United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D.J.
Mery
Ann Astudillo (“Astudillo”) brought this civil
action pro se against United Food & Commercial
Workers International Union Industry Pension Fund (the
“Fund”) for wrongfully denying her payment of her
deceased husband’s pension in violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).
The Fund filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons
discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I.
FACTS
The
following facts are taken from UFCW’s Local Rule 56(a)
statement and supporting exhibits.[1]
The
Fund is a multiemployer pension benefit plan within the
meaning of Section 3(37)(a) of ERISA that provides pension
benefits for eligible employees who work primarily in the
retail food and manufacturing industries. ECF No. 44-3 at
¶ 1. The rights and benefits of participants and
beneficiaries of the Fund are established by the Fund’s
Amended and Restated Future Service Plan (the
“Plan”). Id. at ¶ 5. Section 11.12
of Article XI of the Plan provides that the Fund’s
Trustees shall have complete authority to interpret and apply
the provisions of the Plan, and to make factual
determinations regarding eligibility for benefits under the
Plan. Id. at ¶ 12. Section 11.12 further
provides that the Fund’s Trustees may delegate
responsibility to others, id. at ¶ 13, and that
any decision of the Trustees or their delegates shall be
final and binding and accorded the maximum deference
permitted by law, id. at ¶ 14. The Fund’s
Trustees have delegated the review of the appeals of the
Fund’s denial of benefits to a committee
(“Appeals Committee”) that is authorized to
review and act on behalf of the Trustees; the full Board of
Trustees reviews and ratifies the actions of the Appeals
Committee at its regularly scheduled meetings. Id.
at ¶ 15.
An
individual’s right to a benefit payable under the Plan
depends on whether the individual is a participant in the
Plan or has a recognized relationship with a participant.
Id. at ¶ 6. The Plan defines
“participant” as an employee who is eligible to
participate in the Plan, id. at ¶ 7, and
defines a “spouse” as the spouse of a participant
as “recognized under applicable law, ”
id. at ¶ 8. One of the benefits that may be
payable to the spouse of a participant is the Preretirement
Surviving Spouse Benefit Upon Death Before Age 65 under
Section 8.03 of Article VIII of the Plan (“Surviving
Spouse Benefit”). Id. at ¶ 9. A qualified
surviving spouse of a participant is eligible for the
Surviving Spouse Benefit if the participant “dies prior
to the earlier of the commencement of his pension under the
Plan or his attaining age 65.” Id. at ¶
10. To qualify as a surviving spouse for purposes of the
Surviving Spouse Benefit, “the surviving spouse and the
[p]articipant must have been married to each other throughout
the one-year period ending on the date of the
[p]articipant’s death.” Id. at ¶
11.
Pedro
Antonio Peñaloza (“Peñaloza”) was a
participant in the Fund who earned nine years and three
months of Future Service Pension Credit. Id. at
¶ 16. Astudillo married Peñaloza for the first
time on November 5, 1973, in Lima, Peru. Id. at
¶ 18; ECF No. 30-2 at 27-29. They divorced in Miami-Dade
County, Florida, on October 1, 2004. Id. at ¶
19; ECF No. 30-2 at 39-40. Then, on August 23, 2013, they
remarried in Middletown, Connecticut. ECF No. 44-3 at ¶
20; ECF No. 32-2 at 22. Peñaloza died on May 1, 2014
at the age of 59. ECF No. 44-3 at ¶ 21; ECF No. 30-2 at
23.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After
Peñaloza’s death, Astudillo applied to the Fund
for the Surviving Spouse Benefit, claiming she was entitled
to benefits under the terms of the Plan. ECF No. 44-3 at
¶ 22. The Fund reviewed the application and denied
benefits on the basis that Astudillo and Peñaloza were
not legally married for the full one-year period ending on
the date of Peñaloza’s death. Id. at
¶¶ 23-24. The Fund notified Astudillo of its
initial determination of her claim by letter dated August 11,
2015. Id. at ¶ 25. The letter also notified
Astudillo of the opportunity to submit additional materials
in support of her application within 30 days of the letter.
Id. at ¶ 26. Astudillo did not provide
additional information in support of her application within
30 days. Id. at ¶ 27. By letter dated September
11, 2015, the Fund notified Astudillo that her claim was
denied because she did not qualify as a surviving spouse,
id. at ¶ 28, and that she had the right to
appeal the denial to the Appeals Committee, id. at
¶ 29. On February 4, 2016, Astudillo appealed the denial
with the assistance of an attorney. Id. at ¶
30. She submitted additional documents with her appeal that
purported to show that she lived with Peñaloza for
more than one year prior to May 1, 2014, id. at
¶ 33, but she did not submit a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order, id. at ¶ 34. On April 13,
2016, the Appeals Committee considered the appeal and acted
on behalf of the Trustees to deny it because Astudillo did
not meet the requirements of a surviving spouse under Section
8.03 of Article VIII of the Plan. Id. at
¶¶ 31-32, 35. The Fund’s Board of Trustees
ratified this decision. Id. at ¶ 36. Astudillo
was notified of the decision by letter addressed to her
attorney dated April 19, 2016. Id. at ¶ 37.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The
court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving
party shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is
“material” if it “might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law, ” and a dispute is
“genuine” if “a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on it.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). If a motion for summary judgment is supported by
documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and
“demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, ” the nonmoving party must do more than
assert the existence of some unspecified disputed material
facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or
unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra
Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted). The party opposing the motion for summary
judgment “must come forward with specific evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact.” Id. In reviewing the record, the court
“must construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
its favor.” Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC v.
Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir.
2013).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Under
ERISA, a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action
“to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). “[A]
denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is
to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
“[W]here the written plan documents confer upon a plan
administrator the discretionary authority to determine
eligibility, we will not disturb the administrator’s
ultimate conclusion unless it is ‘arbitrary and
capricious.’” Pagan v. NYNEX Pension
Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted). “The administrator bears
the burden of showing that this deferential review
applies.” Kirk v. Readers Dig. Ass’n,
Inc., 57 Fed.Appx. 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, the
arbitrary and capricious standard applies because Section
11.12 of Article XI of the Plan provides that the
Fund’s Trustees shall have complete authority to
interpret and apply the provisions of the Plan, and to make
factual determinations regarding eligibility for benefits
under the Plan. ECF No. 44-3 at ¶ 12.
The
undisputed facts show that the Fund’s decision was not
arbitrary and capricious.[2]Section 8.03 of Article VIII of the
Plan requires that the surviving spouse and the participant
be married to each other throughout the one-year period
ending on the date of the participant’s death to
entitle the surviving spouse to benefits. Id. at
¶ 11; Article VIII, Section 8.03 of the Plan
(“[I]n order to be a qualified surviving spouse
eligible to receive the Preretirement Surviving Spouse
Benefit, the surviving spouse and the Participant must have
been married to each other throughout the one-year period
ending on the date of the Participant’s death.”).
Here, the undisputed facts show that although Astudillo and
Peñaloza were married for decades, they ended their
marriage and did not re-marry until approximately nine months
before Peñaloza’s death. ECF No. 43-3 at
¶¶ 18-21; ECF No. 30-2 at 27-29 (marriage
certificate showing that Astudillo and Peñaloza were
married on November 5, 1973); id. at 39-40 (final
judgment of dissolution of marriage showing ...