Argued
October 17, 2018
Appeal
from the Superior Court, Judicial District of New London,
Jongbloed, J.
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 535
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 536
S. Max
Simmons, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
David
J. Smith, senior assistant states attorney, with whom, on
the brief, was Michael L. Regan, states attorney, for the
appellee (state).
Robinson,
C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, DAuria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker,
Js.
OPINION
MULLINS,
J.
[332
Conn. 273] After a jury trial, the trial court convicted the
defendant, Jean Jacques, of murdering the victim, Casey
Chadwick, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. The
defendant now appeals from that conviction. The subject of
this appeal is the trial courts denial of his motion to
suppress incriminating evidence linking him to the murder,
which the police obtained from a search of his apartment
without a warrant. The defendant had a month-to-month lease
for the apartment and had paid only the first months rent.
Five days into that lease, the defendant was arrested for
certain drug offenses and, shortly thereafter, the murder of
the victim. The defendant never posted bond or made any
arrangements to pay for a second month of rent.
Five
days after his rent was due for a second month, the police
searched his apartment without a warrant and discovered the
victims cell phone hidden in a bathroom wall. The defendant
moved to suppress that evidence on the ground that the search
violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures under the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution.[1] In denying his motion to suppress, the
trial court explained that the defendant had failed to
"maintain the apartment as his own" because the
lease had expired, the defendant had not made any further
rent payments, and the defendant did not make arrangements
[332 Conn. 274] to secure his belongings in the apartment.
Thus, the court concluded that the defendant did not have a
subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment at the
time of the search.
The
question before us is whether the trial court properly denied
the defendants motion to suppress on the ground that he did
not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment
at the time of the search. We conclude that, under the
specific facts of this case, the defendant established that
the apartment was his home and that neither his incarceration
nor his failure to pay rent five days after it was due
divested him of his subjective expectation of privacy in his
apartment. Therefore,
Page 537
we further conclude that the trial court improperly denied
the defendants motion to suppress and, accordingly, reverse
the judgment of the trial court.
The
following undisputed facts and procedural history are
relevant to our analysis. On January 16, 2015, the defendant
was released from incarceration to supervised
parole.[2] Upon being released, he lived with a
friend until June 10, 2015. On that date, the defendant
secured his own apartment in Norwich. He entered into a
month-to-month tenancy and paid the landlord $450 for the
first month of rent, which ran from June 10 to July 10, 2015.
After securing the apartment, the defendant moved all of his
belongings into the apartment and began living there.
On June
15, 2015, the defendant was arrested on drug charges
unrelated to this case. At the time of his arrest, the police
noticed blood on his sneakers. That same day, police officers
discovered the body of the victim stuffed into a closet in
her apartment. She had been stabbed multiple times.
Subsequent forensic testing [332 Conn. 275] indicated that
some of the blood on the defendants shoes had come from the
victim.[3]
The
following day, on June 16, 2015, the police, accompanied by
the defendants parole officer, searched the defendants
apartment. Inside, they discovered blood on the walls and a
mattress. Forensic testing indicated that this blood came
from the defendant, who had various cuts on his hands. The
defendant was subsequently arrested for the murder of the
victim while he was incarcerated on the drug charges.
While
the defendant was in jail on the pending drug and murder
charges, the police received a tip from a confidential
informant that the defendant had hidden the victims cell
phone and some drugs in a hole in the wall of the bathroom of
his apartment. As a result, on July 15, 2015, police officers
conducted a second search of the defendants apartment in
order to investigate whether there was a hole in the bathroom
wall. This time, the officers were not accompanied by the
defendants parole officer. Instead, the officers went to the
apartment alone and without a warrant. They obtained written
consent from the landlord to search the apartment. After
obtaining that consent, the officers entered the defendants
apartment and confirmed the presence of a hole in the
bathroom wall with a bag inside of it. Inside the bag, the
officers found the victims cell phone and some
drugs.[4]
Prior
to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the
victims cell phone and the drugs, asserting that this
evidence was inadmissible under the exclusionary rule [332
Conn. 276] as the fruit of prior police illegality. An
evidentiary hearing on the motion was held during which both
parties presented evidence related to the defendants lease
of the apartment and the contested search.
In its
memorandum of decision on that motion, the trial court made
the following explicit findings of fact. The defendant had
entered into a month-to-month lease for the apartment and
paid rent for the first
Page 538
month. Five days into his lease, on June 15, 2015, he was
arrested on the drug charges. His bond was set at $100,000,
which he was not able to post. While incarcerated on the drug
charges, he was arrested for the murder of the victim, and
his bond was increased to $1 million. He did not post that
bond either. Thus, the defendant was incarcerated and never
returned to the apartment following his arrest on June 15,
2015. The defendant did not make any further rent payments
for any period beyond the first month. Nor did the defendant
contact the landlord or attempt to have his lease extended.
Despite having the ability to do so, the defendant also did
not contact his friends or family to ask them to pay his
rent. The trial court also found that the search at issue
occurred on July 15, 2015, five days after the date of
expiration of the lease term. Despite not receiving rent for
a second month, the landlord did not initiate eviction
proceedings. In fact, the court credited the landlords
testimony that, if the defendant had been released from jail
in July and had the money to pay his rent, the landlord would
have permitted him to continue to stay in the apartment.
On the
basis of these findings, the court determined that the
defendant did not show an interest in the apartment and,
thus, did not meet his burden of demonstrating a subjective
expectation of privacy in it at the time of the second
search. In making that determination, the court considered
that the lease had expired five days before the second search
occurred, the defendant neither [332 Conn. 277] made any
further rent payment nor any arrangements to have his rent
paid, and the defendant made no effort to "maintain the
apartment as his own." The trial court further explained
that, even though the defendant had been incarcerated, he
could have exhibited some interest in the apartment by asking
his family or friends to maintain the apartment or the
personal belongings within it. The court acknowledged the
defendants testimony that he would have gone back to the
apartment if he had been released from jail. It determined,
however, that his expressing this view many months later did
not rise to the level of exhibiting an actual subjective
expectation of privacy in the apartment.
The
trial court denied the defendants motion to suppress, and,
following a nine day trial, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty on the charge of murder. The trial court subsequently
rendered judgment in accordance with that verdict and
sentenced the defendant to sixty years incarceration. This
appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth below as
necessary.
On
appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during
the second search of his apartment, which occurred on July
15, 2015.[5] Specifically,
Page 539
he claims [332 Conn. 278] that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the apartment because it was his
home and he had never been evicted from it or otherwise
abandoned it. We agree with the defendant.
We
begin by setting forth the relevant principles of law and the
standard of review governing the defendants claim. "The
fourth amendment to the United States constitution ...
provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures ...." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Saturno, 322 Conn. 80, 88, 139
A.3d 629 (2016). "The capacity to claim the protection
of the fourth amendment does not depend upon a property
interest, permanency of residence, or payment of rent but
upon whether the person who claims fourth amendment
protection has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
invaded area." State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323,
330, 541 A.2d 1209 (1988); see id., at 329, 541 A.2d
1209 ("[a] person is entitled to fourth amendment
protection anywhere he resides where he has a reasonable
expectation of privacy"); see also Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d
387 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
"To receive fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, a defendant must have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the [subject of the
search].... Absent such an expectation, the subsequent police
action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pink, 274 Conn.
241, 258, 875 A.2d 447 (2005). To determine whether a
defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
invaded place, we follow the test laid [332 Conn. 279] out by
the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States, supra, 389 U.S. at 347, 88 S.Ct. 507.
"The Katz test has both a subjective and an
objective prong: (1) whether the [person contesting the
search] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy with
respect to [the invaded premises or seized property]; and (2)
whether that expectation [is] one that society would consider
reasonable.... This determination is made on a case-by-case
basis.... The burden of proving the existence of a reasonable
expectation of privacy rests [with] the defendant."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Houghtaling, 326 Conn. 330, 341, 163 A.3d 563 (2017),
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 1593, 200 L.Ed.2d 776
(2018).
It is
well settled that "[w]hen reviewing a trial courts
denial of a motion to suppress, [a] finding of fact will not
be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the
evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [W]hen a
question of fact is essential to the outcome of a particular
legal determination that implicates a defendants
constitutional rights ... and the credibility of witnesses is
not the primary issue, our customary deference to the trial
courts factual findings is tempered by a scrupulous
examination of the record to ascertain that the trial courts
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence....
[When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged,
[our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they
are legally and logically correct and whether they find
support in the facts set out in the [trial courts]
memorandum of decision ...." (Internal quotation
Page 540
marks omitted.) Id., at 339-40, 163 A.3d 563.
"Notwithstanding
our responsibility to examine the record scrupulously, it is
well established that we may not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court when it comes to evaluating the
credibility of a witness.... We must defer to the trier of
facts assessment of [332 Conn. 280] the credibility of the
witnesses that is made on the basis of its firsthand
observation of their conduct, demeanor and ...