Officially
released January 17, 2019
Appeal
from Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Sferrazza,
J.
Page 719
John
C. Drapp III, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(petitioner).
Matthew
A. Weiner, assistant states attorney, with whom, on the
brief, were John C. Smriga, states attorney, and Emily D.
Trudeau, assistant states attorney, for the appellee
(respondent).
Robinson,
C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, DAuria, Mullins, Kahn and
Ecker, Js.
OPINION
KAHN,
J.
[333
Conn. 482] The issue presented in this appeal[1] is whether
the transfer of a fourteen year old
Page 720
defendants case to the regular criminal docket and his
subsequent sentence of forty years imprisonment violate the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in
the dual due process provisions of the constitution of
Connecticut, article first, § § 8 and 9. The petitioner,
Timothy Griffin, appeals from the judgment of the habeas
court rendered in favor of the respondent, the Commissioner
of Correction. The petitioner argues that Connecticuts
"standards of decency" regarding acceptable
punishments for children who engage in criminal conduct have
evolved. That evolution, the petitioner contends, has
rendered both the transfer of a fourteen year old defendants
case to the regular criminal docket and the resultant
sentencing as an adult unconstitutional, in violation of the
state prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.[2] The respondent claims that, because
recent statutory modifications to the juvenile [333 Conn.
483] justice system do not reflect changes in contemporary
standards of decency, the habeas court properly granted the
respondents motion for summary judgment. The respondent
specifically cites to No. 15-183 of the 2015 Public Acts
(P.A. 15-183), which, inter alia, raised to fifteen years the
age of a child whose case is subject to transfer to the
regular criminal docket from the docket for juvenile matters,
and to No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), which
makes certain individuals eligible for parole. We agree that
recent statutory changes to the juvenile justice
system— which significantly limit, but do not entirely
prohibit, the transfer of a fourteen year old defendants
case to the regular criminal docket— do not evidence a
change in contemporary standards of decency for purposes of
the constitutional claim raised by the petitioner in the
present case. We also conclude that, because the petitioner
is eligible for parole pursuant to P.A. 15-84, his forty year
sentence complies with established constitutional safeguards.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The
record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural
history. In December, 1997, the then fourteen year old
petitioner was arrested in connection with the murder of a
grocery store owner during an armed robbery. The petitioner
and an accomplice donned masks and entered the grocery store,
where the petitioner shot and killed the store owner. The
perpetrators then emptied the cash register and fled.
Afterward, the petitioner "bragg[ed] about shooting the
owner of the store ...." At the time of the crime, the
petitioner had been removed from the normal school
curriculum, placed on juvenile probation, and required to
wear an electronic bracelet to monitor his location because,
allegedly, he had assaulted a teacher. The petitioners case
was automatically transferred to the regular criminal docket
pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46b-127 (a). In
1999, he entered open guilty pleas to [333 Conn. 484] felony
murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) §
53a-54c and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a)
(2). He received a total effective sentence of forty years
imprisonment. At that time, the petitioner was not granted
the possibility of eligibility for parole.
In the
petitioners first habeas action in 2007, the habeas court
found that the petitioner
Page 721
failed to prove that his pleas had not been entered
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily but rendered
judgment in his favor on his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel and restored his right to file for sentence
review. In a per curiam decision, this court affirmed the
judgment of the habeas court. Griffin v. Commissioner of
Correction, 292 Conn. 591, 597, 973 A.2d 1271 (2009).
Subsequently, upon the petitioners application for review,
the Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court found that
the sentence imposed was "neither inappropriate [nor]
disproportionate." State v. Griffin, Docket No.
CR- 97-135279, 2010 WL 1794692, *2 (Conn. Super.
February 23, 2010).
After
filing and then withdrawing a second habeas petition, the
petitioner filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
that is the subject of this appeal.[3] The [333 Conn. 485]
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the
habeas court granted the respondents motion.[4] The habeas
court then granted the petitioners petition for
certification to appeal in September, 2017. See General
Statutes § 52-470 (g). This appeal followed.
This
appeal presents issues of constitutional interpretation and
statutory construction, which are matters of law subject to
our plenary review. See, e.g., General Statutes § 1-2z;
Tannone v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 665,
671, 189 A.3d 99 (2018); Honulik v. Greenwich, 293
Conn. 698, 710, 980 A.2d 880 (2009). Summary judgment shall
be granted if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Practice Book § 17-49; see
also Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 6-7, 993 A.2d
955 (2010). The party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Testa, supra,
at 6-7, 993 A.2d 955.
I
We
first consider whether the passage of P.A. 15-183 establishes
that contemporary standards of decency have evolved, such
that it is unconstitutional to transfer the case of a
fourteen year old defendant from the docket ...