Argued
May 21, 2019
Action
to recover unpaid personal property taxes, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, where the parties entered into a
stipulated agreement; thereafter, the court,
Vacchelli, J., granted the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment as to liability and denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment as to liability,
and the defendant appealed to this court, which granted the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, from which the
defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to the
Supreme Court, which reversed this court's judgment and
remanded the case to this court with direction to deny the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss and for further
proceedings. Reversed; judgment directed.
Aaron
S. Bayor, with whom was David R. Roth, for the appellant
(defendant).
Lloyd
L. Langhammer, for the appellee (plaintiff).
DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Noble, Js.
OPINION
NOBLE,
J.
In this
action to collect unpaid personal property taxes, the
defendant, WMS Gaming, Inc., appeals from the summary
judgment as to liability only rendered by the trial court in
favor of the plaintiff, the town of Ledyard, awarding it
attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes §
12-161a.[1] The defendant's sole claim on appeal
is that the trial court improperly concluded that the
defendant was liable for attorney's fees incurred by the
plaintiff while litigating a collateral action in federal
court in addition to the fees incurred while pursuing this
action. Specifically, it argues that the court improperly
determined that the fees incurred in the collateral action
were ‘‘as a result of and directly related
to'' this collection action within the meaning of
§ 12-161a. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the
judgment of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. On August 3, 2006, two years prior to commencing the
present action, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation (Tribal
Nation) filed an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut challenging the authority of
the state of Connecticut and the plaintiff to impose property
taxes on slot machines owned by Atlantic City Coin & Slot
Co. (AC Coin) and leased to the Tribal Nation, for use in its
gaming operations. In that complaint, the Tribal Nation
alleged that the plaintiff lacked the authority to impose the
property tax because such taxation is preempted by federal
regulation of Indian gaming pursuant to both the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(IGRA), and the Final Mashan-tucket Pequot Gaming Procedures,
56 Fed. Reg. 24996 (May 31, 1991), and that the taxation was
an illegal interference with the Tribal Nation's
sovereignty. The present action was filed on June 23, 2008,
to collect unpaid personal property taxes for gaming
equipment owned by the defendant and leased to the Tribal
Nation for its gaming operations.
Our
Supreme Court, in a previous appeal from the judgment of this
court, recited the following additional relevant facts and
procedural history: ‘‘[T]he plaintiff [in the
present action] sought $18, 251.23 in unpaid personal
property taxes, plus costs, interest, and penalties. In
addition, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees pursuant
to . . . § 12-161a.
‘‘Shortly
after the plaintiff had commenced the underlying state
action, the Tribal Nation filed [a second] action in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
challenging the authority of the state of
Connecticut[2] and the plaintiff to impose the taxes at
issue in the present state action.[3] Although it was not a party
to the federal action commenced by the Tribal Nation, the
defendant filed a motion to stay the present state action
pending the outcome of the federal action, which the trial
court, Martin, J., granted.
‘‘On
March 27, 2012, the District Court ruled on cross motions for
summary judgment filed in the . . . federal action. The
District Court, determining that the authority of the state
and the plaintiff to impose the taxes was preempted by
federal law, granted the Tribal Nation's motion for
summary judgment and denied separate motions for summary
judgment filed by the plaintiff and the state . . . . See
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard, Docket No.
3:06CV1212 (WWE), 2012 WL 1069342, *12 (D. Conn. March 27,
2012), rev'd, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013). On July 15,
2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment,
concluding that the authority of the state and the plaintiff
to impose the taxes was not preempted by federal law. See
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457,
477 (2d Cir. 2013).
‘‘After
the proceedings had resumed in the present state action, the
parties executed a stipulation. Under the stipulation, the
parties agreed that the defendant had tendered payment to the
plaintiff for all outstanding taxes, accrued interest, and
accrued penalties at issue. They further agreed that the
plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and
costs incurred in the underlying state action, the amount of
which would be determined by the trial court and the payment
of which would be accepted by the plaintiff as satisfaction
of all of the taxes, interest, penalties, attorney's
fees, and costs recoverable by the plaintiff with respect to
the underlying state action. They disputed, however, whether
the trial court could also find the defendant liable for
attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff in defense of
the federal action commenced by the Tribal Nation to which
the defendant was not a party . . . . The parties agreed to
submit to the trial court the issue of whether the defendant
was liable for the federal action attorney's fees.
‘‘After
executing the stipulation, the parties filed . . . motions
for summary judgment as to liability only with respect to the
federal action attorney's fees. On October 6, 2016, the
trial court, Vacchelli, J., issued its memorandum of
decision granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, denying the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and rendering . . . judgment as to liability only
in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the federal action
attorney's fees. The trial court concluded that the
defendant was liable for the federal action attorney's
fees pursuant to § 12-161a. The trial court further
stated that the plaintiff could file a motion for
attorney's fees within thirty days and that a hearing
would be scheduled thereafter to determine the amount of the
attorney's fees to which the plaintiff is entitled.
Shortly thereafter, on October 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed
a motion for attorney's fees.
‘‘On
October 25, 2016, [before] the trial court [scheduled] a
hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney's
fees, the defendant appealed [from] the trial court's
decision with respect to the federal action attorney's
fees [to the Appellate Court].'' (Footnotes added;
internal ...