United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 74)
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Preliminary
Statement of the Case
The
Plaintiff, Claudette Tracey, brings this case against her
former employer and several of her former colleagues,
alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (age
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation)
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (national
origin, hostile work environment, and retaliation). On
February 19, 2019, the Defendants moved for summary judgment
as to all counts. (ECF No. 74.) The Plaintiff filed an
opposition to the Defendants' motion on April 24, 2019.
(ECF No. 81.) For the following reasons, the Court
GRANTS the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment in its entirety.
Standard
of Review
The
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment if they
demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that [they are] entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catretti, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A dispute
is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, ”
while a fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
At
summary judgment, the movant bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323;
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.
2004). Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at
trial, the movant's initial burden at summary judgment
can be met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the
non-movant's claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
325. Once a movant has met this burden, the non-movant
“must come forward with ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e)). “[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the
true nature of the facts” will not suffice. Hicks
v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations
and internal quotations omitted). Nor will wholly implausible
alleged facts or bald assertions that are unsupported by
evidence. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21
(2d Cir. 1991); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801
F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 585-86). In determining whether there exists a
genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is
“required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against
whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v.
Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.
2003)). The Court's job is not to “weigh the
evidence or resolve issues of fact.” Lucente v.
Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d
Cir. 2002). Rather, the Court must decide whether a rational
juror could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Id.
Facts
As a
preliminary matter, the Court addresses the parties'
compliance with Local Rule 56(a). When a party fails to
appropriately deny facts set forth in the movant's Local
Rule 56(a)(1) Statement, those facts are deemed admitted.
See Shetucket Plumbing Supply Inc. v. S.C.S. Agency,
Inc., 570 F.Supp.2d 282, 283 (D. Conn. 2008) (facts
“deemed admitted because [they have] not been squarely
denied with specific citation to evidence in the record as
Local Rule 56(a)(3) requires.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)
(“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party's
assertion of fact … the court may … consider
the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”); D.
Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3) (“Failure to provide specific
citations to evidence in the record as required by this Local
Rule may result in the Court deeming admitted certain facts
that are supported by the evidence.”). Further, Rule 56
“does not impose an obligation on a district court to
perform an independent review of the record to find proof of
a factual dispute.” S.E.C. v. Glob. Telecom Servs.,
L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D. Conn. 2004).
The
Plaintiff's Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Facts in
Opposition to Summary Judgment runs afoul of these holdings
and the rule itself in several ways. For example, at
paragraphs 23 and 28 of her supplemental statement of facts,
the Plaintiff cites to “[r]ecord,
generally.”[1] The Plaintiff attached over 1, 400 pages
of documents and transcripts to her opposition. Directing the
Court to this record without specific citation is not
adequate. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3);
Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 288 F.3d 467,
470 (2d Cir. 2002) (“nothing in the federal rules
mandates that district courts conduct an exhaustive search of
the entire record before ruling on a motion for summary
judgment”). Moreover, the purported “facts”
are merely a summary of the Plaintiff's argument. As
such, these paragraphs cannot be relied upon to create a
genuine issue of material fact. In addition, many of the
Plaintiff's responses on her Local Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement are replete with argument, as discussed below. This
too is inappropriate. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
56(a)(3); see also Risco v. McHugh, 868 F.Supp.2d
75, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“the Statement improperly
interjects arguments and/or immaterial facts in response to
facts asserted by Defendant, without specifically
controverting those facts”); Costello v. New York
State Nurses Ass'n, 783 F.Supp.2d 656, 661 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (disregarding plaintiff's responses to
defendant's Rule 56(1) statement where plaintiff
responded with conclusory allegations or legal arguments);
Cifarelli v. Vill. of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d
Cir. 1996) (“mere conclusory allegations, speculation
or conjecture will not avail a party resisting summary
judgment”).
The
following facts are therefore either expressly undisputed or
deemed admitted by the Plaintiff's failure to comply with
Local Rule 56(a)(3). See, e.g., Knight v.
Hartford Police Dept., No. 3:04-cv-969 (PCD), 2006 WL
1438649, at *4 (D. Conn. May 22, 2006) (deeming as admitted
certain statements of fact that the opposing party failed to
unambiguously deny and failed to offer a citation to
admissible evidence that would support a denial).
On
March 13, 2015, the Plaintiff applied for the position of
Connecticut Careers Trainee (“CCT”) at the
Department of Social Services. (ECF No. 74-2 ¶ 3.) The
job posting itself stated that “CCTs will be
continuously evaluated on their progress during the yearlong
training period. Trainees must demonstrate that they have
successfully completed all areas of instruction and have
mastered the necessary knowledge and skills to advance to the
Eligibility Services Worker target classification.”
(Id. ¶ 2.) DSS confirmed the Plaintiff's
hiring via letter on August 7, 2015, reiterating that
“As a Connecticut Careers Trainee you will be required
to complete one (1) year in the training position. During
this period, your suitability for state service and your
position will be evaluated.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
Because the CCT position “is a training classification,
CCT employees do not have permanent status in the state
employment system, and are not covered under any ‘just
cause' from dismissal protections ….”
(Id. ¶ 17.) The one-year training program
“constitutes a probationary period during which the CCT
employee's work is closely monitored by the supervisor,
[and] the employee's performance is formally evaluated,
with efforts made by the employing agency to support the
employee in reaching the goals of the training
program.” (Id. ¶ 13.) CCT employees can
be dismissed if DSS determines that “the employee is
not satisfactorily progressing in the training program and is
not adequately performing the duties required of the
position.” (Id. ¶ 14.) If a CCT employee
is “counseled on performance at the three (3) month
assessment and has not satisfactorily progressed by the six
(6) month assessment and it is determined the CCT employee is
not adequately performing the duties of the position”
they are “dismissed … generally no later than
six (6) months from date of hire.” (Id. ¶
18.)[2]
DSS
assigned the Plaintiff to its New Haven Office, in the
“Generalist Unit, ” which was headed by Lisa A.
Wells, Social Services Operational Manager. Wells, in turn
supervised Eligibility Services Supervisor Edward Donroe, a
defendant herein. Defendant Donroe was the Plaintiff's
direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Donroe
also supervised Defendant Ryann McDonald, who was assigned to
help train the Plaintiff. As a new DSS employee, the
Plaintiff “underwent new employee orientation, which
included learning DSS policies and procedures including DSS
Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity policy,
anti-harassment and complaint procedures.”
(Id. ¶ 7.) The Plaintiff further underwent
training on November 19, 2015 and December 2, 2015, regarding
employee human rights protections, DSS Affirmative
Action/Equal Employment Opportunity training, and
Understanding Workplace Diversity and Cultural
Responsiveness. (Id. ¶ 8.) The relevant DSS
policies which prohibit discrimination and harassment on the
basis of race, color, gender, national origin, and other
protected categories, include a complaint procedure which
encourages employees to bring complaints of discrimination or
harassment to the agency's attention. Employees are also
provided information about how to bring complaints to
external agencies such as the Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities. (Id. ¶ 9.)[3]
As part
of the training program, the Plaintiff participated in formal
“CORE (acronym for ‘Curriculum for Orientation,
Reinforcement, and Enrichment') training, ”
conducted by Thomas Scott McDonald (Id. ¶¶
21-22.) During the first CORE evaluation, the Plaintiff only
answered 22 out of 42 questions, getting 4 answers incorrect.
(Id. ¶ 25.) By comparison, nine other CORE
trainees answered all 42 questions, getting only six
questions incorrect. (Id.) McDonald reported the
results of the Plaintiff's performance to Defendant
Donroe via email on October 20, 2015 and November 4, 2015.
(Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) McDonald also prepared a
feedback report, which characterized the Plaintiff as
“need[ing] improvement” in eight out of the
twelve subjects covered by the CORE training. (Id.
¶ 31.) McDonald met with the Plaintiff on November 4,
2015, to discuss her pending three-month performance
evaluation and his “concern about her problems with
navigating and working with the [Eligibility Management
System] in particular.” (Id. ¶ 33.) In
his feedback report, McDonald assessed the Plaintiff's
performance in a case study exercise as
“deficient.” (Id. ¶ 35.)
In
addition to the formal CORE training provided to the
Plaintiff, DSS also provided the Plaintiff with on-the-job
training. (Id. ¶ 37.) Specifically, the
Plaintiff would worked with Defendants Donroe, Defendant
Ryann MacDonald, Brian J. Buckley and Unique Shephard.
(Id.) Defendant MacDonald communicated her
observations of the Plaintiff's performance in a series
of emails to Defendant Donroe. (Id. ¶ 38.)
Buckley did the same. (Id. ¶ 39.)
On
November 4, 2015, Defendant Donroe gave the Plaintiff an
“unsatisfactory” three-month “performance
appraisal.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Specifically, the
Plaintiff received “less than good” ratings on
the job elements of knowledge of work (“requires
considerable assistance”), quantity of work
(“volume below average”), quality of work
(“often unacceptable, frequent errors or
rejections”), and ability to learn new duties
(“requires a great deal of instruction”).
(Id.) The appraisal further noted that the Plaintiff
“is having difficulty using the computer and completing
her assignments timely” and “is slow at using
keyboard.” (Id. ¶ 42.)
Prior
to the appraisal, however, Defendant Donroe told the
Plaintiff that her evaluation would not be good, but that DSS
would continue to work with her for 6 weeks “with two
leads.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Defendant Donroe
assigned Defendant MacDonald and Buckley, even though the
Plaintiff had claimed Defendant MacDonald “talk[ed]
down to her.” (Id.)[4] In this regard, Defendant
Donroe testified that “Ryann is one of my best leads.
The smartest person that I could put on the case[.] [The
Plaintiff's] best chances of success would be to be
trained by Ryann. Ryann is a direct person. She's what
she speaks. I did not see any valid complaint to remove her
from the training process.” (Id. ¶ 44.)
At the
end of November 2015, Defendant Donroe issued a memorandum to
the Plaintiff, entitled “Performance Expectations,
” which identified areas of concern that, despite
training and assistance, were still problematic.
(Id. ¶ 46.) The memorandum included steps that
would be taken “[i]n order to help [the Plaintiff]
facilitate improvement.” (Id.) The memorandum
further stated that “[w]e will meet again formally in
six (6) weeks to review progress. Please be forewarned that
continued unsatisfactory performance may result in dismissal
in your probationary period.” (Id. ¶ 47.)
Defendant
Donroe met with the Plaintiff on December 14, 2015 and
December 18, 2015, telling her that the information he was
receiving from the Leads was that she was still too slow at
processing, that she frequently asked the same questions, and
she still struggled with retaining information. (Id.
¶ 49.) At the latter meeting, which was halfway through
the six-week performance review period, he told her that she
“was not at a desired level of knowledge with both
programs and computer usage.” (Id. ¶ 50.)
The Plaintiff told Defendant Donroe that she felt
“intimidated” by Defendant MacDonald.
(Id.) The Plaintiff requested that Defendant Donroe
spend more time with her in training, (id.), which
he ...