Argued
March 13, 2019
Procedural
History
Action
for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Haven and tried to the court, Abery-Wet-stone, J.; judgment
dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief;
thereafter, the court, Shluger, J., granted the
defendant's motion for contempt; subsequently, the court,
Klatt, J., denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt;
thereafter, the court, Klatt, J., granted the defendant's
motion for contempt; subsequently, the court, Klatt, J.,
denied the plaintiff's motion to modify child support,
and the plaintiff appealed to this court; thereafter, the
court, Klatt, J., granted the plaintiff's motion for
articulation. Affirmed.
Jean-Pierre Bolat, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Richard W. Callahan, for the appellee (defendant).
Lavine, Elgo and Harper, Js.
OPINION
ELGO,
J.
In this
contentious postdissolution case, the self-represented
plaintiff, Jean-Pierre Bolat, appeals from various
postdissolution judgments rendered by the trial court in
favor of the defendant, Yumi S. Bolat. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the
defendant's May 9, 2017 motion for contempt, denied his
September 19, 2017 motion for contempt, and granted the
defendant's August 23, 2017 motion for contempt; and (2)
denied his motion to modify his child support obligation. We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The parties' marriage was dissolved on June 21,
2011. They have three children together. On April 11, 2017,
the parties entered into a stipulation governing various
parenting matters and child support, which was approved by
and made an order of the court (stipulation). Pursuant to the
stipulation, the parties shared joint legal custody, and the
children primarily resided with the defendant. It also
provided for the two elder children to use the
plaintiff's residence in Wallingford as their residence
for school purposes and to finish high school at Sheehan High
School in Wallingford. The stipulation further provided that
‘‘the [plaintiff] shall have parenting time to
include every other weekend from Friday after school until
Monday when school commences or [9 a.m.].'' It also
stated that ‘‘[i]f the custodial parent cannot be
with the children, it is the custodial parent's
responsibility to make arrangements for the children unless
the noncustodial parent agrees in writing to take the
children.''
Subsequent
to entering into the stipulation, both parties filed various
motions with the court. On August 8, 2017, the court granted
the defendant's May 9, 2017 motion for contempt and found
the plaintiff in contempt for failing to make arrangements
for the children when he could not take them during his
scheduled parenting time. On October 4, 2017, the court
denied the plaintiff's September 19, 2017 motion for
contempt when it determined that the issues raised by the
plaintiff's motion were barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. On October 19, 2017, the court granted the
defendant's August 23, 2017 motion for contempt and found
the plaintiff in contempt for failing to pay $3000 toward the
purchase of a vehicle for their children. On November 21,
2017, the court denied the plaintiff's July 31, 2017
motion to modify his child support obligation, concluding
that the plaintiff had ‘‘failed to meet his
burden of showing a significant change in his financial
circumstances . . . .'' From these judgments the
plaintiff now appeals.
I
CONTEMPT
CLAIMS
The
plaintiff first claims that the court improperly (1) granted
the defendant's May 9, 2017 motion for contempt, (2)
denied his September 19, 2017 motion for contempt, and (3)
granted the defendant's August 23, 2017 motion for
contempt. We disagree.
We
begin by setting forth our standard of review and relevant
legal principles. ‘‘[O]ur analysis of a judgment
of contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we must
resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying
order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear
and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. . .
. This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . .
Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was
sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or
refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a
review of the trial court's determination of whether the
violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or
misunderstanding.'' (Citations omitted.) In re
Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 693-94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).
‘‘Civil
contempt is committed when a person violates an order of
court which requires that person in specific and definite
language to do or refrain from doing an act or series of
acts. . . . Whether an order is sufficiently clear and
unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of
contempt because [t]he contempt remedy is particularly harsh
. . . and may be founded solely upon some clear and express
direction of the court. . . . One cannot be placed in
contempt for failure to read the court's mind. . . . It
is also logically sound that a person must not be found in
contempt of a court order when ambiguity either renders
compliance with the order impossible, because it is not clear
enough to put a reasonable person on notice of what is
required for compliance, or makes the order susceptible to a
court's arbitrary interpretation of whether a party is in
compliance with the order.'' (Citations omitted;
emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 695.
The
order at issue is the stipulation, entered into by the
parties, which was made an order of the court.
‘‘In domestic relations cases, [a] judgment
rendered in accordance with . . . a stipulation of the
parties is to be regarded and construed as a contract. . . .
It is well established that [a] contract must be construed to
effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined
from the language used interpreted in the light of the
situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with
the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be
ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the
written words and . . . the language used must be accorded
its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it
can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the
contract. . . . Where the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according
to its terms. A court will not torture words to import
ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for
ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must
emanate from the language used in the contract rather than
from one party's subjective perception of the terms. . .
. Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and
precise meaning . . . concerning which there is no reasonable
basis for a difference of opinion . . . . In contrast, an
agreement is ambiguous when its language is reasonably
susceptible of more than one interpretation. . . .
Nevertheless, the mere fact that the parties advance
different interpretations of the language in question does
not necessitate a conclusion that the language is
ambiguous.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Mettler v. Mettler, 165
Conn.App. 829, 836-37, 140 A.3d 370 (2016).
A
The
plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the
defendant's May 9, 2017 motion for contempt when it held
him in contempt for violating the stipulation by failing to
make arrangements for the children when he could not be with
them during his scheduled parenting time. Specifically, the
plaintiff argues that the court's holding was improper
because the stipulation is ambiguous and there was no
evidence that his violation was wilful. We disagree.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
claim on appeal. Before approving the stipulation and making
it an order, the court canvassed the parties about what they
meant in paragraph 4.2, which states: ‘‘If the
custodial parent cannot be with the children, it is the
custodial parent's responsibility to make arrangements
for the children unless the noncustodial parent agrees in
writing to take the children.'' The court stated:
‘‘So, when I read this paragraph, I read [it] to
be [that] if the custodial parent cannot be with the
children-let's say . . . the custodial parent is going to
be absent for one night or however many nights, it is the
custodial parent's responsibility to make arrangements
for the children unless the noncustodial parent agrees in
writing to take the children. If the noncustodial parent
agrees to take the children, that's terrific. . . . [I]f
[the plaintiff] is traveling and [the defendant] says of
course they can stay overnight and that's acceptable, I
have no problem with that . . . and likewise, on the other
side, if that is not an option, the children must stay with
an adult. The custodial parent's responsibility is to
find an adult to take care of those kids.''
Additionally,
the following colloquy occurred between the court and the
plaintiff about paragraph 4.2:
‘‘The Court: I think that given the context, if
you and your wife want to take an overnight somewhere and it
would be your night to have the kids, you know, I'm sure
[the defendant] would take them. If they're not about to
do that, you've got to find-
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Right.
‘‘The Court: And vice ...