United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Charles S. Haight, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
Albert Farah, a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at
the Garner Correctional Institution ("Garner") in
Newtown, Connecticut, has filed a civil rights action pro
se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four
Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC")
officials employed at Garner in their individual and official
capacities: Robert Richeson, Chief Operations Officer of
Health Services; Michael DeSena, Medical Supervisor; Adriana
De Barrios, Nursing Supervisor; and Michelle Britton,
Registered Nurse (collectively, "the Defendants").
Doc. 1 ("Compl."). He seeks unspecified monetary
damages. Id. at 15. On August 16, 2019, Magistrate
Judge William I. Garfinkel granted Farah's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 5. The Court denied
Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction on September 5, 2019. See
Court now reviews Farah's Complaint to determine whether
his claims may proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the
following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court must dismiss a complaint "in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity[, ] or officer or
employee of a governmental entity," that "is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted." See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a)-(b); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d
Cir. 2007). Although detailed allegations are not required, a
complaint must "must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Id. This plausibility standard is not simply a
"probability requirement," but imposes a standard
higher than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." Id.
undertaking this analysis, the Court must "draw all
reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, assume
all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648
F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the Court is "not bound to accept
conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual conclusions," id., and "a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Ultimately, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense." Id. at
se submissions "are reviewed with special
solicitude, and 'must be construed liberally and
interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.'" Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l
Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). See also Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed
pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and 'a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, mus t be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'" (internal citations omitted)). This
liberal approach, however, does not exempt pro se
litigants from the minimum pleading requirements described
above: A pro se plaintiff's complaint still must
"'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 Fed.Appx. 60,
61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Therefore, even in a pro se case, "threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Chavis
v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), and the Court may not
"invent factual allegations" that the plaintiff has
not pleaded, id.
was diagnosed with diabetes at the age of 33, over 25 years
ago. Doc. 1 ("Compl.") at 10. On March 4, 2019,
Farah walked to the medical unit because he was feeling ill.
Id. at 6. After examining him, Nurse Britton told
Farah that he did not have an abnormal temperature and that
he should rest and drink water. Id. Afterward,
Britton sent him back to his housing unit. Id.
next day, Farah declined to eat breakfast, lunch, or dinner,
and he did not show up to receive his 4:30 p.m. medication.
Id. at 6. Thereafter, Nurse Ginger came to his cell
and told him that she was going to ask a lieutenant if he
could be escorted to the medical unit in a wheelchair.
Id. Farah waited for one hour, but no officers
arrived with a wheelchair. Id. He then decided to
walk to the medical unit where Nurse Ginger assessed his
vitals and then placed him in the infirmary. Id.
after, on March 6, Dr. Valletta examined Farah and concluded
that he was suffering from bronchitis. Compl. at 6. Farah
remained in the infirmary for five days. Id. Before
being placed in the infirmary, he had repeatedly requested
help for chest pains, high temperature, coughing, and loss of
appetite, but Nurse Britton did not assist him. Id.
at 7. Farah also experienced extreme exhaustion, weight loss,
and head pain during his five days in the infirmary.
April 22, 2019, Britton gave Farah another inmate's
insulin medication. Compl. at 8. After eating his dinner,
Farah started shaking and sweating, which he believed to be
signs of the onset of hypoglycemia. Id. He asked
Correction Officer Fortin to call the medical unit and
request that Britton come to his unit to provide him with
emergency sugar paste and check his vital signs. Id.
Fortin later came to Farah's cell and told him that he
had called the medical unit several times and paged Britton,
but she did not call him back. Id. Farah then asked
his cellmate for peanut butter and candy, which he ate with
sugar packets to stop himself from shaking and sweating.
Id. at 8-9. Britton later gave Farah an NPH and
regular insulin injection mix, even though Farah needed 30
units of Lantus insulin. Id. at 9.
April 23, 2019, Farah asked Britton about her failure to
return Officer Fortin's calls on the previous day. Compl.
at 9. Britton said that she was in the medical unit and was
later in Farah's unit to pick up medical inmate requests,
but was never informed by the officers about Farah's
medical issue. Id.
days later, on April 26, 2019, Farah was walking toward the
medical unit to receive his medication. Compl. at 10. At that
time, Fortin informed him that he had contacted the medical
unit several times over the course of two hours on April 22
and had paged Britton three times, but Britton never called
him back. Id. When Britton arrived, Fortin asked her
why she ...