United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is
an administrative appeal following the denial of the
plaintiff, Karen Roberto's, application for Title XVI
supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”). It
is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).[2] Plaintiff now
moves for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), or in the alternative, an order
remanding her case for a rehearing. [Doc. # 15]. The
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming his
decision. [Doc. # 16]. After careful consideration of the
arguments raised by both parties, and thorough review of the
administrative record, the Court denies Plaintiff's
motion to reverse and grants the Commissioner's motion to
affirm.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will meet this definition if his or
her impairments are of such severity that the claimant cannot
perform pervious work and also cannot, considering the
claimant's age education, and work experience,
“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner must follow a sequential evaluation process for
assessing disability claims. The five steps of this process
are as follows: (1) the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe
impairment, ” the Commissioner must ask whether, based
solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which “meets or equals” an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the Listings). If
so, and it meets the durational requirements, the
Commissioner will consider the claimant disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; (4) if not, the Commissioner then asks
whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or
she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or
her past work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform
his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work in the national economy which the
claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four
steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden of proof on
the final step. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146,
149 (2d Cir. 2014).
“A
district court reviewing a final . . . decision [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v.
Califano, 651 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, [are] conclusive
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, the
district court may not make a de novo determination
of whether a plaintiff is disabled in reviewing a denial of
disability benefits. Id.; Wagner v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.
1990). Rather, the court's function is to first ascertain
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles
in reaching his conclusion, and then whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen,
817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, absent legal
error, a decision of the Commissioner cannot be set aside if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Berry v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be
“more than a scintilla or touch of proof here and there
in the record.” Id. If the Commissioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, that decision
will be sustained, even where there may also be substantial
evidence to support the plaintiff's contrary position.
Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1982).
BACKGROUND
a.
Facts
Plaintiff
filed her SSI application on December 17, 2014, alleging
disability onset date of August 4, 2014. Her claim was denied
at both the initial and reconsideration levels. Thereafter,
Plaintiff requested a hearing. On March 8, 2017, a hearing
was held before Administrative Law Judge I.K. Harrington
(“the ALJ”). Plaintiff, who was represented by
counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified
at the hearing. On April 6, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision
denying Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff timely requested
review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. On
August 7, 2018, the Appeals Council denied review, making the
ALJ's decision the final determination of the
Commissioner. This action followed.
Plaintiff
was forty-six years old on the alleged disability onset date.
(R. 17). She has a high school education and has completed
one year of college. (Id.). She is able to
communicate in English. (Id.). Plaintiff has no past
relevant work experience. (R. 67). Plaintiff's complete
medical history is set forth in the Joint Stipulation of
Facts filed by the parties. [Doc. # 15-3]. The Court adopts
this stipulation and incorporates it by reference herein.
b.
The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ
followed the sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act.
At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the date of her SSI
application. (R. 12). At Step Two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease and anxiety
disorder are severe. (Id.). The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff's obesity, right knee pain, left wrist pain,
left shoulder pain, hyperlipidemia, asthma, and chronic
sinusitis are not severe impairments because they have no
more than minimal effects on her ability to meet the basic
demands of work activity. (R. 12-14). At Step Three, the ALJ
found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments. (R. 14-16). Next, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff retains the following residual
functional capacity[3]:
Plaintiff can perform light work except she is capable of
frequent balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling,
and climbing ramps and stairs. She is capable of occasional
climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She is capable of
frequent handling and fingering with the bilateral upper
extremities. She is able to have occasional exposure to
unprotected heights. She is able to perform simple routine
tasks involving no more than simple, short instructions and
simple work-related decisions, with few workplace changes.
She is able to be in a non-public work setting and have
occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.
(R. 16). At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has no past
relevant work. (R. 21). Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ relied
on the testimony of the VE to conclude that there are jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy
Plaintiff can perform. (Id.). Specifically, the VE
testified that a person with Plaintiff's vocational
factors and the assessed RFC can perform the positions of
cleaner, laundry ...