together
with her complaint. (ECF No. 2.) She seeks a declaratory
judgment that the Connecticut statute governing the practice
of medicine or surgery, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-9, is
unconstitutional as applied to her and an injunction
preventing the Defendants from enforcing the statute through
the cease and desist order. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 2 at 9.)
The Defendants oppose her motion for preliminary injunction
and move to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
and (b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. For
the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED. Ms.
Jackson's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED,
and the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Allegations
Ms.
Jackson's complaint contains few factual allegations. She
states that “the Connecticut Medical Board issued [her]
a cease and desist order that is violating [her] religious
rights protected under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As a result of
the cease and desist order, she is “unable to worship
God according to the dictates of [her] own heart because the
Defendants have ordered [her] to stop practicing the
spiritual tenets of [her] religion in the ministry of healing
that Jesus Christ commanded [her] to do.” (Id.
at 3.) Although Ms. Jackson does not describe the basis of
the cease and desist letter in her complaint, her motion for
preliminary injunction explains that she is “a Nedicine
physician licensed nationally to diagnose, treat, and
prescribe sacred rites related to faith-based
Nedicine.” (ECF No. 2 at 8.) She alleges that the Board
“falsely claimed that” her practice of
“Nedicine” constituted the “unlicensed
practice of medicine in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §
20-9.” (ECF No. 2 at 3.) She filed a request with the
Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission. (Id.
at 3-4.) She alleges that the Commission issued a
“final decision” indicating that DPH had
“no records containing any evidence that [she] engaged
in the unlicensed practice of medicine . . . .”
(Id.)
B.
Statutory Background
“The
Connecticut General Statutes provide a comprehensive
regulatory scheme overseeing the practice of medicine and
surgery in Connecticut.” Jackson I, 2016 WL 3460304, at
*2. DPH is tasked with reviewing and investigating any
complaints it receives about providers whose treatment does
not meet the standard of care or who are practicing medicine
without a license. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-14(a)(10);
Id. § 20-13e. If DPH determines that there is
probable cause to conclude that an individual is practicing
medicine without a license, it issues a statement of charges
with the Connecticut Medical Examining Board (“the
Board”). Id. § 20-13e; Id.
§ 20-8a(g).[1] The Board then holds a hearing and issues
a decision on the charges. Id. § 19a-10;
Id. § 20-13e(a). “Once the Board issues a
final decision, that decision may be appealed to the
Connecticut Superior Court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 4-183(a).” Jackson v. Connecticut Dep't
of Pub. Health, 2016 WL 3460304, at *2 (D. Conn. 2016)
(hereinafter Jackson I). The Board may “issue an
appropriate order to any person found to be violating an
applicable statute or regulation, providing for the immediate
discontinuation of the violation.” Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 19a-11. The Board may enforce the order by petitioning
“the superior court for the judicial district wherein
the violation occurred . . . .” Id.
C.
Administrative Proceedings
The
same day Ms. Jackson filed her complaint, the Court ordered
her to provide additional information about the challenged
administrative proceeding to determine whether it could
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. (ECF
No. 9.) She provided the following information in response to
the order:
On
November 16, 2015, DPH filed charges with the Board alleging
that Ms. Jackson engaged in “the unlicensed practice of
medicine.” (ECF No. 12 at 2.) The Commissioner of DPH
notified the Board that its decision would be a
“proposed decision” under Conn. Gen. Stat. §
19a-14, and that she or her designee would render a final
decision. The Board held a hearing on the charges on February
2, 2016. (Id. at 10). On May 16, 2017, the Board
recommended that DPH order Ms. Jackson to cease and desist
“from diagnosing, treating, operating for, and
or/prescribing for any injury[, ] deformity, ailment or
disease, actual or imaginary, of another person, for
compensation, gain or reward, received or expected . . .
until [she] has obtained a license as provided in §
20-10 of the Statutes.” (Id. at 16.) DPH
accepted the Board's recommendation on June 8, 2017, (id.
at 8), and, after reconsidering its decision sua sponte,
reaffirmed its acceptance of the Board's recommendation
on July 28, 2017. (Id. at 7.)
D.
Prior Lawsuit
Ms.
Jackson's response to the Court's order also
describes an earlier lawsuit that she brought in this
District against DPH, Adrienne Anderson, and
then-Commissioner of DPH, Jewel Mullen. (See ECF No. 12 at 3
(citing Jackson I, No. 3:15-cv-750 (CSH) (D. Conn., May 19,
2015).) The Court will take judicial notice of the
allegations and the court's ruling on the defendants'
motion to dismiss in that case.
Ms.
Jackson filed her complaint in Jackson I on May 19, 2015, two
years after DPH first began investigating her
“Ňedicine-related practices.” Jackson I,
2016 WL 3460304 at *3. As Judge Haight summarized
Plaintiff's central claim is that the United States
Patent and Trademark Office has sanctioned her practice of
Ňedicine and that by issuing her a trademark, the
federal government preempted Connecticut's ability to
regulate Ňedicine, even if, as Defendants assert,
“Connecticut finds that the practice of Ňedicine
constitutes the practice of medicine defined by the
Connecticut General Statutes” without the requisite
medical license. Doc. 28-1, at 2. Furthermore, in
“[b]uilding off this central premise, Plaintiff also
alleges that the Defendants' attempt to investigate her
...