United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS
HON.
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Marian Hassan Mohamed (“plaintiff”), brings this
appeal under §205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g),
seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner” or “defendant”)
denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”). Plaintiff has moved to reverse or remand
the Commissioner's decision. [Doc. #23]. Defendant has
filed a cross-motion seeking an order affirming the decision
of the Commissioner. [Doc. #25].
For the
reasons set forth below, plaintiff's Motion for Order
Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner or in the
Alternative Motion for Remand for a Hearing [Doc.
#23] is DENIED, and defendant's
Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the
Commissioner [Doc. #25] is
GRANTED.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY[2]
Plaintiff
filed an application for DIB on September 9, 2016, alleging
disability beginning May 23, 2016. See Certified Transcript
of the Administrative Record, Doc. #21, compiled on January
24, 2019, (hereinafter “Tr.”) at 202-03.
Plaintiff later amended her alleged onset date to August 3,
2016. See Tr. 23, Tr. 55-56. Plaintiff's application was
denied initially on November 30, 2016, see Tr. 146-56, and
upon reconsideration on February 27, 2017. See Tr. 136-44.
On
December 18, 2017, plaintiff, represented by Attorney Kevin
Blake, appeared and testified at a hearing before
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Brien Horan. See
generally Tr. 42-74. Vocational Expert (“VE”)
Susan Gaudet appeared and testified by telephone at the
administrative hearing. See Tr. 47, Tr. 74-84; see also Tr.
288-90. On January 2, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision. See Tr. 20-41. On October 17, 2018, the Appeals
Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the
ALJ's decision, thereby making the ALJ's January 2,
2018, decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See
Tr. 1-7. The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C.
§405(g).
Plaintiff,
now represented by Attorney Olia Yelner, timely filed this
action for review and moves to reverse the decision of the
Commissioner or alternatively to remand for a new hearing.
[Doc. #23]. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed
to develop the administrative record because he: (1) failed
to provide plaintiff with an English interpreter at the
administrative hearing; (2) failed to obtain certain medical
records and opinion evidence from plaintiff's treating
physicians; and (3) failed to obtain evidence from a medical
expert concerning plaintiff's off-task
limitations.[3] See generally Doc. #23-2 at 6-9. For the
reasons stated below, the Court finds that the ALJ did not
err as contended.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
review of a Social Security disability determination involves
two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether
the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in
making the determination. Second, the Court must decide
whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion; it is more than a “mere scintilla.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing court's responsibility is
to ensure that a claim has been fairly evaluated by the ALJ.
See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
The
Court does not reach the second stage of review - evaluating
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
conclusion - if the Court determines that the ALJ failed to
apply the law correctly. See Norman v. Astrue, 912
F.Supp.2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Court first
reviews the Commissioner's decision for compliance with
the correct legal standards; only then does it determine
whether the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence.” (citing Tejada v.
Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999))).
“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the
substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no
disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will
be deprived of the right to have her disability determination
made according to the correct legal principles.”
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).
“[T]he
crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with
sufficient specificity to enable [a reviewing court] to
decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582,
587 (2d Cir. 1984) (alterations added) (citing Treadwell
v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983)). The ALJ
is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, but
a “finding that the witness is not credible must
nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to
permit intelligible plenary review of the record.”
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255,
260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Carroll v. Sec. Health and
Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983)).
“Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on
the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to
enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial
evidence exists to support that finding.” Johnston
v. Colvin, No. 3:13CV00073(JCH), 2014 WL 1304715, at *6
(D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Peoples v. Shalala,
No. 92CV4113, 1994 WL 621922, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 4,
1994)).
It is
important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision,
this Court's role is not to start from scratch. “In
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited
to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507
(2d Cir. 2009)). “[W]hether there is
substantial evidence supporting the appellant's view is
not the question here; rather, we must decide whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
decision.” Bonet ex rel. T.B. v.
Colvin, 523 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary
order).
Finally,
some of the Regulations cited in this decision, particularly
those applicable to the review of medical source evidence,
were amended effective March 27, 2017. Those “new
regulations apply only to claims filed on or after March 27,
2017.” Smith v. Comm'r, 731 Fed.Appx. 28,
30 n.1 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Where a
plaintiff's claim for benefits was filed prior to March
27, 2017, “the Court reviews the ALJ's decision
under the earlier regulations[.]” Rodriguez v.
Colvin, No. 3:15CV1723(DFM), 2018 WL 4204436, at *4 n.6
(D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2018); White v. Comm'r, No.
17CV4524(JS), 2018 WL 4783974, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2018) (“While the Act was amended effective March 27,
2017, the Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the
earlier regulations because the Plaintiff's application
was filed before the new regulations went into effect.”
(citation omitted)).
III.
SSA LEGAL STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, every individual who is under a
disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42
U.S.C. §423(a)(1).
To be
considered disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to
benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is unable to
work after a date specified “by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment
or impairments must be “of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§404.1520(c) (requiring that the impairment
“significantly limit[] ... physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities” to be considered
“severe” (alterations added)).
There
is a familiar five-step analysis used to determine if a
person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. In the
Second Circuit, the test is described as follows:
First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is
not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a
“severe impairment” which significantly limits
his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry
is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant
has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
Secretary will consider him disabled without considering
vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is
afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to
perform substantial gainful activity.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). If and only if the claimant does not have a
listed impairment, the Commissioner engages in the fourth and
fifth steps:
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to
perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether
there is other work which the claimant could perform. Under
the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden
of proof as to the first four steps, while the Secretary must
prove the final one.
Id.
“Through
the fourth step, the claimant carries the burdens of
production and persuasion, but if the analysis proceeds to
the fifth step, there is a limited shift in the burden of
proof and the Commissioner is obligated to demonstrate that
jobs exist in the national or local economies that the
claimant can perform given [her] residual functional
capacity.” Gonzalez ex rel. Guzman v. Dep't of
Health and Human Serv., 360 Fed.Appx. 240, 243 (2d Cir.
2010) (alteration added); Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). The residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) is what a person is
still capable of doing despite limitations resulting from her
physical and mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R.
§404.1545(a)(1).
“In
assessing disability, factors to be considered are (1) the
objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions
based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or
disability testified to by the claimant or others; and (4)
the claimant's educational background, age, and work
experience.” Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d
908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978).“[E]ligibility for benefits is
to be determined in light of the fact that ‘the Social
Security Act is a remedial statute to be broadly construed
and liberally applied.'” Id. (quoting
Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir.
1969)).
IV.
THE ALJ'S DECISION
Following
the above-described evaluation process, the ALJ concluded
that plaintiff “has not been under a disability within
the meaning of the Social Security Act from the amended
alleged onset date, August 3, 2016, through the date
of” his decision, January 2, 2018. Tr. 24; see also Tr.
36. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the amended alleged
onset date of August 3, 2016. See Tr. 26. At step two, the
ALJ found that plaintiff had the severe impairments of
osteoarthritis in the bilateral knees and obesity. See
Id. The ALJ found plaintiff's right thumb
injury, cholelithiasis, and injuries related to a past motor
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