United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
R. UNDERHILL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Kriedel filed a complaint pro se, seeking to recover for the
alleged taking of personal property. Complaint
(“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1. He is now represented.
The Town of Newington (“Newington”) filed a
motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion (Doc. No. 11) is granted.
Standard of Review
case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court
lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir. 2000). A party that moves to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction “may refer to evidence
outside the pleadings.” Id. (quoting Kamen
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d
Cir. 1986)). To survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1),
a plaintiff “has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that [subject matter
jurisdiction] exists.” Id. (citing Malik
v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1996)).
the relevant time period, Kriedel was a resident of
Newington, Connecticut, and owned real property at 366 Maple
Hill Avenue in Newington (“the property”).
Compl., Doc. No. 1, at ¶¶ 2, 4. Kriedel and
Newington were involved in litigation concerning alleged
blight on the property. Id. at ¶ 4. Newington
claimed that Kriedel's property violated the
municipality's blight ordinance because there were
abandoned vehicles and a collapsing barn on the property.
Id. at ¶ 5. After administrative proceedings,
Newington notified Kriedel that it would enter the property
and remediate the blight in January 2016. Id. at
¶ 6. Kriedel filed an action, pro se, in Connecticut
Superior Court seeking to enjoin Newington from performing
the remediation. Id. at ¶ 7. The court denied
Kriedel's claim for relief and ordered him to remove the
blight by July 2016. Id. at ¶ 8. Kriedel
appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on August 3, 2016.
Id. at ¶ 9.
August 30, 2016, Newington provided notice of its intent to
enter the property to remediate the blight. Id. at
¶ 10. On August 31, 2016, Newington entered
Kriedel's property and “destroyed” his barn.
Id. at ¶ 11. Town employees and agents also
removed Kriedel's personal property from his garage,
which Kriedel claims was never authorized. Id. at
¶¶ 11-12. Kriedel alleges those items have been
destroyed. Id. at ¶ 13. Kriedel has demanded in
writing that the personal property be returned or that he be
justly compensated for the value of the property.
Id. at ¶ 14. Newington has not complied.
Id. at ¶ 16.
filed his complaint on August 31, 2018. Compl., Doc. No. 1.
Newington filed a motion to dismiss on December 14, 2018.
Doc. No. 11. Kriedel obtained counsel, who objected on
January 31, 2019. Doc. No. 19. Newington replied on February
11, 2019. Doc. No. 20.
seeks to recover for the taken personal property under three
legal theories: (1) violation of his right to due process;
(2) taking the personal property without providing just
compensation; and (3) negligence. Compl., Doc. No. 1, at
¶¶ 1, 17. Newington argues that I lack subject
matter jurisdiction over each theory. Memorandum in Support
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Def's
Memo”), Doc. No. 11-1, at 3-4.
Taking Without Just Compensation
argues that Kriedel's takings claim “is not yet
ripe for adjudication, thereby deriving this Court of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Def's Memo, Doc. No. 11-1, at
4. Kriedel argues that “Plaintiff's constitutional
claims are ripe for adjudication.” Plaintiff's
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum
in Support (“Pl's Memo”), Doc. No. 19, at 1.
plaintiff must show that [he] sought redress through the
appropriate administrative avenues before suing in the
district court. Id. at 187 (internal citation
omitted). In other words, “a property owner has not
suffered a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until
the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just
compensation through the procedures provided by the State for
obtaining such compensation[.]” Norton v.
Galligan, 2018 WL 564568, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 2018)
(citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195).
First, § 11 of the Connecticut Constitution, which
states that “[t]he property of no person shall be taken
for public use, without just compensation, ” provides
an adequate procedure for a plaintiff alleging a takings
claim to obtain just compensation for a taking. Wellswood
Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron, 2013 WL 356619, at *3
(D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2013), onreconsideration in
part, 2013 WL 5435532 (D. Conn. Sept. 30,
2013). Furthermore, “[f]ederal district
courts routinely dismiss-and the Supreme Court and Second
Circuit routinely uphold dismissal of-Fifth Amendment claims
where a ...