United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
[ECF Nos. 198, 213]
Stefan
R. Underhill, United States District Judge.
The
plaintiff, Ja-Qure Al-Bukhari, also known as Jerome Riddick,
has filed two motions asking the Court to
reconsider[1] its order severing some claims from this
case with instructions to include those claims in amended
complaints filed in other of his cases. The first motion, ECF
No. 198, is entitled “Motion for Reconsideration Re ECF
#193 Nunc Pro Tunc.” The second motion, ECF No. 213, is
entitled “Motion to Vacate Order and Reinstate Certain
Claims in this Action.” For the reasons discussed
below, both motions are denied.
I.
Standard of Review
The
standard for granting reconsideration is strict.
Reconsideration will be granted only if the moving party can
identify controlling decisions or data that the Court
overlooked and that would reasonably be expected to alter the
Court's decision. See Oparah v. New York City
Dep't of Educ., 670 Fed.Appx. 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2016)
(citing Schrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 1995)).
There
are three grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration:
“an intervening change of controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth
Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable
Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the Court “overlooked
controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before
it on the underlying motion, ” reconsideration is
appropriate. Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395
(2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). However, a motion for
reconsideration should be denied when the movant “seeks
solely to relitigate an issue already decided.”
Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257; Waller v. City of
Middletown, 89 F.Supp.3d 279, 282 (D. Conn. 2015).
II.
Motion for Reconsideration
On
September 21, 2018, I granted in part the defendants'
motion to dismiss and entered an order of partial dismissal.
The order of partial dismissal is at issue here. Counts One
and Two of the second amended complaint assert claims for
breach of a 2014 Settlement Agreement and the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing associated with that agreement.
In April 2018, I entered an order in this case, and all of
Al-Bukhari's pending cases, that all claims addressing
the Settlement Agreement would be litigated in one case,
Riddick v. Semple, 3:16-cv-1769 (SRU). In accordance
with that order, I dismissed Counts One and Two without
prejudice to refiling in Riddick v. Semple. In
addition, I dismissed Count Six for a reason different from
the ground asserted by the defendants in their motion to
dismiss. I determined that the only claims to be litigated in
this case concern the application of restraints and/or
deployment of a chemical agent on December 13, 2015, November
19, 2015, March 9, 2016, and January 4-5, 2017, and whether
those uses of force were excessive in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment or constitute the torts of assault, battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 193 at
16.
Al-Bukhari
argues that the decision to include Counts One and Two in
Riddick v. Semple, constitutes improper joinder of
parties and claims in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 20. That rule provides that persons may be
joined in one action if the claims against them arise from
the same occurrence or series of occurrences and common
questions of law or fact will arise in the action.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(1)(2). Riddick v. Semple includes
claims for violation of the 2014 Settlement Agreement. All of
the incidents under Counts One and Two are alleged to be
violations of the Settlement Agreement. Thus, they are part
of a series of occurrences giving rise to the claimed breach
of settlement agreement. In addition, to resolve the claims,
I will have to apply state contract law to determine whether
the defendants breached the agreement by their various
actions. Thus, there is also a common question of law. I
conclude that the decision to include Counts One and Two in
Riddick v. Semple does not constitute improper
joinder.
Al-Bukhari
also argues that, once one of the cases is decided, res
judicata will preclude litigation of the other case. Under
the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, “a
final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were
or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). When considering
whether the first judgment will have preclusive effect, the
court considers three factors: (1) whether the same
transaction or series of transactions is at issue, (2)
whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims,
and (3) whether the facts essential to the second case were
present in the first case. Monahan v. New York City
Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2000).
The
four incidents underlying this action constitute some, but
not all, examples of the alleged breach of the settlement
agreement. Thus, Riddick v. Semple involves many
more transactions or occurrences than this case. The evidence
required to support the claims is different. In Riddick
v. Semple, Al-Bukhari must present evidence of what
treatment is permitted or barred by the terms of the
settlement agreement. That evidence is not relevant to
whether these particular actions violated the Eighth
Amendment. In addition, to establish a defense of res
judicata, the defendants would be required to show that the
claims in the second case could have been raised in the first
case. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94. Here, my order
precludes consideration of the settlement agreement claims in
this case. I conclude that res judicata would not bar
consideration of the claims.
In
addition, “[i]ssues are not identical [for issue
preclusion purposes] if the second action involves
application of a different legal standard, even though the
factual setting of both suits may be the same.” B
& B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., U.S., 135
S.Ct. 1293, 1306 (2015) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The claims in Counts One and Two involve a
different legal standard than the remaining claims in this
case. This action involves the Eighth Amendment excessive
force standard while Riddick v. Semple involves
contract law. I conclude that, based on the information
currently available to me, it is unlikely that either claim
or issue preclusion would bar considering of the claims in
two separate cases.
Also in
the order, I noted that Al-Bukhari did not assert any claim
in this case for deliberate indifference to serious medical
or mental health needs. I instructed Al-Bukhari that, if he
intended to pursue any such claims, he should do so in No.
3:16-cv-2009 (SRU), the case I previously designated as the
case for asserting any claims for deliberate indifference to
medical or mental health needs. Al-Bukhari challenges this
direction on the above grounds. The challenge is rejected for
the reasons stated above.
Finally,
Al-Bukhari argues that I was required to consider the
defendants' motion to dismiss Count Six only on the
asserted ground. Al-Bukhari fails to acknowledge, however,
the requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2(B)(ii), that
“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that-- … the action … fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
Al-Bukhari is proceeding in forma pauperis in this
action. Thus, the section 1915 requirements apply. Because I
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