United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
JEFFREY ALKER MEYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Dasyam Samuel Rajasekhar has filed a complaint for employment
discrimination against defendant Environmental Data
Resources, Inc. (EDR). I will grant EDR's motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the complaint does not state
plausible grounds for relief and that this action is barred
by Rajasekhar's entry into an agreement that releases EDR
from any claims arising from Rajasekhar's employment.
Background
On
September 11, 2018, Rajasekhar filed a complaint against EDR,
alleging that he was subject to employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. Doc. #1 at 1-2. According to
the complaint, EDR engaged in retaliation and terminated
Rajasekhar's employment on March 18, 2016. Id.
at 2.
The
complaint alleges the following facts to support
Rajasekhar's claims:
From June 2015 onwards I complained of discriminatory
act/misconduct directed against me and others both in writing
as well as informally. There was no significant reduction.
Instead I noticed retaliatory acts. These were also brought
to attention in the form of informal as well as formal
grievances. Retaliations were in the form of excessive
scrutiny, false statements of qualifications and work
performance, intimidations, warnings not to complain about
co-workers, false accusation of disrupting meetings,
purposefully and needlessly boasting that illegal cutting
corners to environmental due diligence maps[, ] mocking NEPA
to [o]ffend me, sexual gestures and conversations-offensive
to me, profanity-Christian, not playing along-team player.
Fired after grievance that questioned my continued employment
- harassment.
Id. at 2.
Attached
as an exhibit to the complaint is a letter reflecting that,
upon the termination of his employment, Rajasekhar entered
into a separation-and-release agreement with EDR. The letter
states that the agreement contained a clause whereby
Rajasekhar agreed to “[r]elease and fully discharge
[EDR] of and from any and all claims, demands, causes of
action, and rights, known and unknown, whether in contract,
tort or otherwise, which you ever had on or before the
Separation Date or may have in the future arising out of or
in any way in related to your agreement with or separation
from EDR up to and including the date of the execution of
this Agreement.” Doc. #1-1 at 1. Rajasekhar accepted
from EDR a payment of $15, 407.57 in connection with this
agreement and the termination of his employment.
Ibid.
EDR has
moved to dismiss on multiple grounds. Doc. #25. Although
Rajasekhar has filed certain documents subsequent to the
motion to dismiss, his responses have not addressed any of
the arguments raised in EDR's motion to dismiss.
Discussion
The
background principles governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss are well established. The Court must accept as true
all factual matters alleged in a complaint, although a
complaint may not survive unless the facts it recites are
enough to state plausible grounds for relief. See, e.g.,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep't, 879 F.3d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018). This “plausibility”
requirement is “not akin to a probability requirement,
” but it “asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Charles v. Orange Cty., 925 F.3d
73, 81 (2d Cir. 2019) (same). In addition, a court is
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation” or “to accept as true
allegations that are wholly conclusory.” Krys v.
Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014).
The
allegations of a pro se plaintiff's complaint
must be read liberally to raise the strongest arguments that
they suggest. See McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the
Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam). Still, even a pro se complaint must
allege enough facts to state plausible grounds for relief.
See Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378,
387 (2d Cir. 2015).
EDR
argues that the complaint fails to state facts that give rise
to plausible grounds for relief. I agree. Rajasekhar makes
solely conclusory allegations of discrimination, failing to
identify any particular actions by particular persons on any
particular date other than the date he lists as his date of
termination.
Apart
from these pleading deficiencies, EDR further argues that
this lawsuit has been filed in violation of Rajasekhar's
separation-and-release agreement. I agree. Rajasekhar entered
into an agreement that released EDR from any claims arising
from his employment, specifically including any claims for
violation of employment discrimination laws. Doc. #26-1 at
4-5.[1]Rajasekhar has not stated any reason why
the separation-and-release agreement is invalid or
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