Argued
February 4, 2019
Appeal
from the Superior Court, Judicial District of New
London, Cosgrove, J.
Page 629
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 630
Albert
L.J. Speziali, with whom, on the brief, were Paul M.
Geraghty, New London, and Mark R. Kepple, self-represented,
for the appellants (defendants).
Scott
H. Bernstein, for the appellee (plaintiff).
DiPentima,
C. J., and Alvord and Moll, Js.
OPINION
MOLL,
J.
Page 631
[190
Conn.App. 314] The defendants, Christine Kepple and Mark
Kepple,[1] appeal from the judgment of
foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
Flagstar Bank, FSB. On appeal, the defendants claim that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this
action as a result of the plaintiffs alleged lack of
standing. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to the
resolution of the defendants claim on appeal. The plaintiff
filed this action in February, 2011, seeking to foreclose a
residential mortgage on property located at 140 Elm Street in
Stonington. According to the complaint, on November 19, 2004,
Mark Kepple executed a promissory note payable to the order
of Atlantis Mortgage Co., Inc., in the amount of $ 322,700.
To secure the note, the defendants executed a mortgage on the
property in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc., as nominee for Atlantis Mortgage Co., Inc. The
complaint alleged that the plaintiff was the owner of the
note and mortgage by virtue of an assignment of the mortgage
dated February 3, 2011. The complaint further alleged that
the note was in default and that the plaintiff was exercising
its option to declare the entire balance on the note due and
payable. On October 23, 2017, the court rendered a judgment
of foreclosure by sale. The court thereafter denied the
defendants motion to reconsider, and the defendants filed
the present appeal.
[190
Conn.App. 315] On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action
because of the plaintiffs alleged lack of standing.
Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the plaintiff
merely was the holder of the note and not the owner of the
debt, and (2) the evidence in the record, taken as a whole,
rebutted the presumption that the plaintiff, as the holder of
the note, was the owner of the debt.[2] We disagree.
At the
outset, we note that "[t]he issue of standing implicates
[the] courts subject matter jurisdiction.... Standing is the
legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or
she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some
real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable
right, title or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.... When standing is put in issue, the question
is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
proper party to request an adjudication of the
Page 632
issue .... Because standing implicates the courts subject
matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears the
burden of establishing standing." (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Assn. v. Simoulidis, 161 Conn.App. 133, 142,
126 A.3d 1098 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 913, 130 A.3d
266 (2016). "Because a determination regarding the trial
courts subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law,
[the standard of] review is plenary." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. "In addition,
because standing implicates the courts subject matter
jurisdiction, the issue of standing is not subject to waiver
and may be [190 Conn.App. 316] raised at any time."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, National Assn.
v. Schaeffer, 160 Conn.App. 138, 145, 125 A.3d 262 (2015).
The
following additional facts are necessary for the resolution
of the defendants claim. On March 14, 2012, the plaintiff
filed a motion for default for failure to disclose a defense,
which the court, Martin, J ., granted on March 26,
2012. On April 3, 2012, Mark Kepple filed (1) an appearance
as a self-represented party in lieu of the appearance filed
by his initial attorney and (2) a motion for inclusion in the
foreclosure mediation program. On August 13, 2012, Attorney
Paulann Hosler Sheets filed an appearance for the defendants
in addition to the self-represented appearance filed by Mark
Kepple. The defendants then filed a ...