April 23, 2019
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
from Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, Hon. Stanley Novack, judge
H. Lee, for the appellant (plaintiff).
M. Shanley, for the appellee (defendant).
Judges: DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Diana, Js. DIANA, J.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Conn.App. 305] DIANA, J.
plaintiff, Maya Boreen, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court granting the postjudgment motion filed by the
defendant, Kevin A. Boreen, to terminate alimony, to
determine overpayments, and to set a repayment schedule on
the ground that, under the parties' separation agreement,
the defendant's alimony obligation terminated upon the
court's finding that the plaintiff was " living with
another person." The plaintiff claims that the court (1)
erred in finding that she was " living with another
person" pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86
(b), and (2) improperly concluded
that the only remedy available upon a finding that she was
" living with another person" was to terminate the
defendant's alimony obligation. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Conn.App. 306] The following procedural history and facts, as
found by the trial court, are relevant to this appeal. The
twenty-four year marriage between the parties was dissolved
on September 29, 2009. The parties executed a separation
agreement, which was approved by the court and incorporated
in the dissolution decree by reference. The separation
agreement provides that
the defendant was to pay alimony to the plaintiff "
until the earliest of the [defendant's] death, the
[plaintiff's] death, the [plaintiff's] remarriage or
'living with another person' as defined in [Article]
2.2 [of the separation agreement]." Article 2.2 of the
agreement provides in relevant part: " The
[defendant's] obligation to pay alimony shall terminate
on the date . . . the [c]ourt determines [the plaintiff]
commenced 'living with another person.' . . . For
purposes of this Agreement, the [plaintiff] shall be deemed
to have been 'living with another person' in the
event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding that
the alimony should terminate or be reduced pursuant to the
provisions of [General Statutes] § 46b-86 (b)."
December, 2009, the plaintiff began dating Robert Rodriguez.
On March 13, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to terminate
alimony, to determine overpayments, and to set a repayment
schedule, claiming that, although the plaintiff still
maintained her own home, she had been living with Rodriguez
within the meaning of § 46b-86 (b) since July, 2013, such
that her financial needs had been altered. At the hearing on
the defendant's motion, Rodriguez testified that,
although he began dating the plaintiff in 2009, he had only
owned and maintained a home in Wilton since July, 2013. The
[192 Conn.App. 307] plaintiff's home, which she purchased
in August, 2011, is also located in Wilton. Rodriguez
testified that the couple spends " between three and
four" nights together each week at one of their
respective homes, but that neither of them contribute to the
maintenance of the other's residence. He further
testified that the plaintiff typically cooks for the couple
twice per week and that he pays for their meals when they eat
out more than half, and possibly as much as 75 percent of the
time. Further, the plaintiff, who works part-time as an
artist, keeps a rent-free art studio at Rodriguez's home
Importantly, Rodriguez admitted that in approximately
January, 2015, he added the plaintiff to his health insurance
policy and indicated on the enrollment form that the
plaintiff was his " domestic partner." Before
receiving health insurance coverage as a domestic partner
under Rodriguez' policy, the plaintiff's insurance
company required her to pay annually a $6000 deductible and a
20 percent co-pay. Under Rodriguez' health insurance
policy, the deductible is $750 per incident. The
plaintiff's total estimated share of the health insurance
premium payments that had been made on her behalf by
Rodriguez was, at the time of trial, in excess of $26,000.
Although Rodriguez testified that the plaintiff had agreed to
reimburse him for her portion of the health insurance
premium, that agreement was not reduced to writing and the
plaintiff had made no reimbursement payments to Rodriguez at
the time of the hearing on the defendant's motion.
court granted the defendant's motion in a memorandum of
decision dated October 31, 2017, finding that " at least
since January, 2015, the parties have been living together,
and that the arrangement has altered the financial needs of
[the plaintiff] within the meaning of General Statutes §