Argued
March 13, 2019
Procedural
History
Substitute
information charging the defendant with the crime of murder,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, and tried to the jury
before Miano, J.; verdict and judgment of
guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the judgment; thereafter, the court,
Dewey, J., denied the defendant's
motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Robert
L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief,
was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Ronald
G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, Rita
M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, and
Elizabeth S. Tanaka, former assistant state's attorney,
for the appellee (state).
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Conway, Js.
OPINION
DiPENTIMA, C.J.
The
defendant, Ernest Francis, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence
filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. On appeal, the
defendant claims that his sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner because the court substantially relied on materially
inaccurate information concerning his prior criminal history
and the manner in which he had committed the underlying
crime. We disagree and, thus, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The defendant was convicted of murder in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), and, on April 15, 1992,
was sentenced to fifty years of incarceration. See State
v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 635 A.2d 762 (1993). Prior to
sentencing, the court, Miano, J., was
provided with a presentence investigation report (presentence
report) detailing the defendant's prior criminal history.
The presentence report indicated that the defendant had been
convicted previously of conspiracy to sell cocaine and
assault in the second degree. During sentencing, the
prosecutor informed the court of the details surrounding the
apparent conviction of conspiracy to sell cocaine and noted
that there seemed to be a discrepancy between the offense of
which he was charged initially, conspiracy to sell cocaine,
and the offense of which he was convicted, conspiracy to
possess cocaine. The prosecutor also advised the court that
the defendant had not been convicted of assault in the second
degree, as indicated in the report, but, rather, assault in
the third degree.
In
discussing the reasons for its sentence, the court,
Miano, J., reviewed the events that
transpired on the day the defendant murdered the victim. In
so doing, the court indicated that the defendant had stabbed
the victim more than once during the underlying altercation.
After recounting the relevant facts based on the evidence at
trial, the court noted that the defendant, at the age of
nineteen, had three felony convictions. After noting that one
of ‘‘[t]he purposes of sentencing'' is
deterrence, the court sought to send a message to
‘‘the young men like the defendant that appear
macho, that are involved in drugs, that have cars, attractive
new cars, that have jewelry, that have money, [and] that have
attractive ladies, '' that ‘‘[they] have
to think before they commit such an act like this.''
Thereafter, the court sentenced the defendant to fifty years
of incarceration.
On
December 30, 2016, the defendant filed the motion to correct
an illegal sentence that is the subject of the present
appeal.[1] In the memorandum of law accompanying his
motion, the defendant alleged that his sentence was illegal
because the trial court substantially relied on materially
false information regarding his prior criminal history and
misconstrued the evidence at trial surrounding the underlying
crime. On August 10, 2017, the court, Dewey,
J., denied the defendant's motion, concluding,
inter alia, that there was no indication that the sentencing
court substantially relied on materially inaccurate
information. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be
set forth as needed.
The
defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded
that the sentencing court did not substantially rely on
materially inaccurate information regarding his prior
criminal history and the manner in which the underlying
offense was committed. We do not agree and, therefore, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
We
begin our analysis of the defendant's claim by setting
forth our standard of review and applicable legal principles.
Practice Book § 43-22 provides that ‘‘[t]he
judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal
sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other
disposition made in an illegal manner.''
‘‘[A] claim that the trial court improperly
denied a defendant's motion to correct an illegal
sentence is reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion
standard. . . . In reviewing claims that the trial court
abused its discretion, great weight is given to the trial
court's decision and every reasonable presumption is
given in favor of its correctness. . . . We will reverse the
trial court's ruling only if it could not reasonably
conclude as it did.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bozelko, 175 Conn.App. 599, 609,
167 A.3d 1128, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 973, 174 A.3d 194
(2017).
‘‘[A]n
illegal sentence is essentially one [that] either exceeds the
relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's
right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally
contradictory. By contrast . . . [s]entences imposed in an
illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant
statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way [that] violates
[a] defendant's right . . . to be addressed personally at
sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . .
or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on
accurate information or considerations solely in the
record, or his right that the government keep its plea
agreement promises . . . . These definitions are not
exhaustive, however, and the parameters of an invalid
sentence will evolve . . . as additional rights and
...