May 28, 2019
to recover damages for, inter alia, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where
the court, Bright, J., granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the complaint and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford File No.
White, with whom, on the brief, was A. Paul Spinella, for the
C. Rickman, with whom was Cristina Sala-mone, for the
Alvord, Elgo and Moll, Js.
plaintiff, Nailia Vodovskaia-Scandura, appeals from the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the
defendants, the Hartford Headache Center, LLC, and Tanya
Bilchik, M.D. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of
material fact existed as to (1) the extreme and outrageous
conduct element of her intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, and (2) the duty and causation elements of
her negligence claim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
the termination of her employment, the plaintiff commenced
this civil action against the defendants in 2013. Her second
amended complaint contained twelve counts. In response,
the defendants filed an answer and several special defenses.
Hartford Headache Center, LLC, also filed a counterclaim
against the plaintiff sounding in conversion, statutory
theft, and replevin.
defendants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment on
all twelve counts of that complaint. In opposing the motion,
the plaintiff conceded that she could not prevail on ten of
her twelve counts and, thus, requested leave to amend her
complaint accordingly. In granting that request, the court
indicated that it would consider the defendants' motion
for summary judgment in light of the allegations set forth in
her revised pleading. Days later, the plaintiff filed her
amended complaint, which contained two counts alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.
By memorandum of decision dated October 31, 2017, the court
concluded, as a matter of law, that judgment should enter in
favor of the defendants on both counts because the plaintiff
had not provided an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the
extreme and outrageous conduct element of her intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim or the duty and
causation elements of her negligence claim. On appeal,
the plaintiff challenges the propriety of that determination.
examination of the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof
submitted, as well as the briefs and arguments of the
parties, persuades us that the judgment should be affirmed.
The issues properly were resolved in the court's thorough
and well reasoned memorandum of decision. See
Vodovskaia-Scandura v. Hartford Headache Center,
LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-13-6044074-S (October 31, 2017) (reprinted at
192 Conn.App. 562, A.3d). We therefore adopt it as a proper
statement of the relevant facts, issues, and applicable law,
as it would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the
discussion contained therein. See Citizens Against
Overhead Power Line Construction v. Connecticut Siting
Council, 311 Conn. 259, 262, 86 A.3d 463 (2014);
Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of
Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn.App. 79, 81, 153 A.3d 687
judgment is affirmed.
filed October 31, 2017
action arises out of the plaintiff's employment with the
defendant Hartford Headache Center, LLC (LLC). The defendant
Tanya Bilchik is the sole member of the LLC. The
plaintiff's second amended complaint dated April 29,
2015, alleged twelve causes of action related to how the
plaintiff was treated while employed by the LLC. The
defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all twelve
counts. The LLC also seeks summary judgment on its six count
counterclaim, which alleges that the plaintiff converted and
stole records belonging to the LLC, including certain
confidential patient records. In response, the plaintiff
concedes that judgment should enter for the defendants on ten
of the twelve counts of her complaint. She argues, however,
that there are genuine issues of material fact as to her
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (ninth
count) and her negligence claim (eleventh count). As to the
counterclaim, the plaintiff does not deny taking the records
in question, but argues that the LLC's claims are time
barred. Consequently, the plaintiff asks that summary
judgment enter in her favor on all six counts of the
bases for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, as pled in the second amended complaint, are that the
defendants misrepresented to others that the plaintiff had
engaged in improper conduct and a lack of integrity in the
performance of her professional duties; the defendants
solicited false complaints about the plaintiff from patients
and included those falsities in patient medical records and
charts; and the defendants, in an effort to distort the
plaintiff's professional achievements, omitted materials
from her personal file that reflected favorably on her
performance as a physician. In their motion for summary
judgment, the defendants argue that none of these
allegations, even if true, are sufficiently extreme or
outrageous to support a claim of intentional infliction of
basis for the plaintiff's negligence claim is her
allegation that the defendants refused to allow the plaintiff
to leave work to see a doctor for abdominal pain she was
experiencing. She claims that as a result of the
defendants' conduct, her treatment was delayed, and as a
result of the delay she suffered complications, including
infertility. The defendants argue that they owed the
plaintiff no duty; they, in fact, did tell the plaintiff to
leave work and see a doctor when she complained of the pain;
and that there is no competent evidence that any delay in
treatment caused the harm she is claiming.
argument on the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff filed a request to amend her complaint.
Attached to her request was her proposed fourth amended
revised complaint. The proposed amended revised complaint
is limited to just the intentional infliction of emotional
distress (first count) and negligence (second count) claims.
It, thus, removes the other claims as to which the plaintiff
agreed that summary judgment could enter. The proposed
amended revised complaint also adds allegations of
mistreatment, primarily in support of the plaintiff's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
particular, the proposed revisions allege that the
defendants' office manager, Denise McGrath, created a
hostile work environment by intimidation, humiliation,
constant criticism and bullying of the plaintiff.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that she was bullied to
maximize bill-able hours, including forcing patients to come
in when not medically required. The plaintiff also alleges
that she was constantly criticized for not bringing in new
patients and for how she conducted herself professionally. As
to the negligence claim, the proposed amended revised
complaint specifies that the abdominal pain the plaintiff
suffered from was appendicitis and specifies the date she
reported the pain to the defendant as October 3, 2011.
defendants opposed the filing of the proposed amended revised
complaint because it would unduly prejudice them and was an
attempt to ‘‘end run'' the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. By an order
issued today, the court overruled the defendants'
objection because the allegations set forth in the proposed
amendment were known to the defendants in that the plaintiff
testified to them at her deposition in October, 2016, and
because the amendments do not affect the nature of the
defendants' arguments or the court's analysis.
Specifically, the court must still determine whether the new
allegations are sufficiently extreme and outrageous to
support a claim of ...