United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
se plaintiff Courtney Green, currently incarcerated at
Osborn Correctional Institution (“Osborn”) in
Somers, Connecticut, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that Defendants denied him equal
protection of the laws by treating him differently from
another inmate convicted of the same offense at a different
time with regard to applying earned credits to advance his
parole eligibility date. On May 7, 2019, pursuant to its
screening duty under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court filed
an “Initial Review Order” (herein
“IRO”), which dismissed the case because Green
failed to state a cognizable equal protection claim. See
Green v. Semple, No. 3:19-CV-410 (CSH), 2019 WL 2016779,
at *8 (D. Conn. May 7, 2019). Green responded by filing a
motion for reconsideration of his case's dismissal. Doc.
8. The Court resolves that motion herein.
Standard for Reconsideration
standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
“[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where
the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already
Second Circuit explained, reconsideration “is not a
vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case
under new theories, . . . or otherwise taking a ‘second
bite at the apple'. . . .” Analytical Surveys,
Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir.
2012) (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d
136, 144 (2d Cir.1998)). See also Fan v. United
States, 710 Fed.Appx. 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“Reconsideration is not intended for the court to
reexamine a decision or the party to reframe a failed
motion.”) (citing Questrom v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
District's Local Civil Rule 7 comports with the Supreme
Court's holding in Shrader, and Second Circuit
precedent. Rule 7(c)(1) thus states:
Motions for reconsideration shall not be routinely filed and
shall satisfy the strict standard applicable to such motions.
Such motions will generally be denied unless the movant can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked in the initial decision or order. In circumstances
where such motions are appropriate, they shall be filed and
served within seven (7) days of the filing of the decision or
order from which such relief is sought, and shall be
accompanied by a memorandum setting forth concisely the
controlling decisions or data the movant believes the Court
D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1).
outset, the Court notes that Green's motion for
reconsideration is procedurally deficient for two reasons.
First, it was filed more than “seven (7) days [after]
the filing of the decision” from which Green seeks
relief. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1). The IRO was filed on May
7, 2019, and Green's motion for reconsideration was filed
on May 20, 2019. In addition, the motion was not
“accompanied by a memorandum setting forth concisely
the controlling decisions or data [he] believes the Court
overlooked.” Id. The motion thus fails by
virtue of its non-compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(c).
and alternatively, were the Court to extend leniency to Green
as an incarcerated pro se plaintiff, the motion must
still be denied on its substance. In seeking reconsideration,
Green argues that he has stated a viable equal protection
claim in his complaint because he alleges that he was
“treated differently from those whom [sic] are
similarly situated as him without any legitimate state
objective by the government.” Doc. 8, ¶¶ 1-2.
He asserts his belief that “the court may have
overlooked” this claim. Id., ¶ 3. He also
asks the Court to reconsider its order of dismissal and to
allow him to amend his complaint. Id., ¶ 8.
Green, however, cites no controlling decisions and provides
no factual allegations that the Court overlooked in analyzing
his claim. He simply seeks to renew his claim because he
disagrees with the Court's dismissal of his action. In
the absence of any substantive basis for the Court to
reconsider its IRO ruling, Green's motion for
reconsideration [Doc. 8] will be denied.
Green is pro se, the Court reiterates, in brief,
that under the facts presented, he cannot state a plausible
equal protection claim because there has been no unlawful,
disparate application of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)
to him in light of the date he committed his offense, July
19, 2008. That date occurred before the Connecticut
legislature amended Conn. Gen . Stat. § 54-125a(b) to
allow RREC to be applied to advance an inmate's parole
eligibility date. Therefore, at the time Plaintiff committed
his offense, he could not have expected to receive such a
benefit. Three years after Plaintiff's offense date, the
Connecticut legislature granted that benefit, which Plaintiff
received for two years (i.e., until the legislature
eliminated it in 2013). Following the 2013 amendment to
§ 54-125a(b), Green was no longer eligible to have RREC