United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF, ECF NOS. 28, 33, 34
MICHAEL P. SHEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before this Court is the plaintiff's second motion for
preliminary injunctive relief, ECF No. 28, and cross-motions
for summary judgment filed by both parties, ECF Nos. 33, 34.
For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT in part and
DENY in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
DENY the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and
schedule this case for a consolidated trial on the merits and
hearing on the second motion for preliminary injunctive
relief, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(a)(2).
I.
Procedural History
On June
14, 2018, the plaintiff, Rodney Martin Kyles, an inmate
currently confined at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution (“MWCI”) in Suffield, Connecticut,
brought a civil action pro se under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief against
Dr. Omprakash Pillai and Nursing Supervisor Tawanna Furtick
for violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment. ECF No. 1. The plaintiff claimed that
the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
medical needs by refusing to treat him for his chronic back
problem and/or provide him with a double mattress or hospital
mattress to alleviate his back pain. Id. This Court
issued its Initial Review Order on November 6, 2018
permitting the complaint to proceed on the Eighth Amendment
claim against both defendants. ECF No. 7. The plaintiff filed
an amended complaint on November 14, 2018. ECF No. 19. The
defendants answered the amended complaint on March 8, 2019.
ECF No. 23.
On
November 26, 2018, the plaintiff filed his first motion for
preliminary injunctive relief. ECF No. 9. He requested that
this Court order the defendants to provide him with a
“medium-size[d] hospital mattress” to alleviate
his back pain. Id. at 3, 5. This Court denied the
motion without prejudice because the plaintiff failed to
establish imminent irreparable harm in the absence of a
preliminary injunction. ECF No. 22 at 4. The Court relied on
evidence presented by the defendants that (1) the plaintiff
continues to be evaluated by Dr. Pillai on a regular basis,
(2) the defendants provided the plaintiff with an additional
mattress in January 2019 to alleviate his back pain, and (3)
Dr. Pillai opined that a medical mattress was not appropriate
for the plaintiff's condition. Id. However, the
plaintiff presented evidence that, as of January 29, 2019,
Nurse Shantay Wells submitted a written recommendation that
the plaintiff be provided with a medical mattress for his
ongoing back and leg pain, which the defendants had not yet
reviewed at the time the first motion was filed. See
Id. Therefore, the Court permitted the plaintiff one
opportunity to refile his motion for preliminary injunctive
relief after the defendants had a chance to review Wells'
assessment and recommendation. Id. at 4-5.
On May
3, 2019, the plaintiff filed his second motion for
preliminary injunctive relief. ECF No. 28. He states that he
was re-evaluated by Dr. Pillai on April 1, 2019, and
“it appear[s] that Dr. Pillai is in agreement with
Nurse Wells' recommendation.” ECF No. 28-8 at 2. He
also has provided affidavits from other inmates at MWCI
attesting to the inadequacy of the standard mattresses in the
facility and averring that the plaintiff continues to suffer
ongoing pain. See ECF Nos. 28-10, 28-11, 28-12,
28-13. Therefore, he requests an order that the defendants
provide him with a “medium size[d] hospital
mattress” to alleviate his ongoing back pain. ECF No.
28 at 1-2. In a written objection to the motion, Dr. Pillai
states that, despite Wells' assessment, “there is
no medical need for a medical mattress for Mr. Kyles.”
ECF No. 31 at 8.
On July
4, 2019, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. ECF No. 33. They
contend that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were
deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's medical needs
based on the evidence presented, and alternatively, they are
entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 33-1 at 7-8. The
plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendants' motion
and his own motion for summary judgment, contending that the
defendants' refusal to provide him with a medical
mattress constitutes deliberate indifference. ECF Nos. 34-2,
37-2. The defendants have not responded to the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
II.
Standard for Summary Judgment
In a
motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving
party to establish that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that it is “entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is
“material” if it “might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law” and a dispute of
fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Dister v.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114
(2d Cir. 1988) (mere existence of alleged factual dispute
will not defeat summary judgment motion). The moving party
may satisfy this burden “by showing - that is pointing
out to the district court - that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.”
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105
(2d Cir. 2002) (per curium) (internal quotations
omitted; citations omitted).
When a
motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and
“demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, ” the nonmoving party must do more than
vaguely assert the existence of some unspecified disputed
material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or
unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra
Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted). The nonmoving party “must come
forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of
a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id.
In
reviewing the record, the Court must “construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and to draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters,
Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). If there is any evidence from which a reasonable
factual inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party for the issue on which summary judgment is sought, then
summary judgment is improper. See Security Ins. Co. of
Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77,
83 (2d Cir. 2004).
Where
one party is proceeding pro se, the Court must read
his papers liberally and interpret them “to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.” Willey v.
Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this liberal
interpretation, however, “[u]nsupported allegations do
not create a material issue of fact” and cannot
overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811
(2003).[1]
III.
Facts of the Case
The
Court draws the following facts from the parties' Local
Rule 56(a) Statements and supporting exhibits. ECF Nos. 33-2,
34-1, 34-4, 34-5, 37-1, 37-2.
In
2009, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a neurological
disorder in his spine. ECF Nos. 34-1 at ¶ 1, 34-4 at 2.
In 2010, he underwent bilateral laminectomies on his L-3 and
L-5 vertebrae and an MRI, which revealed “severe
multilevel spinal stenosis and foramina narrowing.” ECF
Nos. 33-2 at ¶ 4, 34-4 at 5, 7, 37-1 at ¶ 4. The
procedures resulted in “good relief of [his]
symptoms.” ECF Nos. 34-1 at ¶ 1, 34-4 at 7. Dr.
Pillai has been treating the plaintiff since 2010, when he
started ...