United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
W. Thompson United States District Judge.
plaintiff, Randal Licari, is currently incarcerated at
Willard-Cybulski Correctional Institution, in Enfield,
Connecticut. He initiated this action by filing a complaint
pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary
damages and injunctive relief against Commissioner Scott
Semple, Drs. Syed Naqvi, Giles, Wu and Coleman, Physician
Assistant Kevin McCrystal, Nurses Heidi Green, Barbara
LaFrance, Dionne Botas and Shannon Beckford and Rikel
Lightner. The plaintiff alleged inter alia that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his hernia
condition both before and after he underwent hernia repair
surgery in April 2015 and that he requires a supplemental
surgical procedure to address a complication of the initial
surgery that has caused him continued groin pain.
9, 2017, the court dismissed the First Amendment retaliatory
transfer claim against all defendants and the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to medical and mental
health needs claims against defendants Semple, Giles and
Coleman. The court concluded that the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to medical needs claim would proceed
against defendants Naqvi, Wu, McCrystal, Green, LaFrance,
Botas, Beckford and Lightner in their individual and official
capacities. See IRO, ECF No. 7. On August 20, 2018, the court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the request for
declaratory relief. See Ruling, ECF No. 32.
the plaintiff and the defendants have moved for summary
judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied
and the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.
support of his motion, the plaintiff reiterates the
allegations in the complaint and claims that each defendant
was aware of but deliberately indifferent to the pain that he
experienced after he underwent hernia surgery in April 2015.
The defendants oppose the plaintiff's motion on the
ground that it does not comply with Rule 56(a)1, D. Conn. L.
District of Connecticut, a motion for summary judgment must
be accompanied by a Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement. See D. Conn.
L. Civ. R. 56(a)1 (“A party moving for summary judgment
shall file and serve with the motion and supporting
memorandum a document entitled ‘Local Rule 56(a)1
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,' which sets
forth, in separately numbered paragraphs meeting the
requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3, a concise statement of
each material fact as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue to be tried.”) Local Rule
56(a)3 further requires that each statement in the Rule
56(a)1 Statement “be followed by a specific citation to
(1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the
facts at trial, or (2) evidence that would be admissible at
trial” and that “[t]he affidavits, deposition
testimony, responses to discovery requests, or other
documents containing such evidence” be submitted
“with the Local Rule 56(a)1 . . . Statement in
conformity with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).” D. Conn. L. Civ.
the plaintiff filed a memorandum and two supplemental
memoranda in support of his motion, he did not file a Local
Rule 56(a)1 Statement. See ECF Nos. 35, 37, 43. Thus, the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment does not comply
with the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)1 or 3.
Additionally, the only evidence submitted by the plaintiff in
support of the arguments in the motion are four pages of his
medical records. The plaintiff did not file a declaration or
affidavit in support of his motion. The four pages of medical
records in and of themselves do not demonstrate the absence
of material facts in dispute or that the plaintiff is
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law” on his
claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”) Accordingly, the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. To the
extent that the memoranda in support of the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment include arguments that might
apply to the arguments raised in the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, the court considers those arguments
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.
defendants move for summary judgment on three grounds. In
response to their motion, the plaintiff has filed a
memorandum, a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, a declaration and
documentary exhibits in support of both the Local Rule 56(a)2
Statement and the declaration.
filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears
the burden of demonstrating “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law, ” and is
“genuine” if “a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on it.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The moving party may satisfy its burden “by
showing - that is pointing out to the district court - that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curium)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary
evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ” the
nonmoving party must do more than vaguely assert the
existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or
“rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Thus, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment
“must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating
the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.”
reviewing the record, the court must “construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and to draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters,
Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). The court may not, however, “make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence. . . . [because]
[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are
jury functions, not those of a judge.” Proctor v.
LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 607-08 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). If there is any
evidence in the record from which a reasonable factual
inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party on
the issue on which summary judgment is sought, however,
summary judgment is improper. See Security Ins.
Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391
F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
court reads a pro se party's papers liberally and
interprets them “to raise the strongest arguments that
they suggest.” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d
51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Despite this liberal interpretation, however,
allegations unsupported by admissible evidence “do not
create a material issue of fact” and cannot overcome a
properly supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock
v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).