Argued
March 13, 2019
Appeal
from Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Shluger
J., Klatt, J.
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
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Jean-Pierre Bolat, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Richard
W. Callahan, for the appellee (defendant).
OPINION
ELGO,
J.
[191
Conn.App. 295] In this contentious postdissolution case, the
self-represented plaintiff, Jean-Pierre Bolat, appeals from
various postdissolution judgments rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendant, Yumi S. Bolat. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the
defendants May 9, 2017 motion for contempt, denied his
September 19, 2017 motion for contempt, and granted the
defendants August 23, 2017 motion for contempt; and (2)
denied his motion to modify his child support obligation. We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The parties marriage was dissolved [191 Conn.App.
296] on June 21, 2011. They have three children together. On
April 11, 2017, the parties entered into a stipulation
governing various parenting matters and child support, which
was approved
Page 740
by and made an order of the court (stipulation). Pursuant to
the stipulation, the parties shared joint legal custody, and
the children primarily resided with the defendant. It also
provided for the two elder children to use the plaintiffs
residence in Wallingford as their residence for school
purposes and to finish high school at Sheehan High School in
Wallingford. The stipulation further provided that "the
[plaintiff] shall have parenting time to include every other
weekend from Friday after school until Monday when school
commences or [9 a.m.]." It also stated that "[i]f
the custodial parent cannot be with the children, it is the
custodial parents responsibility to make arrangements for
the children unless the noncustodial parent agrees in writing
to take the children."
Subsequent to entering into the stipulation, both parties
filed various motions with the court. On August 8, 2017, the
court granted the defendants May 9, 2017 motion for contempt
and found the plaintiff in contempt for failing to make
arrangements for the children when he could not take them
during his scheduled parenting time. On October 4, 2017, the
court denied the plaintiffs September 19, 2017 motion for
contempt when it determined that the issues raised by the
plaintiffs motion were barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. On October 19, 2017, the court granted the
defendants August 23, 2017 motion for contempt and found the
plaintiff in contempt for failing to pay $3000 toward the
purchase of a vehicle for their children. On November 21,
2017, the court denied the plaintiffs July 31, 2017 motion
to modify his child support obligation, concluding that the
plaintiff had "failed to meet his burden of showing a
significant change in his financial circumstances ...."
From these judgments the plaintiff now appeals.
[191
Conn.App. 297] I
CONTEMPT CLAIMS
The
plaintiff first claims that the court improperly (1) granted
the defendants May 9, 2017 motion for contempt, (2) denied
his September 19, 2017 motion for contempt, and (3) granted
the defendants August 23, 2017 motion for contempt. We
disagree.
We
begin by setting forth our standard of review and relevant
legal principles. "[O]ur analysis of a judgment of
contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we must
resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying
order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear
and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt ....
This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review ....
Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was
sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or
refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a
review of the trial courts determination of whether the
violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or
misunderstanding." (Citations omitted.) In re Leah
S., 284 Conn. 685, 693-94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).
"Civil contempt is committed when a person violates an
order of court which requires that person in specific and
definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or
series of acts .... Whether an order is sufficiently clear
and unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of
contempt because [t]he contempt remedy is particularly harsh
... and may be founded solely upon some clear and express
direction of the court .... One cannot be placed in contempt
for failure to read the courts mind .... It is also
logically sound that a person must not
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be found in contempt of a court order when ambiguity either
renders compliance with the order impossible, because it is
not clear enough to put a reasonable person on notice of what
[191 Conn.App. 298] is required for compliance, or makes the
order susceptible to a courts arbitrary interpretation of
whether a party is in compliance with the order."
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., at 695, 935 A.2d 1021.
The
order at issue is the stipulation, entered into by the
parties, which was made an order of the court. "In
domestic relations cases, [a] judgment rendered in accordance
with ... a stipulation of the parties is to be regarded and
construed as a contract .... It is well established that [a]
contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the
parties, which is determined from the language used
interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and
the circumstances connected with the transaction .... [T]he
intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and
reasonable construction of the written words and ... the
language used must be accorded its common, natural, and
ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied
to the subject matter of the contract .... Where the language
of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to
be given effect according to its terms. A court will not
torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning
leaves no room for ambiguity .... Similarly, any ambiguity in
a contract must emanate from the language used in the
contract rather than from one partys subjective perception
of the terms .... Con-tract language is unambiguous when it
has a definite and precise meaning ... concerning which there
is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion .... In
contrast, an agreement is ambiguous when its language is
reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation ....
Nevertheless, the mere fact that the parties advance
different interpretations of the language in question does
not necessitate a conclusion that the language is
ambiguous." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Mettler v. Mettler, 165 Conn.App. 829,
836-37, 140 A.3d 370 (2016).
[191
Conn.App. 299] A
The
plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the
defendants May 9, 2017 motion for contempt when it held him
in contempt for violating the stipulation by failing to make
arrangements for the children when he could not be with them
during his scheduled parenting time. Specifically, the
plaintiff argues that the courts holding was improper
because the stipulation is ambiguous and there was no
evidence that his violation was wilful. We disagree.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
claim on appeal. Before approving the stipulation and making
it an order, the court canvassed the parties about what they
meant in paragraph 4.2, which states: "If the custodial
parent cannot be with the children, it is the custodial
parents responsibility to make arrangements for the children
unless the noncustodial parent agrees in writing to take the
children." The court stated: "So, when I read this
paragraph, I read [it] to be [that] if the custodial parent
cannot be with the children— lets say ... the
custodial parent is going to be absent for one night or
however many nights, it is the custodial parents
responsibility to make arrangements for the children unless
the noncustodial ...