United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is
an administrative appeal following the denial of the
plaintiff, Kimberly Francis’, application for Title II
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). It is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).[2] Plaintiff now
moves for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), or in the alternative, an order
remanding her case for a rehearing. [Doc. # 13]. The
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming his
decision. [Doc. # 16. After careful consideration of the
arguments raised by both parties, and thorough review of the
administrative record, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
motion and remands the case for further proceedings.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will meet this definition if his or
her impairments are of such severity that the claimant cannot
perform pervious work and also cannot, considering the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience,
“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner must follow a sequential evaluation process for
assessing disability claims. The five steps of this process
are as follows: (1) the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe
impairment, ” the Commissioner must ask whether, based
solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which “meets or equals” an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the Listings). If
so, and it meets the durational requirements, the
Commissioner will consider the claimant disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; (4) if not, the Commissioner then asks
whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he
or she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or
her past work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform
his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work in the national economy which the
claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520; 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof on
the first four steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden
of proof on the final step. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014).
“A
district court reviewing a final . . . decision [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v.
Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly, the district court may not make a de
novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in
reviewing a denial of disability benefits. Id.;
Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court’s
function is to first ascertain whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal principles in reaching his
conclusion, and then whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d
983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, absent legal error, a
decision of the Commissioner cannot be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Berry v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Williams v. Bowen, 859
F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be
“more than a scintilla or touch of proof here and there
in the record.” Id. If the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, that decision will be sustained, even where there
may also be substantial evidence to support the
plaintiff’s contrary position. Schauer v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982).
I.
BACKGROUND
a.
Facts
Plaintiff
filed her DIB application on January 26, 2016, alleging an
onset of disability as of May 1, 2013. Her claim was denied
at both the initial and reconsideration levels. Thereafter,
Plaintiff requested a hearing. On November 15, 2017, a
hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Imelda K.
Harrington (“the ALJ”). Plaintiff, who was
represented by counsel, and a vocational expert
(“VE”) testified at the hearing. On January 25,
2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s
claims. Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s
decision by the Appeals Council. On October 18, 2018, the
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s
decision the final determination of the Commissioner. This
action followed.
Plaintiff
was forty-seven years old on the alleged onset of disability
date. (R. 27). She has a high school education and can
communicate in English. (R. 28). Plaintiff has past work
experience as a cashier (including stocking shelves) and as a
retail manager (trainee). (R. 27). Plaintiff’s complete
medical history is set forth in the Joint Stipulation of
Facts filed by the parties. [Doc. # 13-1]. The Court adopts
this stipulation and incorporates it by reference herein.
b.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ
followed the sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act.
At Step
One, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since May 1, 2013. (R. 18). At Step Two, the
ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
obesity, osteoarthritis, affective disorder, anxiety
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (R. 18). At
Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments. (R. 20-22). Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
retains the following residual functional
capacity[3]:
to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b)
except: The claimant can frequently balance; occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally climb ramps and
stairs; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can perform
occasional overhead reaching with the right upper extremity
(the dominant side); must avoid concentrated exposure to
extreme heat and humidity; must avoid direct exposure to
unprotected heights; can perform simple, routine tasks
involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple
work related ...