United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING § 2254
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Hon.
Vanessa L. Bryant, United States District Judge
The
Petitioner, Gazmen Gjini, an inmate currently confined at
Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center in Uncasville,
Connecticut, brings this action pro se for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He
challenges his 2013 Connecticut state court conviction for
possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell on two
grounds: (1) he was denied a hearing pursuant to Franks
v. Delaware in violation of his Fourth Amendment right
to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and (2) his
conviction for possession of a narcotic substance with the
intent to sell is not supported by legally sufficient
evidence. For the following reasons, the Application is
denied.
I.
Standard of Review
A
district court may only entertain a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus challenging a state court conviction if custody
of the petitioner violates the Constitution or federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If a state court has rejected a
petitioner's claim on its merits, federal courts cannot
issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state proceedings
either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Further, a petitioner must exhaust
his remedies in state court unless there is no available
state process or circumstances render the state process
ineffective to protect his rights. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1).
“State-court
decisions are measured against this Court's precedents as
of ‘the time the state court renders its
decision.'” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.
170, 182 (2011) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)). A decision is “‘contrary
to' clearly established federal law . . . if ‘the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has
on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”
Davis v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13
(2000)). “The inquiry for the federal habeas court is
not whether the state court's application of, or refusal
to extend, the governing law was erroneous, but rather
whether it was ‘objectively unreasonable.'”
Davis, 532 F.3d at 140 (quoting Williams,
529 U.S. 408-410). Thus, federal courts grant a writ of
habeas corpus if the state court's decision “was so
lacking justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of
fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
Further,
a federal court's review under § 2254 “is
limited to the record that was before the state court that
adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen,
563 U.S. at 181. Factual determinations made by a state court
are presumptively correct, and the petitioner may only rebut
this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). These
procedural safeguards protect the autonomy of state criminal
proceedings against federal intrusion. Harrington,
562 U.S. at 103.
II.
Factual and Procedural Background
The
Connecticut Appellate Court set forth the following facts
leading to the Petitioner's surrender:
In 2009, the Stamford Police Department was investigating the
defendant for illegal drug related activities. . . . The
police used a cooperating witness to pose as a drug buyer and
to purchase illegal drugs from the defendant. . . . [O]n June
13, 2009, under the supervision and surveillance of the
police, the cooperating witness met with the defendant at a
restaurant located on West Main Street in Stamford . . .
[and] "talked about drugs."
One week following this initial meeting, . . . the
cooperating witness contacted the defendant by telephone for
the purpose of purchasing narcotics from him. . . . When the
defendant arrived . . ., the cooperating witness got into the
defendant's automobile, at which time she gave the
defendant $80 in exchange for slightly less than one ounce of
cocaine. . . .
[O]n July 2, 2009, the defendant sold drugs to one or more
cooperating witnesses. . . . After this interaction, one or
more police officers observed the defendant drive to his
residence, a single family home located at 179 Cedar Heights
Road in Stamford.
On August 13, 2009, the police obtained an arrest warrant for
the defendant. That day, the police began to surveil the
defendant's residence. The police observed an automobile
that they had observed the defendant driving during the
course of their investigation, a black 2009 Honda Accord with
heavily tinted windows, parked in the driveway. The
automobile was registered to Nahile Gjini, the
defendant's mother. The police directed the cooperating
witness to contact the defendant and arrange to purchase
illegal narcotics from him. The cooperating witness informed
the police that she had arranged for this transaction to take
place at approximately 12:30 p.m., at the restaurant located
on West Main Street in Stamford.
Shortly thereafter, the police observed the defendant exit
the residence on Cedar Heights Road, get into the Honda, and
drive to the restaurant located on West Main Street in
Stamford, where he previously had sold narcotics to the
cooperating witness. Two police officers traveling in an
unmarked ...