United States District Court, D. Connecticut
LUDYS C. NINO Plaintiff,
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., ET AL. Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC NO.
53) AND PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION (DOC. NO. 72).
C. HALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ludys C. Nino (“Nino”) brings this pro
se action against defendants Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. (“CHL”); Bank of America, N.A.
(“BOA”); Indy Mac;Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
(“Ocwen”); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(“JPMC”); OneWest Bank
(“CIT”); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. (“MERS”); M&T Bank Corporation
(“M&T”); and various Jane and John Does.
See Complaint (Doc. No. 1) at 4-5. Nino alleges that
the defendants committed fraud, in violation of Connecticut
law, and violated the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), by misrepresenting the appraisal
value of two properties and fraudulently inducing Nino into
entering into mortgages on those properties. See
Compl. ¶¶ 113-18.
court previously dismissed Nino's claims against CHL,
BOA, IndyMac, JPMC, CIT (OneWest Bank), and M&T.
See Ruling (Doc. No. 57). The court also dismissed
Nino's claims against the various John and Jane Does.
See Order (Doc. No. 71). Before the court is
defendants MERS and Ocwen's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.
53). Also before the court is Nino's Objection to this
court's Ruling dismissing her claims against all other
defendants and this court's Order dismissing Nino's
claims against the Doe defendants. See Objection
(Doc. No. 72).
reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and Nino's Objection is
objects to this court's dismissal of her claims as to
CHL, BOA, IndyMac, JPMC, CIT (OneWest Bank), and M&T, as
well as this court's Order dismissing her claims against
unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants. See Objection
(Doc. No. 72) at 1. The court liberally construes this
Objection as a Motion for Reconsideration. See,
e.g., McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864
F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting the Second Circuit
“liberally construe[s] pleadings and briefs submitted
by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to
raise the strongest arguments they suggest”).
standard for granting a Motion for Reconsideration is strict,
and such a motion “will generally be denied unless the
moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Objection raises many of the same arguments as her Complaint
(“Compl.”) (Doc. No. 1), her Objections to the
prior Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 26, 37), and her prior
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 59). She argues that the
defendants fraudulently inflated property values in relation
to mortgage agreements, resulting in damage to her.
See Objection (Doc. No. 72) at 2 ¶ 3. Nino
argues that the court's conclusion, in its prior Ruling,
that Nino's claims were time barred because she could
have discovered the alleged fraud through a reasonable
inquiry, was “arbitrary and capricious.” See
id. at 2. As an initial matter, Nino's subjective
disagreement with the court's Ruling, standing alone, is
not sufficient to warrant reconsideration. See,
e.g., Rotundo v. Vill. of Yorkville, No.
6:09-CV-1262, 2011 WL 1558685, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2011)
(“Simply because plaintiffs disagree with the outcome
of the . . . motion does not permit them to reargue the issue
on a motion for reconsideration.”). To the extent that
Nino's request for reconsideration is based only on her
disagreement with the court's Ruling, it is denied.
Civil RICO Claims
further argues that the continuing violations doctrine
excepts her civil RICO claims from the applicable statute of
limitations. See Objection (Doc. No. 72) at 3-4.
Nino argues that “the fraudulent acts of Defendant(s) .
. . are such that it has [sic] not abated and is ongoing . .
. which will be much more evident upon completion of
discovery.” Id. However,
[t]he continuing violations doctrine does not apply under
RICO; instead RICO actions are subject to a rule of separate
accrual, meaning that each time a plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered an injury caused by the
defendant's violation of the statute, a new cause of
action arises as to that injury, regardless of when the
actual violation occurred.
Hilow v. Rome City Sch. Dist., No. 6:14-CV-288, 2015
WL 893050, at *9 n.10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015) (citing
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1105
(2d Cir. 1988) (quotations and alterations omitted)). A
plaintiff, therefore, has a right to sue, even after the
statute of limitations has run as to the underlying
racketeering activity, when a “new and independent
injury is incurred from the same [RICO] violation.”
421-A Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. 125 Court St.
LLC, 760 Fed.Appx. 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2019). An injury is
not independent of the alleged underlying RICO violation
where it is caused in material part by the original fraud.
Nino has not alleged any injury independent of the underlying
alleged RICO violation. The “alleged misconduct”
noted in the Complaint included the following: (1)
misrepresentation of the value of properties in loan
documents; (2) false overstatement of property values in loan
documents; and (3) understatement of a loan-to-value ratio in
loan documents. Compl. ¶ 71. Nino alleges that she has
suffered injury in the form of underwater mortgages,
see Objection (Doc. No. 72) at 2-3, but-as Nino
herself argues-that injury is caused by the original conduct
of misrepresenting property values in the loan documents.
Therefore, Nino's alleged injury is not a “new,
independent injury” falling outside of the RICO statute
of limitations. See 421-A Tenants Ass'n,
Inc., 760 Fed.Appx. at 50 (concluding that injuries
caused by renewal of leases were ...