Argued
March 4, 2019
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Appeal
from the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Fairfield, geographical area number two, and tried to the
jury before Kavanewsky, J.
Laila
M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Denise
B. Smoker, senior assistant states attorney, with whom, on
the brief, were John C. Smriga, states attorney, and Marc R.
Durso, senior assistant states attorney, for the appellee
(state).
Lavine,
Bright and Bear, Js.
OPINION
BRIGHT,
J.
[191
Conn.App. 35] The defendant, Patricia Daniels, appeals from
the judgment of conviction, rendered by the trial court
following a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3) (reckless
manslaughter) and misconduct with a motor vehicle in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-57 (a) (criminally
negligent operation).[1] The defendant also [191 Conn.App. 36]
had been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree in
violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1) (intentional manslaughter), but
at sentencing the trial court vacated her conviction of that
charge. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the jurys
verdict was legally inconsistent because each of these crimes
requires a mutually exclusive mental state, and (2) the court
erred in failing to exclude testimonial hearsay. We agree
that the verdict is legally inconsistent, and, therefore, we
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The
following facts, as reasonably could have been found by the
jury, are relevant to this appeal. The victim, Evelyn Agyei,
left her Bridgeport home at approximately 6 a.m. on December
4, 2014. Her eleven year old son accompanied her. Agyei and
her son got into her Subaru Outback (Subaru), Agyei driving
and her son in the back seat on the passengers side. After
traversing some back roads, they took Bond Street and arrived
at the intersection of Bond Street and Boston Avenue. Agyei
stopped at the red light and then proceeded to make a right
turn onto Boston
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Avenue, staying in the right lane. As she was making the
right turn, her son looked to the left and saw a white BMW
sport utility vehicle (BMW) approximately two streets down,
traveling at a high rate of speed in the left lane.
After
Agyei got onto Boston Avenue, the driver of the BMW pulled
alongside Agyeis vehicle. Agyeis son saw the BMW logo on
the hood; however, he could not see the driver or the license
plate. The driver of the BMW then moved into the right lane,
hitting Agyeis Subaru once on the drivers side and causing
her to begin to lose control of the vehicle. The driver of
the BMW then moved behind the Subaru and ran into it from
behind, causing the vehicle to cross the median, proceed
under a fence, and hit a tree. Tragically, Agyei died from
her injuries, and her son, who also was [191 Conn.App. 37]
injured, continues to have vision problems as a result of the
injuries he sustained.
After
an investigation, which included obtaining a video of the
incident from a nearby high school that had surveillance
cameras in the area, the police, having concluded that the
defendant was the driver of the BMW that hit the Subaru,
causing Agyeis death and the injuries to Agyeis son,
arrested the defendant.[2] Ultimately, she was charged, in a
long form information, with, inter alia, intentional
manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent
operation of a motor vehicle; the jury found her guilty of
these charges, among others. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
The court accepted the jurys verdicts and rendered judgment
accordingly. On the date of sentencing, upon the request of
the state,[3] the court vacated the
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defendants conviction of intentional manslaughter, and it,
thereafter, sentenced the defendant to twenty years
incarceration, [191 Conn.App. 38] execution suspended after
sixteen years, with five years of probation.[4] The defendant
raises two claims on appeal— (1) the jurys verdicts of
guilty on the crimes of intentional and reckless manslaughter
and criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent
because each of these crimes requires a mutually exclusive
mental state, and (2) the court erred in failing to exclude
testimonial hearsay— and requests that we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and order a new trial on all
charges and, alternatively, on the charges of intentional
manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent
operation. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
The
defendant first claims that the jurys verdicts on the counts
of intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and
criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent
because they each require a mutually exclusive mental
state.[5] She argues that it was logically
impossible for the defendant to have possessed [191 Conn.App.
39] three forms of intent, simultaneously, for a single act,
involving a single victim. The defendant explains that, at
trial, the states theory of the case was that her action in
twice hitting Agyeis vehicle was one single act, which
caused Agyeis death. She argues that the state tried the
case under the theory that each of the three relevant counts
of the information were charged in the alternative, one being
intentional, one reckless, and one negligent. She contends
that the fact that the jury found her guilty of all three
charges, each requiring a different mental state, and that
the state, thereafter, requested that the court vacate the
intentional manslaughter conviction, demonstrates that the
verdicts were legally inconsistent. After setting forth our
standard of review and the general legal principles involved,
we will consider the relevant mental element of each of these
crimes in order to ascertain whether convictions of all three
crimes would be legally inconsistent.
"It is well established that factually
inconsistent verdicts are permissible. [When] the verdict
could have been the result of compromise or mistake, we will
not probe into the logic or reasoning of the jurys
deliberations or open the door to interminable
speculation.... Thus, claims of legal inconsistency between a
conviction and an acquittal are not reviewable [on
appeal].... We employ a less limited approach, however, when
we are confronted with an argument that [two or more
convictions] are inconsistent as a matter of law or when the
[convictions] are based on a legal impossibility.... A claim
of legally inconsistent convictions, also referred to as
mutually exclusive convictions, arises when a conviction of
one offense requires a finding that negates an essential
element of
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another [191 Conn.App. 40] offense of which the defendant
also has been convicted.... In response to such a claim, we
look carefully to determine whether the existence of the
essential elements for one offense negates the existence of
[one or more] essential elements for another offense of which
the defendant also stands convicted. If that is the case, the
[convictions] are legally inconsistent and cannot withstand
challenge.... Whether two convictions are mutually exclusive
presents a question of law, over which our review is
plenary." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nash,
316 Conn. 651, 659, 114 A.3d 128 (2015).
"[C]ourts
reviewing a claim of legal inconsistency must closely examine
the record to determine whether there is any plausible theory
under which the jury reasonably could have found the
defendant guilty of [more than one offense]."
Id., at 663, 114 A.3d 128. Nevertheless, the state
is bound by the theory it presented to the jury. See
State v. Chyung, 325 Conn. 236, 255-56, 157 A.3d 628
(2017) (where state argued defendant engaged in only one act,
rather than two, principles of due process prohibited state
from relying on different theory on appeal).
A
Intentional Manslaughter and Reckless Manslaughter
We
first consider whether the charges of intentional
manslaughter and reckless manslaughter were legally
inconsistent under the facts of this case and in view of the
states theory.[6] We conclude that they were not [191
Conn.App. 41] legally inconsistent because the mental state
element for each of these crimes related to different
results.
The
following additional facts and procedural history inform our
review. As set forth previously in this opinion, the state
charged the defendant with, inter alia, intentional
manslaughter and reckless manslaughter. As to intentional
manslaughter, the state charged in relevant part that,
"on or about the 4th day of December, 2014, at
approximately 6:30 a.m., at or near Boston Avenue within
[Bridgeport] ... PATRICIA DANIELS, with the intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, caused the death
of EVELYN AGYEI, in violation of [§ ] 53a-55 (a) (1)
...."
As to
reckless manslaughter, the state charged in relevant part
that, "on or about the 4th day of December, 2014, at
approximately 6:30 a.m., at or near Boston Avenue within
[Bridgeport] ... PATRICIA DANIELS, under circumstances
evincing an extreme indifference to human life, recklessly
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to one
EVELYN ...